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Abstract

The fast paced work environment that exists today requires organizations to adapt
quickly in order to sustain high performance. Research suggests that the use of highperformance work practices (HPWPs) in human resource management is a possible way
to increase performance. As the United States Air Force continues to face decreasing
budgets, possible fixes such as the use of HPWPs may be considered. This research used
a phenomenological approach to collect data from civil engineer controllers throughout
the Air Force about their experiences and perceptions. The purpose of the study was to
investigate whether current human resource practices are potentially contributing to the
perceptions of controllers. The results were analyzed and coded into overall themes.
These collected data were compared to models of HPWPs to identify which practices
could be altered to possibly increase performance. There were five key findings from
this research. Controllers felt that there were too few senior leaders in the career field,
there was an unawareness of their role by other squadron members, there was
inconsistent employment and recognition of controllers, they needed advanced training,
and there was a lack of standardized guidance.
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HIGH-PERFORMANCE WORK PRACTICES:
A CASE STUDY USING THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL APPROACH

I. Introduction

The accelerated pace of the modern work environment demands that
organizations maximize their outputs by developing robust, flexible work structures.
Employee management is just one of the many factors that can contribute to such a
structure. In the recent past, organizations have shifted their focus to human resource
management (HRM) in search of changes that could boost performance. It can be easily
surmised that in order for an organization to realize its full potential, it is necessary for all
members of the organization to operate at their highest efficiency. Numerous studies
have suggested that the extra efficiency organizations seek can be found in the
implementation of high-performance work practices. Though every organization must
manage employees in some manner, research suggests that the use of these more involved
practices may provide the increase in performance for which organizations are searching.

Background
HRM has been thoroughly investigated in search of ideas that organizations can
use to increase performance. There is a common belief among both researchers and
practitioners that individual performance can be positively affected by HRM practices.
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By focusing on the management of individuals, gains in overall organizational
performance are expected. Research suggests that the use of strategic, involved practices,
know as high-performance work practices (HPWPs), do in fact lead to increases in
organizational performance. Specifically, studies have shown a positive relationship
between HPWPs and various performance measures. For example, HPWPs can be used
to lower employee turnover (Sheridan, 1992). Additionally, productivity was increased
by the use of HPWPs that emphasized training (Russell et al., 1985). Finally, Cascio
(1991) and Paul and Anantharaman (2003) demonstrated the connection between HPWPs
and the overall financial performance of organizations.
In other work, Huselid (1995) suggested that three processes of employee
behavior were affected by different HPWPs. The three processes are: increasing the
knowledge, skills, and abilities (KSAs) of the worker, motivating workers to use KSAs,
and empowering them to do so. A later study gathered data from prior HRM research
and isolated 10 HPWPs that most affected organizational performance (Liu et al., 2007).
These practices were found to affect overall performance more when implemented as a
system rather than as individual initiatives (Combs et al., 2006). Practices included
training, selection, grievance procedures, employment security, and others. From this
information, it can be assumed that an organization should at least consider the use of
HPWPs to increase overall performance and maximize efficiency.
The United States Air Force is in a position where it too is looking for possible
ideas that can enhance performance. The sustained war efforts of Operation Iraqi
Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom have taken a significant toll on the United
States military forces. These two engagements have been costly in terms of both money
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and manpower (Belasco, 2011). In addition to the ongoing conflicts, the Department of
Defense is facing severe budget cuts. These cuts are a result of the government’s desire
to reduce the national debt accumulation. In response, the Air Force is expected to cut
$33 billion in annual costs (Byers, 2011).
Along with funding, reductions in manpower have been proposed to address the
budget pressures. In doing so, the Air Force aims to “right size” the force so that only
essential personnel are retained (Byers, 2011). Each career field in the Air Force has
subsequently been prompted to evaluate its current practices and provide leaders with
possible solutions to save money and manpower. In 2007, Civil Engineer (CE) leaders
responded to the increasing budget crisis by releasing a plan, termed “CE
Transformation,” to meet the “20/20 by 2020” goal of offsetting the 20% reduction in
funds available for installation support activities and reducing the amount spent on the
current physical plant by 20% by the year 2020 (Moriarty, 2007). The belief was that the
Air Force could save money if it used better business processes to manage its physical
infrastructure, learned best practices from industry, and utilized off-the-shelf technology
for its databases (Culver, 2007). There were also manpower reviews conducted to ensure
that personnel levels were adequate for the missions they were charged with carrying out.
One of the main points of the CE Transformation plan is the adoption of an asset
management approach. Asset management is the term coined for the process of using all
available resources in the most efficient way possible. Major General (retired) Del
Eulberg (2007), former Civil Engineer of the Air Force, defined asset management as
using systematic and integrated processes to manage natural and built assets and their
associated performance, risk, and expenditures over their life cycles to support missions
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and organizational goals. In an address to the CE community, he stated, “We’ve initiated
one of the most significant paradigm shifts in civil engineering’s recent history.” Other
Air Force leadership has agreed that a more “business-minded” approach must be used.
This approach requires a deliberate assessment of risks, costs, and benefits to provide a
common level of service across the Air Force (Lawrence, 2007).
Since the asset management model is a data dependent system, the quality of the
data used, on which these “business-minded” decisions are based, may be a source of
concern. Data must be collected on what is owned, what it is worth, and what is the
expected life-cycle. Vanier (2001) suggested that answering these questions was
essential to implementing asset management. In addition, he looked at what decisions
can be made with the existing data, but failed to look at the data collection itself and the
problems associated with it. Errant or incomplete data hinders the decision-making
process, regardless of the number of creative and innovative decision tools that are
created. Furthermore, the implementation of asset management is a socio-technical
process. As part of a study of the British coal industry, the Tavistock Institute found that
during a landmark change in processes, “the goal must always be the joint optimization
of the social and technical systems” (Mumford, 1994).
The underlying assumption in the initiatives enacted to meet budget pressures is
that the personnel employed are performing their jobs as intended. It is assumed that they
are properly trained and can accomplish the work necessary to support the initiatives.
This implies strong career field management along with leadership support regarding
inputs into the decision-making process and resources for training and development. If
performance is not at the level desired, one could argue that the implementation of
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HPWPs would be an appropriate endeavor. This could address any shortcomings in
training, motivation, and other areas.
The personnel responsible for a large amount of the data that asset management
depends on are known as controllers. Their jobs include communicating with the
customers, planning work, and maintaining the systems that document work, inventory,
and schedules. Upon closer examination of the controller functions though, many issues
that HPWPs claim to address are present and may be causing unforeseen performance
problems. For example, senior members of the controller, or operations management,
career field attending a CE Superintendent’s course voiced concerns about the void of
advanced training, feelings of not being part of the team, retention, deployments, and
manning (McDowell, 2011). These issues hint at systemic failures, or perceptions of
failure, in HRM within the controller career field.

Problem Statement
Initial indications from leaders in operations management suggest that there is a
perception that the career field may have systemic problems that directly affect its ability
to conduct its assigned mission. These problems relate to the three processes that
HPWPs claim to aid: increasing the KSAs of the worker, motivating workers to use the
KSAs, and empowering them to do so. The operations management career field may
benefit from an investigation to determine which HPWPs are used and which could be
implemented to address the observed problems. If these problems are not corrected, they
may result in a loss of performance.
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Research Question
Based on the concerns expressed about HRM practices within the controller
career field, the primary objective of this research was to answer the following question:
Are current human resource practices potentially contributing to the perceptions of
controllers? To address this question, the following investigative questions were
explored to focus on specific areas:
•

Do controllers feel they possess the KSAs needed to perform their jobs well?

•

Are controllers motivated to perform?

•

How are interpersonal relationships between controllers and other engineers
affecting job performance?

•

Do controllers believe they have the necessary representation among decisionmakers?

•

Do controllers perceive the product they produce is reliable?

Methodology
A qualitative approach, based on the phenomenological method, was used to
examine the controllers’ perceived reality. The desired information was collected
through semi-structured interviews. The exploratory nature of these interviews allowed
the subjects to answer however they desired and allowed them to introduce additional
topics. After each interview, the questions for the next interview were altered by constant
comparison to further explore areas identified in prior sessions. Interviews ceased once
the collected data reached a point where no new information was produced known as
theoretical saturation. Interviews were transcribed semi-verbatim and analyzed by
coding. Once the data were distilled into a small number of theoretical codes, they were
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summarized and presented; secondary data sources were sometimes used to further
clarify results.

Assumptions and Limitations
Two main assumptions impacted this research. First, it was assumed that there
was truth to the perceptions described. Although some of the results are reinforced by
secondary sources, a majority of the issues that were uncovered are based solely on the
recurring perceptions of the subjects interviewed. These perceptions were viewed as
likely realities since they were confirmed by multiple interviews. The second assumption
was that increased performance of operations managers will translate into successful
performance of asset management as it applies to overall CE and Air Force goals.
This study is limited to responses from controllers. Although a few noncontroller members of CE were contacted as secondary sources, the study focuses on the
perceptions of controllers alone. Similar problems may exist in the production control
elements of other groups such as communications or maintenance, though the
consequences of mismanaging a specific group of workers may not have the same effect
in different industries.

Implications
Problems identified in this study can be communicated to leaders in the career
field and the CE community as a whole. The awareness of these problems may prompt
leadership to focus on investigating relevant areas more closely and introduce changes
that may increase performance. Although the issues revealed may apply specifically to
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controllers, the underlying HRM relationships and the results of this study may bring to
light the challenges that many small groups within larger organizations face when the use
of HPWPs is marginal or absent. It may also prompt leaders to closely examine groups
within their organizations that they are not as familiar with to see if similar issues are
present.

Overview
The next chapter contains relevant literature that details the use of HPWPs and
explains the career field studied. Chapter III contains an explanation for the methodology
selected as well as a description of how the data was collected and analyzed. Chapter IV
is a hybrid of results and additional literature. At times, a topic is framed using relevant
literature so that the comments of the interviewees are displayed in the proper context.
The chapter concludes with a discussion on how the results relate to a previously
established HRM models. The final chapter contains conclusions from the study.
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II. Literature Review

The following literature review provides further information about two areas
pertinent to this research. The first section looks at high-performance work practices
(HPWPs) and explains the beginning of their use, what they include, and how they affect
performance. The next section provides a needed explanation of the career field that this
study focuses on. The job description, as described by the United States Air Force is
included as well as a comparison to a similar civilian job. These two areas are critical to
understanding the context of this study.

High-Performance Work Practices
This section consolidates the work of numerous researchers in the field of human
resource management (HRM). Specifically, it looks at a number of practices that have
been termed “high-performance” to show the utility of such practices in an organization.
The section concludes with one of many models that neatly organizes the most effective
HPWPs.

Genesis of HPWPs
Human resource management refers to the actions of an organization that focus
on the employee rather than the product or service they provide. The growing literature
base includes many different studies that look at the relationships between the
characteristics of employees and the performance of the organization (Guthrie, 2001).
These studies hope to provide justification for the necessity of HRM. The goal of HRM
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is to remove any roadblocks being faced by an employee to facilitate their productivity
(Liu et al., 2007).
Near the beginning of the 20th century, management leaders such as Frederick
Taylor championed the idea that managers should hold all the power in a company and
treat workers as interchangeable parts. When this philosophy met fierce criticism, the
idea of HRM was born (Cappelli & Neumark, 1999). It took many years for
organizations to fully embrace the concept of HRM. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, a
shift was seen by organizations to focus more on HRM. Many companies renamed their
“personnel” departments to “human resource” departments, emphasizing the fact that
workers were viewed as assets as opposed to pieces of a machine (Liu et al., 2007).
In the 1990s, management researchers began to identify certain HRM practices
that they believed organizations should implement to provide a competitive advantage.
The thought was that a system of practices providing workers with skills, information,
and motivation would become invaluable to an organization’s success (Guthrie, 2001).
These practices have been referred to in a number of ways, from “high performance”
(Huselid, 1995) to “high involvement” (Lawler, 1992) to “high commitment” (Arthur,
1994). Pil and MacDuffie (1996) believe that referring to these practices as “high
performance” is a mistake because it implies that the practices undoubtedly translate to
increased performance, a belief that they do not support. Although there are debates
about the appropriateness of such titles, the concept behind each term is similar. The
phrase “high performance work practices” (or HPWPs) is used throughout this document
because the focus is on the model developed from Huselid’s (1995) work.
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Benefits of HPWPs
The growing intensity of international competition has forced many organizations
to explore HPWPs in search of an edge over their challengers (Pil & MacDuffie, 1996).
The question that they want answered is whether or not implementing HPWPs will
actually increase performance at some level. The majority of the literature indicates that
there is a connection between HPWPs and performance.
A study conducted by Huselid (1995) found that there was consistent evidence
that effective use of HPWPs directly contributed to organizational performance. Some of
the practices linked with performance were extensive recruitment, selection, training,
information sharing, attitude assessment, job design, grievance procedures, participation
programs, appraisals, promotions, and incentives. The study crossed several industries
and organizations of different sizes. Repeatedly, he showed a connection between these
practices and performance measures such as lower employee turnover, greater
productivity, and corporate financial performance.
Another study found that the key to the effectiveness of such practices is that the
ideas and motivations of employees must be tapped into to increase productivity.
Without the use of HPWPs, employees might withhold effort and compliance either due
to an inability or indifference to act (Cappelli & Neumark, 1999). Research by Russell et
al. (1985) showed that an emphasis on training was key to overall success. Others also
demonstrated the connection between effective HRM and performance (Liu et al., 2007).
Vandenberg et al (1999) studied the path from HPWPs to performance by way of
morale. By increasing employee involvement, increases in organizational performance
were shown as well as an indirect influence though employee morale. The study
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measured levels of morale within multiple organizations and saw increases in connection
with HPWPs. It was expected that the increased morale would lead to overall increases
in organizational performance. This assumption was supported by performance
measures. Stronger morale resulted in improved organizational-level performance
evidenced by lower turnover, higher productivity, and higher financial performance
(Vandenberg et al., 1999).
The positive results often result in opponents suggesting various sources of bias,
thereby dismissing their impact. Cautious of the wide applicability of such studies,
Cappelli and Neumark (1999) agree that studies within a single industry may yield usable
results. They believe that performance measures within industries are “less contaminated
by extraneous factors, hence more accurately measure true performance differences
across firms.” In contrast, others have shown evidence that the HPWP-performance
relationship is not affected by the researcher’s choice of organizational performance
measures (Combs et al., 2006). Instead, there is a meaningful relationship between the
use of HPWPs and a variety of performance measures (Liu et al., 2007).

Costs of Implementation
Though HPWPs have been shown to increase organizational performance, some
groups may not find it advantageous to implement such practices due to the initial
implementation costs. To effectively use HPWPs, the group must embrace the
philosophy of commitment and involvement of the employees. Vandenberg et al. (1999)
state that an abundance of corporate policies and good intentions from the company
leadership means nothing if the employees do not feel they are a crucial piece of the
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overall success. The perception among employees must be one of significance of the
individual. Therefore, the necessary steps to develop a culture of involvement must be
taken, which is not without cost.
To start using HPWPs, an organization must transform into an employee-centered
group. This investment is risky because it places power at lower levels than traditionally
done. The decision-making authority must be dispersed to the necessary levels (Guthrie,
2001). The company must then manage this stretch of power though a robust HR
department (Lawler, 1992). Rather than separating thought processes from work
processes, the company must rely on the tacit knowledge of the employees (Guthrie,
2001).
Pil and MacDuffie (1996) noted the possible levels of performance that may be
observed once HPWPs are implemented. By introducing practices that require more out
of employees, change areas of emphasis, and stray from familiar procedures, performance
will likely fall at first, costing the organization the productivity it had before the changes
were implemented. Once the practices take hold, it is implied that performance will
reach higher levels than if no practices were introduced or if some HPWPs were slowly
introduced. This relationship is shown in Figure 1.
The initial effects may discourage some managers due to the loss in efficiency
that initially occurs. For managers who are judged on short-term financial gains, HPWPs
hurt their immediate bottom lines. Another reason that HPWPs may not be adopted is if
the organization does not have time to realize the benefits. For these reasons, introducing
a bundle of HPWPs may not be feasible (Pil & MacDuffie, 1996). Conversely, in the
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wake of a large operational disruption, some companies may find it easier to start a new
HPWP campaign.

Figure 1: Effect of Practice Changes in Performance over Time (Pil & MacDuffie, 1996)

On the other hand, there are ample arguments that an organization cannot afford
not to implement HPWPs. As mentioned earlier, performance measures for most of the
research on this topic included turnover, productivity, and financial gains; in fact, a
majority of the studies used turnover as the main indicator of performance. Therefore, an
HRM strategy that strives to improve performance must minimize turnover (Sheridan,
1992). This assumption was made because of its apparent connection to productivity and
finances.
Guthrie (2001) proposes that there is a high investment in employees for
companies that use HPWPs. By using these practices, the uniqueness of the employee
grows. They become more productive the longer they stay employed. Therefore, when
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an employee does leave, the impact of their departure is stronger in organizations that use
HPWPs. On the contrary, turnover affects companies less when HPWP usage is low.
The connection between HPWPs, turnover, and realized costs was made by
Sheridan (1992). He demonstrated that companies focusing on HPWPs retain employees
longer. His study showed that professionals hired by firms emphasizing interpersonal
relationships (a core tenet of the HPWP philosophy) stayed with their original employers
14 months longer than those at firms emphasizing work task values. The cost to replace
an employee is significant. Total costs include separation costs, replacement costs, and
training costs for the new employee (Cascio, 1991). Considering the extra 14 months of
employment that were lost, it was estimated that $6-9 million dollars were spent on
turnover by the companies not using HPWPs.
There are arguments that the performance increases realized by using HPWPs are
offset by the cost of implementing them. The increased productivity of workers is not
seen because labor costs increase simultaneously in order to pay for HRM (Cappelli &
Neumark, 1999). However, individual improvement was noted in many of the studies. It
could be concluded that HPWPs are worth implementing as it poses no direct costs to
employers while possibly elevating individual well-being.

System versus Individual
The overwhelming takeaway from most of the research on HPWPs is that they are
best used as a system rather than individually. This idea was supported by two different
views. First, no single practice had enough power to significantly contribute to
organizational performance (Lawler, 1992). However, there was clear evidence that
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HPWP systems have a greater effect than individual practices (Combs et al., 2006). The
interactions of the different practices seemed to provide a sort of synergy when
implemented simultaneously (Pil & MacDuffie, 1996). Secondly, the research could not
pinpoint a singular practice as the most useful (Vandenberg et al., 1999). Some practices
were seen as ideal, yet yielded poor returns when applied alone or complemented with
the wrong combination of other practices such as information sharing (Combs et al.,
2006).
Paul and Anantharaman (2003) could not find a single practice that was linked
directly to performance and demonstrated the means by which HPWPs act directly and
indirectly as a system. They first hypothesized that some HPWPs would directly affect
financial performance, while others would indirectly affect it through intervening
variables and operating performance measures. Their hypothesized model is shown in
Figure 2.
After conducting their study, they presented a second model showing the
observed relationships shown in Figure 3. The numbers in the figure represent the
correlation between each item. The most significant finding was that none of the HPWPs
had a direct affect on financial performance. This supported many similar claims made
by other researchers. The results also showed that the combination of the different
practices did indeed lead to increases in overall financial performance. It was noted that
even in the absence of a direct relationship, some practices were considered significant
players in performance and should not be mistakenly overlooked (Paul & Anantharaman,
2003).
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Figure 2: Hypothesized Model of HRM-Performance Relationships (Paul &
Anantharaman, 2003)

Figure 3: Observed HRM-Performance Relationships (Paul & Anantharaman, 2003)
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Similar conclusions were presented by Combs et al. (2006), who suggested a
conceptual model showing the relationships between individual HPWPs, HPWP systems,
and organizational performance. They believed that the system would have a greater
influence on performance as opposed to individual practices. They also hypothesized
that the degree of influence would be moderated by the organizational strategy that the
HPWPs were a part of, the industrial context of the organization, and the design of the
research, specifically the measures used to describe performance. Their results
confirmed that a systems approach was the most effective. They also found that the type
of industry impacted effectiveness and that the results were consistent regardless of the
measure used to determine performance.

Effective HPWP Model
Research on HPWPs often include models that explain how individual practices,
moderating factors, and organizational performance measures are related. Two models
resulting from one particular study stood out as inclusive of the main ideas shared
throughout the literature. The first model was developed by Liu et al. (2007) based on
the research of Huselid (1995). The model categorizes prevalent individual practices into
three groups based on the process they enhance. These three processes are increasing
knowledge, skills, and abilities (KSAs); motivating employees to leverage their KSAs for
organizational benefit; and empowering them to do so (Combs et al., 2006). Along with
contributions to the three processes described, HPWPs improve the social environment
by promoting communication and aligning employees towards common goals. Each
process is described in more detail in the following paragraphs.
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The first process is increasing the KSAs of workers. Although this is
accomplished by a number of practices, it starts with recruiting. Certain skills or
attributes can be sought when hiring employees (Huselid, 1995). Personality traits may
be considered in order to get employees that fit well within the company. Once hired,
robust training programs are employed to provide workers with any needed skills.
Training may take the form of classes, on-the-job training, or focused mentorship.
The second process is motivating employees to use their KSAs. Such motivation
may be derived from incentive programs linked to performance appraisals. Incentives
can range from monetary bonuses to priority in job selection. Promotions are also used to
motivate employees by promising more responsibility and greater compensation. These
practices are necessary because employees must desire to use their KSAs (Combs et al.,
2006). If they do not, the company stands to lose money in the investments they make in
training.
The last process is empowering employees to use their KSAs. Even if an
employee wants to do well and has the ability to do so, he or she still must be supported
by management and allowed to perform. The HRM practices in place must facilitate
such actions (Vandenberg et al., 1999). Practices that can aid in this process are
participation programs where employees play a role in decision-making and flex-time
options so workers can decide how to best use their time (Huselid, 1995). By pushing
decision-making to lower levels, the needs of employees for responsibility,
independence, and autonomy may be met (Vandenberg et al., 1999).
The three processes described above resemble ideas suggested by other
researchers. Likert once listed training, motivation, decision making, communication,
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and control as causal variables of organizational performance (Russell et al., 1985).
Vandenberg et al. (1999) refer to these processes as the PIRK attributes. The first is the
power to act and make decisions. The next is information, which can range from reviews
to feedback to performance reports. The third attribute is rewards which may be related
to individual or team performance. The last attribute is knowledge which encompasses
the KSAs described earlier. If these four attributes are present throughout an
organization, HPWPs have been successfully implemented.
After considering the three processes suggested by Huselid (1995), Liu et al.
(2007) sought to determine which HPWPs significantly affected organizational
performance and which process they enhanced. HPWPs prevalent in the literature were
compared and the top practices were presented. The resulting model is shown in Figure
4. The top 10 HPWPs are (in order of greatest impact): HRM planning, compensation
level, incentive compensation, training, internal promotion, employment security,
participation, selectivity, grievance procedures, and flex-time (Liu et al., 2007). Teams,
information sharing, and appraisals were also considered but were eventually left out of
the model because of weak connections to performance. As stated previously, each
HPWP is grouped with the process that it most enhances.
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Figure 4: Top HPWPs Organized by Process Enhanced (Liu et al., 2007)

The second model developed by Liu et al. (2007) shows three factors that impact
the effectiveness of the HPWPs, as shown in Figure 5. They include vertical alignment,
horizontal alignment, and work context. Vertical alignment refers to the integration of
selected HPWPs with the strategy of the organization. This is where the HRM planning
shown in the middle of Figure 4 is applied. Careful planning from leaders must be
present to align the appropriate HPWPs with the goals of the organization. Horizontal
alignment refers to the care that must be taken to ensure that each HPWP complements
the others. If HPWPs are implemented without considering the interactions, poor
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performance may result. One example of this could be individual incentives used within
a team structure. These contradicting practices may hurt each other. Finally, the third
factor is work context. This factor acknowledges that not all HPWPs are suited for every
industry. Certain HPWPs benefit the manufacturing industry while others may better fit
service industries. The important takeaway is that HPWPs must be carefully considered
before blind implementation.

Figure 5: Factors that Impact Effectiveness of HPWPs (Liu et al., 2007)

HPWP Summary
The literature shows an increasing amount of research on human resource
management. This indicates that organizations are interested in the benefits that may be
possible if HRM tools are used. Numerous studies have demonstrated that there is a
positive connection between HPWPs and organizational performance. Although no
single practice is effective in isolation, a system of HPWPs can increase overall
performance. Finally, a model is suggested that summarizes these conclusions and offers
the top HPWPs that should be considered.
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What is the Job of a Controller?
Before any discussion of issues facing the operations management career field, it
is important to understand the job that controllers are assigned to accomplish. Further
discussions are easier to understand when referenced from this baseline. Operations
managers, Air Force Specialty Code 3E6, are members of the Operations Flight within a
civil engineer (CE) squadron. They are referred to as “ops managers,” “controllers,”
“triple nickels” as a tribute to their previous career field code of 555, or simply just
“ops.” From this point forward, the term controllers will be used. Controllers are a
unique group to study because of the fundamental difference between them and the other
members of the Operations Flight. Whereas most members in the flight work outside
with their hands, controllers’ jobs are primarily indoors and clerical in nature.
The intended career path for controllers is outlined in the 3E6 Career Field
Education and Training Plan (CFETP). The plan is developed by the career field
manager at the Air Force Civil Engineering Support Agency along with inputs from the
3E6 Major Command program managers and the Air Education and Training Command
staff of the technical school at Sheppard Air Force Base. The CFETP serves as a
guideline for frontline supervisors, enlisted personnel supervisors, and program managers
to ensure that the career paths of their airmen are correct and equitable. It also serves as
reference for training expenditures (Department of the Air Force, 2011b).

Job Description
The operations management career field is unique in many ways. It is one of the
few career fields in a CE squadron where planning, funding, and execution converge.
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Because of this, controllers must be aware of how each of these areas operates. The
career field is also unique because it positions a clerical job within a “blue collar” flight.
Even authorized positions are assigned differently. While most manning is based on
assets such as total square feet of floor space or number of facilities, squadrons are
assigned four controller positions regardless of the size of the organization (Department
of the Air Force, 2000).
The operations management shop is where work starts and finishes. Whether it is
a request from a customer on base or an internal request from another flight, the request
is formalized by the controllers so that all work can be accounted for. From there, the
work request is passed to the proper shop for completion. All along the way, controllers
track the job’s progress, provide materials, and ensure that the right work is completed.
The following sections outline the three major areas of responsibility for the 3E6 career
field.

Work Management
The largest part of a controller’s job is to manage the work of the Operations
Flight. “Management” does not imply that the controller is making decisions on what
work to accomplish. This decision resides at the flight level and in the respective shops.
What it means is that the controllers know the work being done, the shop doing the work,
the schedule and required materials, and the plan for completion.
At the initiation of a work request, a controller enters the data into the Interim
Work Information Management System (IWIMS). The data entered include request
description, shop assigned, date of request, and requesting party. Each shop then
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accesses IWIMS to see the requests they have been assigned. At times, the request will
not be immediately scheduled to the shops. Instead, the controllers will gather such
requests and present them to the Work Request Review Board (WRRB), a meeting
chaired by the Operations Flight Chief but conducted by controllers, for filtering and
prioritization.
The controllers are responsible for conducting sanity checks during each step of
the process. First, they must make sure that the proper money codes correspond to the
correct type of work accomplished. They must also monitor the progress of the work to
identify any irregularities. From the vantage point of their office, they are perfectly
situated to observe trends in work and areas that may present problems. These concerns
can then be forwarded to the flight chief. As a final task, controllers manage the priority
list as dictated by flight and squadron leaders so that all efforts are focused on the proper
jobs.
A second important meeting often conducted by controllers is the weekly
scheduler’s meeting. This is not prescribed in the CFETP but has become a regular
activity at most bases. This meeting includes all shop leads, superintendents, and flight
leaders. At this meeting, controllers present reports that show where the work of last
week was performed and what the plan is for the near future. Other reports include
percentage of hours dedicated to different activities and special interest jobs that need the
attention of the flight chief. Information on costs, reimbursements, and materials may
also be presented in this forum.
Because the controllers are trained on a data management system in their
introductory school, they become the flight experts by default. They can provide
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assistance to shop representatives in order to help them enter their work plans and
progress. Controllers should be proficient in IWIMS and Automated Civil Engineer
System usage and able to train other members of the squadron. Additionally, controllers
are expected to work as supply officers, a job previously performed by airmen from the
Logistics Readiness Squadron who were assigned to the CE squadron. This duty requires
competency using the Civil Engineer Material Acquisition System to order construction
materials. Job tasks include ordering, tracking shipments, receiving product, and
inventorying material stocks.

Customer Interface
An important and often overlooked aspect of a controller’s job is interaction with
customers. A controller is the face of CE for many people on base. A controller’s core
task is receiving work requests. Request reception is completed both in person and over
the phone. It is for this reason that communication skills, language, and interpersonal
skills are valued qualities for a controller. Controllers must be able to respond
professionally to any customer, regardless of whether the requestor is confrontational or
not. Due to the inconveniences possible when a system malfunctions, such as a broken
air conditioner in the summer, requestors may often be in an agitated state when making
contact. Controllers are also responsible for conducting customer satisfaction surveys.
A controller must maintain a level of technical competency in order to recognize
and interpret information pertaining to construction and maintenance projects. Upon
request, a controller must determine if the work fits the criteria to be directly scheduled or
whether it should be presented at the WRRB. Familiarity with the capabilities of each
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shop will allow the controller to forward only requests that can completed and table those
that need further investigation.
As representatives of the squadron, controllers also manage the facility manager
program. Each building on base is assigned a facility manager. This person belongs to
the organization that occupies the building. Whenever there is a problem, members of
that organization contact the facility manager and then the facility manager forwards the
request to the CE squadron. In most cases, this person is not a civil engineer. Controllers
are responsible for training the facility managers on the work request process and
maintaining the database of facility managers assigned to each building.

Emergency Operations
The final aspect of a controller’s job is their role during emergencies and
deployments. Controllers maintain and operate the Unit Control Center (UCC) during
contingency operations. Duties in the UCC include maintaining team statuses and
accountability for the flight. Additionally, maps of damage, unexploded ordinances
locations, and alternate airfield location options are displayed and updated. Members
may also serve as representatives of the squadron in the Emergency Operation Center if
so appointed by the squadron commander.
While deployed, a controller should expect to do similar tasks as performed at
home station. One noticeable addition is performing quality assurance on contracts. This
job includes writing statements of work, performing inspections, and determining job
completion. A controller may be the interface between the Air Force and the host nation
while discussing requirements, purchase agreements, and contracts.
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Civilian Job Comparison
The civilian job that most closely resembles that of a controller is a Production
Control or Planning and Expediting Clerk. According to an online job database (O*NET,
2010), the clerk is responsible for reviewing and distributing schedules, working with
shop supervisors to determine progress of work and completion dates, and compiling
reports on progress, inventory, associated costs, and problems. For entry into this career
field, a high school diploma is usually sufficient. Most clerks learn their trade by doing
routine tasks under direct supervision (U.S. Department of Labor, 2010). Of the traits
required, the most important are oral and written communication, computer skills, and
knowledge of production processes.
There are many reasons why their jobs are important. One of the key benefits of
employing a production clerk is the ability they possess to identify problem areas through
the reports produced (Kelchner, 2011). The clerk also helps the craftsmen work more
smoothly by managing inventories and schedules in order to maximize efficiency. These
are the same benefits that are desired in a civil engineer squadron. A key point of interest
is that the civilian job descriptions all contain the requirement that the clerk be able to
manage inventories. This is a new job for controllers in the Air Force, but it essentially
aligns their career field with that of their civilian counterparts.

Summary of Literature
The information provided in this chapter helps frame the problem by providing a
background on HPWPs, including two models that this research uses as reference points.
It also includes a job description for controllers as prescribed by the Air Force. The
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results that follow can be compared against the details explained. The following chapter
explains the choice of methodology used and explains how the research was conducted.
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III. Methodology

This research used phenomenological life interviews along with numerous
secondary sources to gather the desired information. Kvale and Brinkmann (2009) define
phenomenology as “a term that points to interest in understanding social phenomenon
from the actor’s perspective and describing the world as experienced by the subjects, with
the assumption that the important reality is what people perceive it to be.” By using an
exploratory structure, the interviewees determine the path of questioning. This chapter
first explains the decision to use interviews. It is then followed by the structure used to
perform the interviews. Last, an explanation of how the data were analyzed is provided.

Why Use Interviews?
The method chosen in any research must align with the desired outcome. Locke
(1989) asserts that the adequacy of a method depends on what the question is.

A

qualitative approach was chosen because of the emphasis on relationships as opposed to
well-defined problems. Supporters of qualitative methods believe that there are
fundamental differences between the two problem types. The main difference between
social and natural sciences is that the subjects in social sciences can talk and think
(Seidman, 2006).
In the case of this research, there are obvious issues within a target group,
though the details of each problem are not necessarily apparent. From the initial Air
Force Institute of Technology study, the identified problems center around the absence of
many high-performance work practices (HPWPs). Having preconceptions before
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interviewing subjects is incongruent with the stance of phenomenological purists who
believe there should be no hypotheses present initially (Husserl, 1962). It is suggested
that some situations can only be studied through understanding the events experienced
which undoubtedly relies on prior assumptions (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009). Therefore,
the interviewer must keep the discussions focused without excessively influencing the
conversations (Lester, 1999).
Interviews have been used for a long time. Socrates used them often, though
using them as research is a relatively new occurrence (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009). Kvale
and Brinkmann (2009) note that Feyeraband argues in Against Method that the rules of
research were meant to be broken and that if they were not, many past discoveries may
not have been made. This suggests that lesser known methods should not be immediately
discarded, but rather judged on their own merit. The aim of a qualitative interview is to
discover the interviewee’s framework of meanings (Britten, 1995). Life interviews are
intended to understand the lived experience of others rather than testing hypotheses
(Seidman, 2006). Interviewing goes beyond back and forth conversation. Rather, it
becomes an approach to obtaining knowledge through careful questioning and listening
(Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009).
At times, there are methods that are more appropriate than interviews. If the
questions do not need explanations and a hypothesis is already developed, a survey may
be a better fit. Likewise, a period of personal observation may be more appropriate for
certain studies. As with any method, certain limitations exist. Not all institutions
consider qualitative research as valuable as quantitative. Other common hindrances
include the time it takes to conduct and transcribe numerous interviews as well as finding
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and making contact with the right subjects. Lastly, phenomenological interviews allow
deep issues to rise to the surface and provide an avenue for lesser voices to be heard.
Though this may be viewed as a strength, some organizations may reject this method
because of the issues that it would prefer to keep hidden (Lester, 1999).

Interview Procedures
The research approach resembled a modified version of the seven-step model
developed by Kvale and Brinkmann (2009): thematizing, designing, interview situation,
transcription, analysis, verification, and reporting (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009). This
section jumps ahead to designing the interview since the question was framed, or
“thematized” in the previous chapters.
The most important aspect of setting up an interview is understanding the desired
outcome. This allows the questions to elicit the right information and allows for proper
selection of interviewees (Seidman, 2006). This study included responses from members
of the operations management community including career field leaders, instructors, and
airmen currently working within the career field. A list of possible candidates for
participation was provided by the Air Force Civil Engineer Support Agency (AFCESA).
The choice of participants was decided by the researcher to cover a wide variety of
positions. Four ranks were questioned. Eight of the ten major commands of the Air
Force were represented by current or previous assignments of the interviewees. Along
with the experiences for a variety of base-level subjects, Rapid Engineer Deployable
Heavy Operational Repair Squadron Engineers (RED HORSE) squadrons, AFCESA,
Major Command (MAJCOM) staffs, and the Pentagon were represented also. Subjects
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also brought experience from deployments to Afghanistan, Iraq, Kuwait, United Arab
Emirates, Egypt, Kosovo, Oman, and Singapore.
None of the participants were personally or professionally known by the
researcher prior to the study. The number of participants was decided along the way as
determined by the absence of new information during the interview. At that point, the
interviews were stopped because the topic had been considered exhausted or saturated
(Charmaz, 2006). Saturation appeared to occur after eight interviews in this study. The
number of interviews was also guided by a common theme among interview studies that
suggested that it is optimal to have fewer interviews analyzed more closely than an
abundance of interviews (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009). Other researchers agree that eight
to ten subjects are sufficient to reach saturation which supports the number used in this
study (Creswell et al., 2007).
Each participant was initially contacted by phone by the researcher. At this time,
a description of the research questions and the research objective were explained. Each
interviewee agreed to participate based on an understanding that identifying information
would not be used in the final product. Before proceeding further, permission was
requested and received from each subject’s commanding officer. Consent forms were
also distributed and collected with signatures of both the researcher and participant. The
consent forms provided an agreement between the researcher and subjects. The
agreement included statements of voluntary participation, the purpose and procedures of
the research, the risks and possible outcomes from participation, and the channels of
reconciliation for any problems along the way. It also stated that participation could be
terminated by the interviewee at any time and that their comments could be withdrawn.
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The contact information of subjects was kept in a spreadsheet that included phone
numbers of participants and commanders, current duty stations and MAJCOMs, and
interview status: contacted, scheduled, or completed. This spreadsheet also matched
subjects with a single letter identifier that was used through the remainder of the research.
This information was kept on a portable hard drive separate from the computer where the
remainder of the files was stored. These files included transcripts, memos, digital
recordings, and manuscripts. Hard copies of the consent forms were kept in a file at the
researchers’ office. All digital and hard copies were secured at all times.
The interviews lasted between 45 and 60 minutes; each was recorded digitally for
transcription at a later time. Each interview started with generic questions about the rank,
experience, deployment history, and current job of the interviewee to provide the
interviewer with a frame of reference. The questions followed a semi-structured outline
based on previously identified problem areas from the Civil Engineer Superintendent
course at the Air Force Institute of Technology. General questions were developed to
further inquire about areas of concern. Using an open-ended approach, the interviewee
recreated the experience of being a controller in the Air Force. By using an exploratory
approach, the interviewees were able to indentify topics of interest that may not have
been initially recognized as relevant (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009).
The interview returned to the outline when necessary to assure timely completion.
Leading questions were deliberately avoided. Each interview ended with an explanation
of the next steps in the research. After each interview, the questions for the next
interview were altered to further explore areas identified in the prior session. This
technique is described in the following analysis section. The process of altering

34

questions was aided by taking notes during the interviews, also explained later in the
chapter.

Analysis
The analysis of the interview data began during the first interview rather than
after all interviews had been completed. The first step was writing memos during the
interviews. Because memos involve some interpretation, they are the beginning of
analysis rather than data collection (Groenewald, 2004). Memos, or field notes, allowed
the researcher to capture initial impressions and ideas which are often forgotten in the
midst of data collection (Miles & Huberman, 1984). An outline of the questions was
printed out before each interview and used for taking notes. Groenewald (2004) suggests
that four types of notes should be used. The first are observational notes that emphasize
what happened. These were made in line with the text of the outline and underlined to
remind the researcher of the importance of the statement. The next types are theoretical
notes that attempt to explain why things happened. These comments were made in the
right hand margin of the outline as possible ideas to consider later. Caution was
exercised to keep these comments separate from comments provided directly from the
subjects. The third type is methodological notes which are reminders to the researcher.
These comments were recorded in the left hand margin of the outline often noting
possible follow-up questions. The last type is analytical memos that were written later in
the analysis.
The next step was transcription of the interviews from a digital audio file. The
recording was played back at half speed and transcribed semi-verbatim. Semi-verbatim
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implies that exact words were recorded, though pauses, mutters, and fillers were not
captured since speech patterns and linguistics were not the focus of this research. When
dramatic responses occurred, observational memos were made. Each transcript was
reformatted into a chart so that future coding could be clearly organized with each
question and response (Hycner, 1985). The complete transcriptions and codes are
included in the appendices.
After a transcription was completed, the interview was listened to again and
analytical memos were written. These notes contained mostly ideas and theories of the
researcher that were developed from listening to the interview as a whole. Listening to
the interview was an important step at this point as the researcher was preoccupied with
asking questions during the first iteration and typing during the second (Bailey, 2007;
Hycner, 1985). After this step, the questions for the next interview were edited and the
following interview was conducted.
After an interview was transcribed, it was coded. This process has been described
differently by past researchers using varying terminology. Essentially, coding refers to
the grouping of ideas based on similar themes (Seidman, 2006). The first iteration
produced open, or initial, codes which are initial summaries of a response with few
details (Charmaz, 2006). These codes are similar to “units of general meaning” as
described by Hycner (1985) without placing as much emphasis on the original language
used. After providing open codes for a few of the interviews, some main themes began to
emerge. In conjunction with memos developed earlier, selective, or focused, codes were
created to capture the main issues (Charmaz, 2006). This is similar to the “clustering of
meanings” prescribed by Hycner (1985). These ideas were then reinforced by each

36

subsequent interview by using a “constant comparison” of themes (Glaser & Strauss,
1967). An example of these codes is shown in Table 1.

Table 1: Example Coding

Question and Response
You touched on this a little earlier but
we’ll touch on it now a little more in
detail. What are your typical roles while
deployed?
Quality assurance evaluation. Looking at
repair maintenance and sustainability for
facilities on a base. Tactical ops support,
communications, setting up data links
between one point wherever we’re at such
that we’re going forward operating. Some of
things we’ve also been tasked with have been
convoy duties and then damage control.

Open Codes

Selective Codes

Duties include:
QAE
tactical support
computers
convoys and
damage control

Mostly extra
duties outside of
primary job while
deployed

After all interviews were completed and coded, the selective codes were arranged
in a mind-map to show causes, effects, and relationships (Lester, 1999). This map began
on a PowerPoint presentation but grew to the point that it required a large dry-erase board
and multiple post-it notes. As the relationships were mapped, a few groupings emerged,
each with a central theme, or theoretical code. Once the data were distilled into a small
number of theoretical codes, they were summarized in concert with secondary data
sources that provides context for the reader.
The final step was verification. Due to the nature of the method, this step was
actually a part of all the other steps. The most important standard of validity related to
the research was whether or not the research answered the questions it was intended to
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answer. Since this effort was exploratory, all results were considered valid. Ideas from
previous interviews were sometimes offered to other subjects to concur or reject. The
strength of the argument increased as multiple responses centered on the same themes
(Lester, 1999). During the entire process, efforts were made to remain unbiased. Though
reliability was a worthy goal, it could not be sought in exchange for creativity in the
questioning. The prior experience of the researcher also served as a source of reliability.
Some follow-up contacts were made with subjects by telephone and email to clarify
comments and/or validate themes. Lastly, the details of the entire process were described
to provide transparency of the process.
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IV. Results

This chapter describes the insights gained during this research. Using the analysis
explained in Chapter III, the interview results were developed into five broad themes
related to high-performance work practices (HPWPs). A summary of the results is
presented first before describing in more detail each of the themes in separate sections.
At the end of each section, the key insights from within the theme are compared to the
models presented in Chapter II. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the
challenges the military faces in implementing HPWPs.

Summary of Insights
The research question for this study aimed to identify the areas of human resource
management (HRM) that are problematic as seen by controllers. From the many
selective codes that were identified, five theoretical codes or themes emerged as
discussed in Chapter III. Figure 6 displays these top five themes in HRM affecting job
performance. Many of the themes were interrelated in some fashion. The themes are
arranged in no particular order. Problems associated with each theme are listed under
each heading. As previously stated, not all problems stem from one main theme.
However, each problem is arranged under the theme with which it is most closely
associated. The sections that follow look at each theme and the resulting consequences
individually.
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Figure 6: Top Five Themes

Theme #1: Few Senior Leaders in the Career Field
The problem that was often discussed first was the void of senior leadership
within the career field. All interviewees were asked if they believed there were enough
senior leaders in their career field to mentor them and the airmen below them. One
respondent emphatically stated, “No. To say it bluntly, no.” This void of senior
leadership has led to imbalances in manpower and experience.
Different events over the last 20 years and changes in the career field all have had
an effect on this problem; yet one event stands out as a likely contributor to the lack of
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experienced controllers in the top ranks. After the Gulf War in 1992, the Air Force drew
down its forces as part of a “peace dividend.” Many commands faced extreme
reorganizations in order to reduce manpower. For example, Strategic Air Command and
Tactical Air Command were combined into Air Combat Command while Military Airlift
Command transformed into Air Mobility Command. Reorganizations in personnel
followed, and the current nomenclature scheme for career fields emerged. For instance,
the operations management career field went from the designation of 555 to Air Force
Specialty Code (AFSC) 3E6.
Many of the civil engineer (CE) career fields combined in order to reduce
manpower requirements. For instance, exterior and interior electricians were combined
into the same career field. Plumbing, water, and waste water personnel were combined to
form “utilities.” There was a reduction in force across the entire service along with
voluntary separation incentives. For a time, the school pipeline for controllers was
frozen. No new controllers entered the Air Force for a full year. These events were
described by an older controller:
“When they had the early out, they drew down the career field and a lot of
smart 3E6s got out and the knowledge went with them. It was ’95 or ’96
when they basically turned off the pipeline for the career field. You had to
be a prior CE staff sergeant to cross-train into it. So they were bringing
in craftsmen into the lower management levels that had no experience…all
the people that would have been around to teach them were gone…you
had a this void of knowledge.”
Figure 7 shows the number of authorizations each year broken out by skill level (Corpuz,
2011). Each skill level of upgrade requires certain demonstrations of proficiency and
serves as a standardized indicator of an individual’s career progression. Along the way,
the tasks that each level is required to perform increase in complexity and responsibility.
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Airmen enter as a 1-level and quickly move to a 3-level after receiving their initial career
field training. Levels increase until airmen become 9-levels.
Overall, the authorizations were reduced from 1994 to 1996 as described by the
interviewees. To do this, the pipeline of incoming controllers was frozen. Also,
controllers that were 3-levels were cross-trained into other career fields because there
were no authorizations for 5-levels. In 2000, 5-level authorizations were reinstated. To
maintain the achieved levels, the authorizations for incoming airmen were reduced.
Levels continued to shrink until 2008 when the career field reached an all-time low in
manning. It is important to note that the values shown are authorizations and not actual
manpower levels. Critical imbalances in experience emerged due to the changes in
authorizations over this time span. This imbalance is apparent in the manpower numbers
published by the Air Force Personnel Center (AFPC). The following section looks at the
current manpower levels for the career field and offers insight into possible problems.
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Figure 7: Total Authorizations by Skill Level from 1994-2010 (Corpuz, 2011)

Manpower Imbalances
As previously mentioned, manning levels for controllers present a number of
problems. At first glance, the overall percentage of authorizations filled looks as healthy
as any other group. Recent personnel levels show the entire career field manning at 99%
(Department of the Air Force, 2011a). After close examination of the individual rank
breakouts, a few problem areas become apparent. Table 2 shows the percentage of filled
positions of authorized billets by rank.
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Table 2: Percent 3E6 Manning by Rank in 2011 (Department of the Air Force, 2011a)

Rank

Senior
Master
Sergeant

Master
Sergeant

Technical
Sergeant

Staff
Sergeant

Senior
Airman

Airman
First
Class

Grade
Manning

75%

55%

91%

71%

132%

222%

Effective
Grade
Manning

67%

50%

85%

66%

121%

210%

The breakout by ranks shows that every rank is undermanned with the exception
of the lower ranks. The most alarming shortages are at the grade of Master Sergeant
(MSgt), with Senior Master Sergeant (SMSgt) and Staff Sergeant (SSgt) grades at low
levels as well. To compound problems, the lowest rank is more than double the required
size. Essentially, there are far more young airmen that need to be supervised than there
are supervisors available. Three undermanned groups in combination with an
overmanned group cancel each other out in terms of overall manning and provide the
perception that manning is not an issue.
The second set of data shows the “effective” grade manning when deployments
are considered. The first set of data assumes that all filled positions actually have a
person at their home base. The effective manning show the percentage of personnel left
at home while members are deployed. This unavailability of personnel to work at home
further exacerbates the problems present due to low manning. Deployments are
discussed in more detail in a later section.
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The numbers shown in Table 2 show overall manning distribution across the
entire Air Force. However, some bases have one MSgt while others do not. Depending
on the size and mission of a particular unit, two MSgts may even be assigned. This
uneven distribution is a source of irritation to controllers. One interviewee told of how he
got where he was when asked about fairness in distribution:
“Nope, I don’t think they’re distributed around out there where the young
guys can pick their minds. There’s not actually a master sergeant slot
here. I got here on my wife’s orders. There was only a tech sergeant slot
here. There weren’t any 3E6s above staff sergeant when I came, so there
was quite a bit of knowledge gap to be made up.”
Though this snapshot of the current manning levels clearly identifies problems, the
undermanned ranks also affect the future state of the career field. If the number of MSgts
are low, within the next few years, the rank of SMSgt may also be undermanned, since
there will be a reduced pool of members to promote. This same issue may be seen in the
middle ranks as the number of SSgts remains lower than the required level. An opposite
problem may arise when the Airmen First Class (A1C) are due for promotion. There may
not be a need for the number of existing airmen in the next rank. As a result, younger,
inexperienced airmen may likely be placed in jobs left vacant by SSgts. This
repositioning of A1Cs may even out manning levels somewhat, but may potentially
damage the progression of airmen through the prescribed career development. The
essential tasks that SSgts are expected to perform may not be correctly performed by
Senior Airmen (SrA) who are prematurely promoted.
This ripple effect of retention is shown in Figure 8. This information is compiled
by the AFPC staff to demonstrate the effect that current manning levels will have on
future manning. The continuous line represents the number of personnel desired at each
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year of service in order to sustain current requirements. That level decreases naturally
over time as the number of airmen needed at the higher ranks decreases. The problem
areas are those where the current personnel levels are far below the sustainment line.
These shortages may shift to the right each year, growing worse as time continues.
Members may be lost along the way for a number of reasons. Because of this natural
decay in personnel levels, shortfalls already identified will increase as more members
leave. In addition, the members that are accounted for are not always working within the
career field. By employing controllers outside of their core areas of responsibility, the
gap between the number of personnel required to sustain and the actual members
available is larger than depicted.
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Figure 8: Current Personnel and Projected Needs (Department of the Air Force, 2011a)

A few attempts have been made to curb these problems. Retention bonuses have
been offered to members of stressed CE career fields, including 3E6s. By offering such
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“signing” bonuses, the Air Force gains the commitment of an airman for four or six
years. Another effort to increase manning levels is to deny special duty opportunities to
specific ranks. Special duties include the jobs to which all Air Force members contribute,
such as recruiting and instructing. By denying 3E6 SSgts and MSgts the option to work
outside of their primary career field, more personnel will be available to fulfill core CE
duties. Lastly, greater numbers of new accessions are redirected toward the career field
in an effort to resupply the shortages. This practice of increasing entries into the career
field has been successful as seen by the over population of the early ranks. The efforts to
keep mid-level members in the career field are yet to be shown successful.

Lack of Experience
A second problem that stems from the lack of senior controllers is that the
experience usually held by the older ranks has diminished. Table 3 shows problems
similar to those in Table 2. The lower skill levels are more than adequately manned. As
the skill level increases, the number of airmen with the necessary knowledge decreases.

Table 3: 3E6 Manning by Skill Level (Department of the Air Force, 2011a)

Skill Level

1-Level

3-Level

5-Level

7-Level

9-Level

Manning

N/A

290%

71%

68%

58%
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Younger and often inexperienced airmen have been promoted prematurely to fill
the gaps at the top of the rank structure. One controller remembered:
“When I came in, it took forever to make staff and tech. Nowadays it’s
like boom, boom. You can be a staff or tech in a leadership position, but
how much experience did you really get because you got there so quick?
You can be a master with only a few years actually being in charge of
people. What kind of leader are you going to be?”
In response to the undeniable holes in the higher positions, the Air Force decided to
cross-train members of other overmanned AFSCs into operations management. This
decision carries strong concern from senior controllers. An interviewee recalled:
“Right now, tech to master is really hurting as far as manning numbers,
so within a squadron there’s not enough of that leadership. A lot are
being filled by cross-trained tech sergeants from AGE [aerospace ground
equipment] or other career fields…we’re trying to recover since they cut
too much, trying to rebuild those positions.”
Regardless of the competency of a cross-trainee, they must still be certified by a
controller with the necessary qualifications. Since they themselves are serving in the
position normally held by a certifier, some bases’ upgrade programs are at a standstill.
Until an outside certifier is brought in, there is no way for anyone to advance. The
sentiment is best captured by this response:
“Well, only 60% [of bases] will have a master in the shop. It’s just gonna
take a lot of time to grow master sergeants. You can’t just cross-train
them in. You can’t cross-train experience. You gotta let it grow up.”
The cross-training solution has also met problems as manning fluctuates after repeated
“knee jerk” reactions. One supervisor remembered a time where his airman was forced
to cross-train because the airman’s particular year group was too crowded. Once the
paperwork was filed, the airman was given a list of possible career fields into which they
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could cross-train. Operations management was on the list. The airman administratively
cross-trained from being a 3E6 to a 3E6. He recounts, “It made no sense at all.”
The point that held consistent among interviewees was that experience was the
ultimate indicator of success. A respondent surmised that without experience, controllers
were simply “robots rather than people that know their jobs.” A second story of
inexperience was told not of a cross-trainee, but of a controller who worked outside of the
career field for her entire career.
“From 2000 to 2008, she was in a medical logistics job…no access to
IWIMS [interim work information management system], never fired an M16, never had radio training, never went to Silver Flag. She’s currently a
facility manager…Now they send her [here] with no real 3E6
training…folks like that know the books, but don’t know the job.”
Perhaps the most unfortunate impact of inexperience and sparse senior leadership is that
the overall experience of instructors at tech school continues to decrease. This is not the
fault of the instructors. Rather, it is simply a reality. When fewer experienced controllers
are available for duty, younger airmen must step into instructor roles. The lack of
experience is not always apparent. If instructors are unaware of the reasoning behind a
certain process, there is no way for them to pass it along to new trainees. An older
controller explained:
“They’re showing them how to enter data, but they’re not giving them the
fine intricacies of why you enter some things and what the correct data is.
If a trainer explains that, then the airman knows why they’re doing
stuff…Really, it’s left up to whoever is left to do the training. Once we hit
the 18 to 19 year mark, we have a big gap in experience.”
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Non-controller Supervision
To combat the lack of leadership in base-level customer service shops, outside
supervisors are often brought in to provide needed supervision. It is not uncommon for a
non-3E6 MSgt to be the Operations Support element chief, the element where controllers
reside. One controller recounts, “We’ve had three master sergeants in the ops support
superintendent position so far and they keep changing out…a plumber, an electrician,
and a utilities guy.” For common military affairs, this substitution works fairly well.
The issue arises when the outside supervisor is not able to offer any career specific
mentorship. In most cases, the younger airmen are serving in the role of trainer so their
supervisor can understand his/her responsibilities. The problem seems obvious to one
controller who stated:
“With only 50% masters on the books, half of the bases are sitting with a
waste water guy or someone else in control. They’re not giving 3E6
mentorship. If anything, they’re asking the senior airman for a report they
need for the boss. Whether they’re trained or not, they can provide at
least something to that master.”
In a few cases, this creates an uneasy work environment for the most experienced 3E6 in
the shop. It is at times possible that the vision of an outside supervisor contradicts what
their most senior controller believes. When this happens, neither side wins and the
overall productivity of the shop may suffer. A technical sergeant (TSgt) controller
thought:
“You have a lot of tech sergeants put in a position that know their job,
they want to do the right thing...but since we’re so light at master…they
put a craftsman in as NCOIC [non-commissioned officer in charge].
While some can do it, a majority of them don’t know what they’re doing
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and they butt heads with the tech sergeant that knows what needs to be
done but can’t do it.”

Model Comparison
This section compares the results associated with this theme to the Liu et al.
(2007) models provided in Chapter II. Both the major processes and the individual
HPWPs that were discussed in the results are emphasized by bold lettering and a dotted
oval in Figure 9. The main process that this theme reflects is the enhancement of
knowledge, skills, and abilities (KSAs). First, due to the reorganization described at the
beginning of the section, a large portion of the personnel who possessed the necessary
KSAs were let go by the career field. That decision immediately decreased the level of
experience in the career field. After that point, KSAs had to be added back as described
in later sections. The void of senior experience created when the career field was
downsized had a ripple affect. Younger and less experienced airmen were promoted
prematurely without the KSAs that develop from years of experience. The amount of
knowledge that was passed down to each lower level decreased as a result. As shown by
studies discussed in Chapter II, retaining qualified workers directly relates to
performance.
Two of the three HPWPs that affect KSA enhancement were specifically
mentioned by the interviewees: compensation and selection. Compensation was
increased in the form of retention bonuses. Though compensation was not directly
increased, the bonus allowed the Air Force to retain more airmen which is normally the
goal of compensation increases. Additionally, the interviewees mentioned the cross-
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training of other career field members into operations management. By simply leveling
manpower across career fields, the operations management career field lost what ability it
had to select the proper people into the career field.

Figure 9: HPWPs and Processes Discussed in Theme #1

The lack of senior leaders also affected the process of enhancing empowerment.
Particularly, the grievance procedures that controllers have for career-specific issues are
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diminished by not having enough representation at the highest levels. This weak
representation plays a part in a number of problems discussed in later sections. This has
created a number of issues, including the ability to perform well. The following section
looks at the lack of awareness from personnel outside of the career field regarding
operations management.

Theme #2: Unawareness of Role
The second main theme deals with unawareness of the operations management
career field role. This unawareness was observed by interviewees throughout the flight
and the squadron. The degree that interviewees felt it affected “feeling like a team”
varied widely. Some saw it as a hindrance while others felt it provided an opportunity to
educate others. The following sections show different views of the problem.

Not Part of the Team
Many respondents agreed, “…people don’t take us seriously.” They felt that it
was ignorance rather than harsh feelings from the other shops. Subjects were asked if
they felt like part of the team. One replied, “Not really. We’re just there to run the
programs, mostly just off to the side.” Another thought, “I don’t think the career field is
respected in the squadron.” The most shocking comment was from a controller that felt
leadership had pushed him aside and essentially told him, “Just sit behind the glass and
whenever we need to set up the UCC [unit control center], we’ll break the glass and let
you out.”
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Feeling like a part of the team is not only about respect. It is closely related with
how important others appear to view your job. A controller responded:
“With some senior NCOs [non-commissioned officers], and in the shop
level, you get that feeling that you’re not [part of the team]. You’re more
looked at as CSS [commander’s support staff] or administrative red tape
that they have to deal with. They don’t understand what’s required or why
it’s really necessary. You’re more of a hindrance than a help.”
Subjects felt that the shops knew very little about what they did. “Do they know what we
do? Absolutely not. They think they do. They know about the piece they see every day:
customer service, taking service calls, putting in labor. Outside of that, their view is
pretty limited,” one controller recalled. Another echoed the same: “No they don’t. Most
of the people you talk to think all you do is answer the telephone. That’s your whole
job.”
One controller felt that others assumed they were slackers, a view that he felt
could lead to poor performance. “Folks keep saying, ‘You’re just playing video games
during the day or just zooming YouTube.’ People look at us sitting behind computers not
doing anything. [Controllers] start to think, ‘If that’s all you think I’m doing, then that’s
all I’m going to do.’” While controllers see themselves as civil engineers, not all non3E6 supervisors agree. A controller remembered an instance where this was displayed:
“People look at us like admin troops. I had a master sergeant say,
‘Here’s a deployment for admin. Would you like to go?’ I said, ‘I’m not
admin.’ He replied, ‘Then what are you?’ I answered, ‘I’m a 3E6 in the
CE career field.’ That pretty much spoke to my whole career. We’re
more or less treated like admin troops than actual civil engineers.”
Are the operations chiefs any better? The answer was consistent: “It depends.” One
controller felt that it depended on their prior experience. “It helps if you have a seasoned
ops chief. A lot of times you get a guy that came from either readiness or engineering.
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They don’t really get 3E6s.” Another found the operations chief’s training insufficient.
“I don’t think they get taught much about us at the ops chiefs’ course. I saw the
curriculum once and it didn’t really mention us.” Still, there are some very motivated
operations chiefs that give controllers the necessary attention. One controller fondly
remembers:
“…I had one. She was fully engaged in ops management. She used us
fully, asked us for information, allowed us to give out input on how to
build the work order priority program. That was great. At other bases,
they didn’t deal with us at all, other than telling us, ‘run this report, run
that report.’ That’s all they used us for.”
Another controller claimed, “The ops chief is behind us 100%. He gives us the support
we need…Everywhere I’ve been, I’ve had good ops chiefs.”
Interviewees were asked about their relationships with the other flights,
particularly Programs and Asset Management. Alarmingly, many responded that they
did not have any relationships with them. When asked about the Programs flight, one
controller answered, “Naa, we don’t work with them.” This creates quite a problem in
the asset management philosophy of each section working together to capture an accurate
picture of all assets. Others felt that the other flights were yet other groups in CE that did
not appreciate what they did. Rather, they inserted operations management whenever it
was convenient. One respondent said,
“It didn’t seem like we had a good relationship. A lot of times we would
get a [form] back saying, ‘Hey, we need a job for this.’ Kind of seems like
we were working backwards. Just seemed like we were a second thought
when we should be a first thought to make sure everything was going
right.”
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Increased Workload and Inter-shop Friction
The level at which leadership remains uninformed of the operations management
role contributes to a number of problems. The first problem is increased workload for
controllers who are already stressed. If a shop ignores a request from the controllers to
update their records, it creates more work. When incomplete information is entered, the
resulting time lost later can be significant. One controller recalled:
“Remarks aren’t being put in, so there’s a lot of research needed. If
someone calls me about a work order, I should be able to look into IWIMS
and find out everything I need to know about that order, but I can’t. I
have to research, find out who was on the job, all the craftsmen, talk to
other people. What should take five minutes takes me a few hours.”
Another problem is the friction between shops. During weekly meetings, a lack of
communication during the week comes to the forefront. A controller recalled a common
occurrence at scheduler’s meetings, “We’d call people out on the table because their
work orders were delinquent and they would say, ‘We did this and that.’ We’d say, ‘well
you didn’t tell us.’” A second respondent agreed, “Naturally, whenever a shop gets
called out, they respond, ‘Oh, we had an issue closing that out.’ No one identified it to
us, so how could we help? We can’t know what’s wrong if they don’t tell us.” The lack
of experience discussed earlier is known throughout the flight. Because of this, a
controller realized, “There’s distrust at the perceived lack of [our] training. Certain
sections will question the data no matter what.”
Retention is yet another effect of the discord in the flight. One controller
believes, “If people don’t take us seriously, people aren’t going to stay in the career
field.” Another controller saw it affecting the newest airmen: “As new guys in CE,
they’re going to see us as pretty much the stepchildren of CE.”
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Mishandled Opportunities for Teamwork
Half of the respondents reported that they had seen possible points of tension
between shops, but through communication and leadership, some problems could be
resolved. One controller, when asked if others understood what controllers did, said,
“They do. They come and ask us and we’re more than willing to help them. Since I’ve
been here, all the shop leads have come over. I think I’ve had a personal touch with
them.” Others saw improvements when tense moments were approached differently. An
interviewee suggested:
“Some of the 3E6s have the wrong approach. Instead of trying to help the
shops, they get focused on pointing out the problems, finger pointing at all
the shops. You just can’t do that. When you see a problem, you have to
see it as a flight problem instead of an individual shop’s…You got to find
out why [it’s a problem] so you can help.”
A second respondent proposed, “…the 3E6 needs to explain himself…educate them. It’s
all about networking and communicating. If you actually bring something to the fight
and show what you can do for them or how it impacts them, you get that respect.”
Two events from the past may provide explanations for these increasing
problems: the elimination of the 7-level course and the elimination of zones. There was
once a 7-level class that all enlisted engineers attended. The course provided a
management level view of the operations flight. Controllers who attended this class felt
that it did not teach them much since it basically outlined their job. On the other hand, it
provided craftsmen the opportunity to learn how work orders moved through the flight.
This training relayed the importance of operations management to the other career fields.
With budget cuts such as Program Budget Decision (PBD) 720 looming, the class was
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cancelled in 2005. The course was seen as too managerial rather than technical. This
required each CE career field to create a job specific 7-level technical course. Some
career fields were successful, but operations management was not due to lack of funding.
One controller stated, “Maybe [the other shops] didn’t understand us because the 7-level
school went away and the craftsmen weren’t learning that anymore.” He recalled their
response. “It was up to us as NCOs to offer that course to CE, to other craftsmen since
we knew it was lacking. We as senior NCOs realized that it had been dropped. Are other
bases doing that? Perhaps not.”
The second possible explanation for role unawareness is the elimination of zones.
This topic could be studied to determine if reinstating it could improve the situation.
Older controllers reminisced about working in zones. In the recent past, bases were
divided into zones. This allowed a blend of craftsmen to focus on one area of base which
provided continuity and familiarity with facilities and customers. Often, controllers were
in the shops. The opportunity to work side by side with the craftsmen allowed both sides
to see the other in action. The spirit of this method is still used at some bases to expose
controllers to the other shops. This idea is discussed in a later section.

Model Comparison
This section compares the results associated with this theme to the Liu et al.
(2007) models provided in Chapter II. The major processes and the individual HPWP
that were discussed in the results are emphasized by bold lettering and a dotted oval in
Figure 10. The factor of vertical alignment which contributes to the effectiveness of
HPWP implementation in emphasized in Figure 11. The first area of the model discussed
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is the knowledge and training of engineers not in operations management. It seems that
a great number of the problems between controllers and the other CE shops are a result of
the training on how controllers fit into the mission that other shops never received. This
shows that the maintenance of KSAs for other groups that controllers work with may be
equally important to their success.
This point illustrates the need for HPWPs to vertically align with the strategic
plan of the larger organization, which is the second area of the models discussed. In
order for an organization to succeed using HPWPs, they must make sure that the
practices align with the overall mission of the organization. It is safe to assume that the
implementation of this idea has failed if members feel that they are not part of the team.
This is further shown by other groups not realizing how the outcast group contributes to
the mission. Feeling like outsiders may possibly contribute to the motivation of
controllers and may impact retention.
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Figure 10: HPWPs and Processes Discussed in Theme #2

Figure 11: Factors that Impacts HPWP Effectiveness Discussed in Theme #2
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Theme #3: Inconsistent Employment and Recognition
A third theme that emerged was inconsistency in the manner in which controllers
were utilized. Because non-controller leaders did not fully understand controllers’ roles,
the controllers were often misused. When there are few senior leaders in the career field,
there is no one to educate other leaders about operations management. Likewise, if no
one realizes the importance of operations management, efforts to retain and promote
controllers suffer. One controller said it best:
“It’s a challenge to compete with the blue collar work force for chief slots.
What you wind up having are very few 3E6 chiefs who are able to
[influence] the future of the career field and have enough clout to make
sure that things are progressing in the career field, guidance being
published, CFETPs [career field education and training plan], training in
place…you just don’t have a lot of 3E6 chiefs out there.”
In the current system, SMSgt controllers compete for Chief positions against SMSgts in
four other elements rather than solely competing against other controllers. While these
other SMSgts are likely the superintendents of their elements, a controller’s element is
often led by an officer or civilian. This hinders their ability to promote by limiting the
leadership positions they can have. This section discusses problems that are caused
misusing controllers and failing to recognize their importance.

Extra Duties
Subjects of this research resoundingly commented on the disproportionate amount
of time they spent on extra duties. Although all Air Force members perform additional
duties, the controllers thought that they attract an unfair amount of these duties. One
responded,
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“Of course we do a lot of things that are outside of our career field since a
lot of folks don’t know exactly what we’re supposed to do, I guess. And
that’s been a sore spot of 3E6s over the years. ‘Why do we have to do it
when it’s not our job?’ So you kinda gotta nip it in the bud you know,
suck it up and do it, I guess.”
The different jobs that operations managers have done are considerable. Among the
interviewees, extra duties included: emergency management, unit deployment
management, radios, base details, janitorial jobs, urinalysis, orderly room, commander’s
calls, vehicle NCO, safety NCO, explosive ordinance disposal (EOD) logistics,
computers, housing, real property, and fiber optic installation. It is true that many other
career fields can complain about being tasked with these same duties. However,
controllers argue that the disproportional burden from additional duties comes from the
convenience of being located in the same building as the command section. They feel the
leadership thinks:
“You’re in the office, so you can just pick these things up.” One
controller shared, “We do a little more because of where our office is. We
get tagged for a lot of the stuff that our higher ups kind of need. They
can’t really get the guys in the shops to do it, so they come to us. We have
most of the additional duties.”
A second controller echoed the same feelings:
“Since we’re up in the head shed, we get tasked with the odds and
ends…all the additional duty stuff that comes down to the ops center
because we’re right there. The commander, the first sergeant can look at
us and say, ‘the 3E6s can do it.’ I think that’s the biggest thing over the
years. We’re just so close that we get stuck with the extra duties.”
Two examples were provided that demonstrate the perceived mismanagement of
controllers. The first example was about a new airman who had just graduated from tech
school. Immediately, she was assigned to honor guard. She stayed there for four months.
When she went to the squadron for the first time, a deployment tasking was waiting for
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her. She was sent down range with no operations management experience at all. Her
supervisor remembers, “That was a huge factor for her decision to separate. She’s on
her way out.”
Another example is the unit deployment manager (UDM) position. According to
Air Force Instruction (AFI) 10-403, each squadron has a UDM who is the primary liaison
to the unit training manager, squadron superintendent, and wing training functions
regarding deployment related issues. They are responsible for readiness reporting,
monitoring, force posturing activities, and deployment execution actions (Department of
the Air Force, 2008). Due to the clerical nature of this particular job, many units feel that
a controller is the logical choice for that position. One controller epitomized this. He
served as the UDM at three of the four base-level assignments in his career. However,
the AFI never states that the job requires one career field over another.
The onslaught of extra duties becomes a real problem as manning levels remain
low. A respondent surmised,
“Leadership still asks the same things from us in the career field, but they
just don’t have the manning to accomplish it all. Work order area
programs, doing in-depth analysis of RWP [reoccurring work program].
Guys aren’t there to do it. Simple things like customer feedback and
survey programs. No time for that either.”
The problem of extraneous duties goes beyond base-level instances. Some 3E6
assignments consist solely of extra duties with no duties similar to operations
management work. One such assignment was with a Rapid Engineer Deployable Heavy
Operational Repair Squadron Engineers (RED HORSE) unit, which is organized to be an
agile heavy construction arm. As opposed to a traditional squadron responsible for the
infrastructure and facilities of their home base, RED HORSE units spend their time at
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home station training and preparing for the next deployment. A controller’s primary
duties do not fit into that mission. Still, controllers are assigned to RED HORSE units.
One controller said:
“We don’t do any traditional 3E6 stuff. We do a bit of tracking projects,
but not much. We don’t have access to IWIMS…We do a little facility
management stuff…Other than that, everything else we do is not 3E6 stuff.
We have huge radio accounts that we manage even though we have
comm.. folks…not a real need for 3E6s in REDHORSE in my mind.”
Another trend observed was assigning controllers as facility managers. A facility
manager is an appointed member within an organization who is responsible for inspecting
the condition of the building, upholding security directives, and establishing procedures
to notify the CE squadron of any needed maintenance. Controllers are responsible for
managing the facility manager program, not performing facility manager duties
themselves. Their proximity to the program does not make them better candidates for the
position than anyone else. The only requirement to be a facility manager is that you are
at least an E-4 or higher (Department of the Air Force, 2004).
Unfortunately, other career fields do not agree. Controllers serve as facility
managers at a number of locations throughout the world, many of which are not
controlled by the Air Force. The consensus feeling is that these extra positions should be
scrutinized to determine if they are absolutely necessary. Perhaps they can be filled by a
career field without as large of a manning problem. One supervisor thought back to his
previous airmen and the assignments that many of them have since occupied:
“I had one that’s at Fort Meade, Maryland, now that works as facility
manager. Not in a CE unit, works for the Army. Really, anyone can do a
facility management job. It doesn’t have to be a 3E6. We have one in
Belgium, a couple other spread out, one in Maui. All these folks could be
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brought into units that area really stressed. We gotta beef up the units
that only have two or three people when they’re authorized seven.”
Many of these positions are seen as “useless” in the operations management community.
A respondent noted that he was assigned to an undesirable job position. Before he
accepted the job at Base X, three other MSgts were notified that they were headed to
Base X for their next assignment and decided to retire rather than take it. He admits that
he accepted it only because it is near his wife’s family.
A sore spot with controllers concerning these “useless” positions is that the
positions often receive priority with available 7-level controllers. Because they are
positions for only one person, if it is not filled, it shows up as 0% manned. Conversely, if
a TSgt is removed from a squadron, manning may only drop from 100% to 80%. Areas
that are 0% manned appear far more critical than those at 80%, so they receive the
requested personnel. This further depletes the squadrons of 7-level controllers.
It is possible to see this issue from the outside and question the job analysis
originally performed. If it is a common practice for controllers to fill these extraneous
positions, perhaps their job description should be reviewed. There is obviously a
disparity between the current job classification of controllers and the job they are actually
performing. In order to employ personnel in the most efficient way possible, an accurate
job analysis is desired. This analysis is the backbone on which many other management
systems are built to include recruiting, performance appraisals, and workforce planning
(Butler & Harvey, 1988). As seen by the lack of research in the area of job analysis
inaccuracies, it appears that job analyses are based almost completely on human
judgment (Goldstein et al., 1993). Because many systems are based on the initial job
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analysis, and the validity of the analysis is rarely questioned, the inaccuracies of an initial
job analysis can result in many effects (Harvey, 1991). Possible problem areas include
pay, promotions, and recruiting (Morgeson & Campion, 1997). Though these are all of
interest to the military, perhaps the largest area of concern is in misidentified training
needs that lead to an inadequate workforce or wasted dollars in unnecessary training.

Problems with Deployments
Average deployment lengths have increased consistently since the beginning of
Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) (AFPC, 2004;
Hanson, 2010). Each career field of each branch of the military has its own unique set of
challenges which include increasing levels of stress due to increased deployment tempos,
additional missions at home and abroad, and constant funding concerns. Operations
management is no exception.
Because of the multiple engagements of the United States military, the Air Force
CE community is at an unprecedented level of stress. Controllers score a “3” for the Ops
Demand metric, which is the highest score given (Department of the Air Force, 2011a).
The quantified “stress” considers manning levels compared to deployment taskings. The
accelerated deployment cycles not only add to the number of taskings, but also add to
difficulties in retaining airmen (Williams, 2005).
The manner in which civil engineers deploy has changed significantly over the
last ten years. Engineers have been increasingly deployed to locations around the world.
As OIF and OEF have evolved, engineers now fill positions traditionally manned by
other services (Goodfellow, 2008). Although these new deployment taskings are now
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commonplace, operations flight civil engineers must continue to fill traditional roles to
maintain airfields. It is for this reason that each assignment, whether deployed or at
home, must be filled with the right person doing the right job.
This is a huge source of frustration for controllers. One controller explained it
like this:
“The deployments are extremely aggravating. It’s a toss-up of whether
you’re going to do your job or be bored for six months…I see a lot of
underutilization in the AOR [area of responsibility] for the 3E6s. They
ask, ‘Why am I here?’ We’re sitting over there in the AOR and people
look as us like, ‘Why are you even here? Someone else is doing your job.’
They have two or three of us at one location where there’s only enough
work for one.”
Another argued, “They really need to pay attention to the manning over there. [Look at]
what’s actually needed versus what they’d like to have to do all their admin and extra
duties.” This sentiment was repeated by another:
“We had guys that deployed and did nothing. Just across the board they
need to get a grasp on what they actually need down range. The problem
is that most positions, once they’re one the books, they never come off.
Even if the function goes away, the slot doesn’t get turned off.”
A reoccurring theme was that any career field could fill the jobs that the Air Force
believes are specific to operations management. One controller remembered, “The job I
did could have been done by any 3EX. A dirt boy could have done that job.” This, like
everything else, has retention implications. “From what I’ve seen, a lot of tech sergeants
and staff sergeants were deployed to jobs that anybody could have done. As a result, we
are losing a lot of tech sergeants,” another controller stated. Despite the frustration,
some see it as a compliment. “Word on the street is that we’re pretty good at
multitasking. We can do a lot, so we’ve been picked up for a lot of JET [joint
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expeditionary tasking] taskings. Because we’re willing to do the job, we’ve been tasked
quite a bit.” Regardless of the view, the truth remains that excessive deployments of
MSgts only adds to mentoring problems previously discussed. One controller realized,
“Airmen don’t get feedback while their NCO is deployed. They’re by themselves and
they go on about their business. When the NCO gets home, then it’s the airman’s turn to
go.”
There is also a problem with the distribution of deployments similar to the
unbalanced distribution of MSgts. While some controllers are deploying at unsustainable
rates, others are watching and waiting for their turn to contribute. A newly cross-trained
TSgt discussed her frustration with not being deployed:
“When my bucket came around, we didn’t get any taskings. They sent the
jobs somewhere else. I’m just frustrated because I came into this career
field and one of the biggest draws was to deploy. Now, I’m not getting the
opportunity…I’ve been here a year and three months with no taskings.”
Stories about too many deployments were equally passionate. One controller recalled:
“I knew a guy that was deployed when I was and returned in April of this
year. In August, they tried to tag him to go to Afghanistan again. Really?
We have 60 master sergeants in the career field and you’re gonna tag
someone that got back six months ago? He was gone for seven, home for
six, and you’re gonna send him for another seven? He dropped his
paperwork. He’s one of the guys that know the career field, a triple nickel
like me. The Air Force lost a good one there.”
A second story echoed similar feelings and also resulted with the airman getting out:
“There was one airman that was a single mom. She went to Korea, came
back and did a year deployment and in six months, deployed again. She
was told, ‘By the way, when you get back, you’re going to Korea again.’
She got out at 15 years because over a five year period, she’d only see her
kid one year.”
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Underutilized by Leadership
The unawareness leaders have of what a controller can do leaves them feeling
underutilized. One controller stated, “I think it’s the mind frame of civil engineers. I
don’t think that most understand what we have the capability to do and what we could do
for them.” Many of the respondents felt that they were not part of the decision-making
process. Not only were they upset at being removed, but they also believed that they had
the best vantage point in the flight to make such decisions. “We’re willing to do things
that they’re not interested in. We could bring so much more to the fight and make sure
that we’re doing things proactively. It just seems like their interest is into HVAC
[heating, ventilations, and air conditioning], structures, or dirt boys,” one controller
said. Another agreed, “We have the ability to give them the information, give them the
best guess based on what we see. We’re never asked those questions. We’re never given
the opportunity to give our input. We’re just data entry and data collection for CE.”
Many capabilities were offered as useful products that are not fully used: internal work
programs, Top Ten programs, project programming, sorting data, life cycle analysis,
trend analysis, and other management tools.
As demonstrated throughout the interviews, controllers were not willing to sit
back and let their career field slowly decline. Some senior controllers took it upon
themselves to affect change. One controller recalled a program that was started at a
previous assignment:
“I went to my captain and said, ‘I can run reports for your guys for EPRs
[enlisted performance reports] or what you’ve done. We have stuff we
can do for your shops to show or prioritize your requests.’ We even gave
classes, built our own enhancement classes where the 3E6s showed the
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craftsmen that they can do these things yourselves or we can do it as
well.”
Two of the interviewees went as far as applying for leadership positions within the career
field so they could help address issues that they felt were affecting their career field the
most. Another has even brainstormed a completely different view of operations
management. With efficiency as the main goal, he suggested that all the offices in the
operations support element should be collocated and supervised by a 3E6. This could
help by combining duplicate efforts and gaining from other shops’ strengths. Recent
consolidations of utilities and electrical career fields were provided as case studies.
This area of questioning, like many previously, was linked to retention. Many
younger controllers have questioned the importance of their role. One controller
remembered a story he had heard from a subordinate:
“An airman said, ‘A monkey could do our job,’ and that he’s not staying
in. We’ve had discussions with him to help him see the bigger picture, but
we don’t have leadership telling us the capabilities that we have are
important to the squadron. Therefore, you have this sense of not
belonging, not being understood. What’s the point of staying if I could
make more of a difference somewhere else?”
Unfortunately, this view is shared by older controllers as well. One respondent replied:
“I even thought of changing [career fields] myself. I love my career field,
but as I said earlier, there’s no room for growth. I know a lot of things I
can do, but I’m not getting utilized and I wanted to get out. I can’t do
anything. I can’t even apply for a special duty even though I’m not even
doing my [ops management] job.”

Trouble Competing
Promotions are an important aspect of any career path. The military definitely has
a different model than most industries, yet the emphasis placed on promotions is equally
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heavy. Interviewees were asked if they felt that promotions were fair. Although the
resounding response was “yes,” the topic of promotions still had an effect on
performance. The truth is that smaller career fields have a tougher time getting
promotion simply because of size. One controller framed it objectively:
“At senior airman, staff, and tech, percentagewise, we’re as good as
anyone else. Once you meet master, if you’re [another career field], you
have better numbers to get promoted. Even if you’re a super troop, we
only usually get two slots for senior master sergeant. Are the 3E6
candidates better than those that get promoted in other career fields?
Perhaps. Heck, there are more seniors and chiefs in the 2S0X1 [supply
management] career field than there are in all of ops management. We
only have around 430 total on active duty.”
Another controller concurred, “I think we have a fair chance at lower levels, but once we
get to senior and chief, I don’t think we’re fair.” Yet another agreed, “Of course it’s
tough. Our career field is the smallest in CE, so historically the career field is the
toughest to get promoted in considering EOD, fire, and readiness. Still, over the years, if
you look at promotion rates, we get what we deserve.” One respondent’s story stood out
among the rest as the perfect example of the frustrations. He recalled:
“It took me seven years to make staff sergeant. I had a 324 [promotion
score] the last year that I didn’t get selected. My friend in another shop
only needed a 200 to get promoted. That’s the disparity we have between
small and large career fields because they work off of percentages. That
year—this is no lie—I was the highest scoring non-selectee in the Air
Force.”
One respondent felt that the low promotion rate further exacerbated the lack of
mentorship available to young controllers. Since the available slots at the top are limited,
he felt that it forced the most experienced guys to take their focus off of mentoring their
subordinates and instead, focus on extra activities to ensure promotion. One controller
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actually felt that low promotion rates were just due to the limited experience discussed
earlier. He argued:
“The young techs and masters get promoted now, but haven’t had the
mentorship and training. Do they have the knowledge and leadership
experience to fill those positions? We complain we’re always stuck as a
section chief, but if the people we’re promoting don’t know that much,
they won’t be able to advance themselves.”
Opinions about awards were split down the middle. Some respondents felt that they were
completely unfair while others voiced that they were the highest competitors in their
squadron. A controller complained,
“All the glory is in the shops. Typically, the 3E6s have a hard time
writing packages on administrative accomplishments that can be
comparable to the shops ‘responded to in-flight emergencies’ or ‘mission
critical facility.’ It’s like apples and oranges. How do you compare two
totally different functions?”
A second controller agreed,
“Our justifications on things aren’t adequately captured or they’re not big
enough as the dirt boys working in REDHORSE or the fire department or
EOD. Sure, fire and EOD are big things, but it seems like they look at us
like we’re just paper pushers unless we’re saving someone.”
Conversely, some subjects bragged about the accomplishments they had been a part of.
One controller emphatically stated,
“Yeah we’re competitive. One of our staff sergeants made it to the group
for quarterly awards. Not quite the wing yet, but we’re working on it. We
just had one airman below the zone and we’re putting in another. We’ve
had the opportunity to compete.”
Another added, “I would put in guys [for awards] all the time. We were a section that
when it came time for awards or below the zone, others were hesitant to put anybody in if
they knew they’d have to compete against us.” One respondent presented an idea that
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refers back to educating leadership. She suggested, “I try to sit on boards so that I can
make them understand just how important the work we do is.”

Model Comparison
This section compares the results associated with this theme to the Liu et al.
(2007) models provided in Chapter II. The major processes and the individual HPWPs
that were discussed in the results are emphasized by bold lettering and a dotted oval in
Figure 12. The factor of vertical alignment which contributes to the effectiveness of
HPWP implementation in emphasized in Figure 13.
The problems discussed refer to many different areas of the models. Perhaps the
most prevalent is the vertical alignment of the HPWPs used and the mission of the
organization. The number of extra duties and assignments outside of the career field
show that controllers are not being utilized in the manner intended. However, if the jobs
they are performing are in fact the jobs they should be doing, one might consider that
their training in operations management was a waste and that they should instead be
trained on administrative tasks. As with the issues previously stated, these problems may
also affect retention.
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Figure 12: HPWPs and Processes Discussed in Theme #3

Figure 13: Factors that Impacts HPWP Effectiveness Discussed in Theme #3
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Theme #4: No Advanced Training
A robust training program is important to build the knowledge needed to
appropriately accomplish the operations management mission. The existence of a solid
training program relates significantly to overall organizational performance (Russell et
al., 1985). Although experience may be low, the proper training program can correct the
problem by producing competent controllers over time. However, the sentiment among
controllers is that “there is no real course to teach us what you should know as a 7level.” This section looks at the Air Force’s view of training for operations management.
It then discusses the existing training situation and what is being done to correct it.
The Career Field Education and Training Plan (CFETP) outlines five types of
training required: initial skills, upgrade, qualification, advanced, and proficiency
(Department of the Air Force, 2011b). Although the CFETP addresses the different types
of training possible, all types are not necessarily available. There is an absence of
advanced formal training opportunities in the career field. Similarly, there is no clear
guidance dictating the tasks included in qualification or proficiency training.

Problems with Initial Training
The operations management tech school is a controller’s first exposure to the
career field. Some of the problems that the school house experiences are common to
training programs in other organizations. The procedures that are taught are often based
on out-of-date job analyses or those of workers with slightly different jobs (Oriel, 1973).
One example in operations management is the different situations that airmen deal with
that were formerly handled by NCOs. One controller explained, “[The school house]
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doesn’t touch on work orders because most won’t deal with them until the NCO level, but
since we don’t have that many NCOs, many airmen are dealing with them as soon as they
get to a base. There’s no real training on work orders.” If a job changes enough, it may
be necessary to totally rewrite curriculum rather than just update it. One controller
believed that this is the position that the school house is in. He stated, “Our tech school
should be completely rebuilt from the ground up. It’s not doing anything for the airmen
going to base.”
When the material is correct, there are instances where the content is written or
taught at a level above or below the comprehension of the workers (Wilson et al., 1980).
There may also be a misalignment between classroom training and situations observed on
the job. This point was mentioned by a few respondents. One controller said, “I don’t
think that tech school prepares people for what they will be doing. It gives you a
background, but everything you’re going to learn is going to be on the job.” Finally,
completion of a training program is often based on whether or not a trainee was exposed
to an idea rather than if they demonstrated an understanding of the idea taught (Wilson et
al., 1980). The origin of the problems again stems from the lack of experience of the
instructors since there are few senior controllers available to teach.
Another source of training is the Community College of the Air Force. There is
an associate’s degree offered for each career field. Controllers receive a degree in
Maintenance Production Control which is shared by three other career fields. The
usefulness of the coursework required by the degree is debatable. Most respondents
agreed that the degree did not help them with operations management specific tasks. One
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bluntly stated, “I don’t believe it was helpful at all.” Others felt that there were some
benefits. One added:
“It didn’t really [help]. Most of it you get from your military training or
tech school. Then you just take your core classes like math and English.
Maybe speech and English might have helped me a little bit. But the other
classes didn’t.”
Considering the lack of mentorship, one controller thought that some courses had merit.
He argued, “Leadership and management I thought were pretty useful. Without taking
those classes, I’m not sure how effective a leader or mentor I’d be without those skills.”
Further education is not limited to what the Air Force provides. Most of the
interviewees had a bachelor’s degree. The fields of study included medical, education
and development, legal, public health, computers, and networks. Along with academic
degrees, many controllers sought other training in Microsoft Office applications, database
management, and management certifications.

New Responsibilities
Regardless of inadequate training or mentorship, a controller can at the very least
survive by mimicking what the other controllers do. This becomes an issue, however,
when the career field is given new responsibilities. Operations management has two
recent additions to their job description. The first is quality assurance (QA), which has
only recently become a part of the CFETP. Many of the subjects noted that they had
performed QA duties at one point or another, many before the task was actually added
officially. Most airmen were responsible for QA while deployed. This task is not
specific to controllers. It was added to many of the CE career fields’ CFETPs, although
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controllers and engineering assistants are used in this capacity a majority of the time.
This incongruence contributes to an overall void of training in this area. One controller
noted that “It’d be nice for people to know what they were doing when they got
[downrange] rather than trying to figure it out once they got there.”
A second additional responsibility is managing material supply. This job was
previously accomplished by airmen in the logistics readiness career field. Logisticians
were traditionally assigned to CE squadrons to manage the ordering, delivery, and storage
of materials for engineering work. In 2006, PBD 720 required all career fields to limit
their budgets and only focus on their core responsibilities. Each career field used
different avenues to restrict spending and manpower. Logisticians decided to retrieve the
personnel assigned to CE squadrons in an attempt to reduce their required manpower.
Though the airmen responsible for material supply were removed, the job they did
remained. Controllers were chosen to adopt the mission in their place.
The obvious issue with this is that any additional mission will likely stress a
career field that is already suffering from low manning. A second issue is that there is no
way to train airmen on these new duties. The mission was added before a formal training
plan was made. One controller explained it like this:
“They updated the CFETP but didn’t offer any type of training. It would
have been good if they said, ‘Here’s 15 new tasks on your plan, but here’s
a course where you can send your folks. It’ll be funded by your command
or the Air Force and not your unit because it’s not your fault that it got
added.’ But they didn’t…It would have been nice to have something
established before they dropped that bomb on us.”
In cases where there is not a senior controller qualified in material supply, airmen must
simply learn on their own and wait until they move to a different base to get certified.
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Efforts have been made to add 15 days of supply training to tech school for new 3E6
airmen.

Emphasis on “On-the-Job Training”
Due to the lack of advanced formal training, the operations management career
field relies heavily on on-the-job training (OJT), which is the most frequently used
training method in industry (Utgaard & Dawis, 1970). OJT received the highest rating
compared to other training methods in usefulness and acceptance (Walker, 1965). Larger
companies were found to have more structured OJT programs than smaller companies
(Wilson et al., 1980). It is of little surprise that the Air Force has one of the most robust
OJT programs. It is estimated that 10% of the enlisted workforce man-hours are spent on
some sort of OJT each year (Stephenson & Burkett, 1975). In fact, many years ago, the
Air Force depended solely on OJT to train airmen. An older controller recalled, “I came
in in’89 back when they had what they called ‘direct duty airmen.’ I didn’t go to tech
school. I graduated basic, went on leave, and then reported straight to my unit…I had to
kind of learn it from my supervisors.”
OJT is implemented by many companies because of its assumed advantages: low
costs, hands-on style, and acceptance by trainees that do not like to be in a classroom
(Wilson et al., 1980). Unfortunately, the cost may not be as low as expected. In an
unstructured program, costs are lower than bringing in an instructor or sending trainees
away to school (Gant, 1977). But to properly start an OJT program, a great deal of effort
must be applied to planning, evaluating, and administrating. There are also hidden costs
due to the lack of production normally accomplished by the trainer and the possibility of
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damage by unskilled trainees (Gant, 1977). Although the Air Force values training,
funding for schools usually determine whether or not certain specialties are taught in
classes or by OJT (Stephenson & Burkett, 1975).
The most significant disadvantage of OJT is that it is most often carried out in an
unstructured manner. The military has one of the most structured OJT programs
compared to those found in industry (Wilson et al., 1980). Unfortunately, the operations
management career field does not have an OJT program that is as structured as other
career fields. In a study conducted by the University of Wisconsin, Perlman (1969)
found that of 150 companies, all used OJT as the main training method but only four
percent had a structured program.
This presents two issues, each of great concern. First, the worker charged with
training new workers may have little to no experience as an instructor. Educating another
is a large task that has been levied on workers who may lack skills themselves (Oriel,
1973). One controller related this fact to premature promotions: “They’re giving them
rank…but they’re still learning the job and whatnot. It’s hard to train and understand
what to do in that position if you don’t know what to do in the first place.” This gap in
knowledge is apparent to both the trainer and trainee.
The second issue is that it is seldom possible to conduct legitimate training while
keeping production maximized. One of the two will suffer for the sake of the other. In
most companies, the decision is made to keep production as the priority. One respondent
was frustrated at his current position. He said, “Here I’m just a trainer. My main goal is
just to train. I know that’s where we’re lacking, but still I feel I could be utilized in other
programs our section is responsible for.”
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In reality, on-the-job training is often replaced with as-you-work training
(Perlman, 1969). One controller recollected, “All the stuff I’ve learned about ops
management has been from being thrown in the fire, figuring it out and asking
questions.” Another agrees: “Unfortunately, most troops will just learn on their own by
sending them to a shop to figure it out on their own.” Rather than following a prepared
plan for training, new workers are told to just go and learn what they can by watching.
Rather than having designated instructors, instruction is provided by just another worker
(Wenig & Wolansky, 1972).

Reliance on Outside Courses and Workarounds
Controllers have tried to fill the void of training in the operations management
career field. There have been a few attempts to get young controllers exposed to the
different aspects of the job. These efforts include contract courses, in-house courses, and
shop exposure programs.
Every subject questioned during this research had heard of Alice Anderson
courses and most had attended at least one course. Alice Anderson is one of the pioneers
of IWIMS. As a consultant, she travels throughout the Air Force offering classes in
report writing, RWP, in-service work program (IWP), work control, and cost
management. She has a monopoly on the market because the few controllers, military
and civilian, that actually understand all the details of IWIMS have retired. Her business
is quite successful since bases around the world are willing to pay top dollar to host one
of her classes.
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Her praises were voiced by the MSgts that had taken one of her classes. One
controller proclaimed, “Alice Anderson kind of brought the light bulb on. [She] tied
everything together, all those little tidbits you learn over time.” Another believed that
her classes were a necessity. He declared, “All ops managers should go to the Alice
Anderson course because a lot of people only know the basics of how to get the basic
information in.” Yet another controller added,
“All we get is how to input stuff into the database and we get good at it.
But if you don’t take the Alice Anderson class, you don’t know how to set
up an RWP cycle or adjust the whole RWP to make sure the database is
running right.”
Other courses have been arranged by controllers at all levels. One controller spoke of a
course hosted at his base for all the controllers stationed there. Rather than sending 25
people across the country, an expert from Gunter Air Force Base was brought in to teach
them about the Automated Civil Engineer System (ACES). Some bases reached out to
others to develop joint program management courses. Leaders in the career field are
working on developing a 7-level course to replace the course that was canceled in 2005.
The idea is to use the material offered in the Alice Anderson courses as a template to
develop an in-house replacement.
One possible roadblock in developing such a course is funding. Proponents of
reinstating a 7-level course have a hard time providing a strong connection between the
course and the war effort. It has been discussed amongst career field leaders over the last
few years, but it has not been reinstated. It is possible that the low level of support is due
to the unawareness of upper management of the need for such a course. With no high
ranking controllers, there are fewer advocates available for its creation. At the Air Force
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Civil Engineering Support Agency, the Career Field Manager (CFM) position is filled by
a MSgt while the other CFMs from the Operations Flight are SMSgts. This disparity in
rank may also limit advocacy for controller training. One controller thought, “With TDYs
[temporary duties] getting cut and money being tighter for courses, everyone is fighting
to justify their own…I look at it and our course has no ownership because we can’t
clearly explain the costs and consequences.” At the least, it is desired that controllers
attend the Alice Anderson courses. Some Major Commands have made this a priority by
securing funding ahead of time and allowing two controllers from each base to attend so
that the knowledge is distributed as equally as possible.
A final effort mentioned was moving controllers into the different shops for a few
weeks to learn the intricacies of the different crafts. One shop has a standard “floater”
that moves from shop to shop. Another shop expressed desires to instate such a program
once the youngest airmen catch up on their training. The exposure to the various crafts
ideally helps the controller do a better job. A new controller explained her situation:
“One thing we’re missing is going out into the shops and learning, especially us females.
Like, ‘Who does hot water?’ I didn’t realize that HVAC did that until I talked to them.
Things like that, getting hands on experience with what they really do.” Not only can
exposure help them understand who does what, but it can help them ask more meaningful
questions that make everyone’s job easier. One controller clarified:
“When I was managing customer service, I tried to get us engaged in the
unit. I moved guys around to the shops so they got HVAC calls and
plumbing calls. Then, when they came back to customer service, they
asked better questions. They knew a little more.”
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The lack of advanced training is apparent in the operations management career field.
Though many efforts have been made to fix this problem, money and manning stand in
the way of reaching success. Through ingenuity on the part of the senior controllers, the
effects of this problem are lessened. However, the missed training adds to the last theme
of lack of guidance.

Model Comparison
This section compares the results associated with this theme to the Liu et al.
(2007) models provided in Chapter II. Both the major processes and the individual
HPWPs that were discussed in the results are emphasized by bold lettering and a dotted
oval in Figure 14. This theme pertains mostly to training, which enhances KSAs. The
amount of times that training was mentioned in the interviews bolsters the fact that
training is one of the most studied HPWPs. Problems with training are not isolated.
Instead, they are horizontally integrated with other areas. As described earlier, a lack of
training creates senior controllers that may not be as competitive for promotion. If they
cannot demonstrate that they have mastered their primary job, they may be less likely to
be chosen for top positions. Training is also aligned with participation. If controllers
want more participation in decision-making, they must first demonstrate that they have
mastered their controller duties and possess the needed skills to legitimately contribute to
decisions.
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Figure 14: HPWPs and Processes Discussed in Theme #4

Theme #5: Lack of Guidance
This section examines problems resulting from a lack in guidance for the career
field. Traditionally, the military provides guidelines for every action and a plan for every
possible contingency. However, the operations management career field has limited
guidance. As a result, many bases have developed their own standards of operation. The
lack of standardization may be affecting the quality of data entry and retrieval. There
also seems to be a gap in the guidance provided to operations managers for the
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implementation of asset management. The details of these problems are discussed
further.
In the mid 1990s, the Air Force moved from regulations to instructions. The
reason widely given was to gain cost efficiencies by allowing individuals the freedom to
vary some processes. Air Force Regulation 85-2 provided controllers with a standardized
“how to” guide. It was replaced with a more generic Air Force Instruction (AFI) 321001. Since then, multiple updated versions have been created, yet the detail of the old
regulations remains unmatched. One controller explained, “It goes back to AFIs
dictating what you do. When the regs changed to AFIs, Regulation 85-2 went from 200
to 10 pages as AFI 32-1001. It lets you do whatever you want since you’re not getting
measured by any standard.” By eliminating specific guidance, younger airmen are left
with no way of learning the intricacies of the job without the guidance of a senior
controller. Another controller made the connection:
“A lot of the processes that apply to doing work in IWIMS, they were
outlined in those publications. Then in the AFIs, they were just so thin.
For reference for future generations to develop training using AFIs or if
they were trying to pick up extra skills with no one to help them, it was
impossible. Plain and simple, [they need] good, old-fashioned guidance—
standardized guidance.”
It is difficult for younger airman to learn on their own when there is no material to learn
from. A ten-page document can be read and “mastered” in a day. Without a clearly
defined performance guide, the end-product can vary significantly based on
interpretation. One subject responded, “The quality goes back to the lack of standardized
guidance on the procedures on how to directly input the data.” He went on to say, “The
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thing is you won’t find the answers written down anywhere, you just have to know it. I’m
not talking about a playbook, I’m talking about good old instruction manuals.”

Local Variations
Due to the lack of guidance, each base can interpret many aspects of the job
differently. Without a standard dictating exactly what information must be entered, each
base develops a culture of what is important to track and what is not necessary. As one
controller recalled, “The quality of the data depends on what the base emphasizes.” This
frustration was shared by another controller who realized that someone had to step in and
provide some guidance. He recounted, “There’s no specific guidance. That’s why I said
if I were ever in a position to change it, I would. I would volunteer for a chance to
develop the needed documents.”
There are many examples of operations management programs that could greatly
benefit a squadron. Unfortunately, they are deemed “optional” for controllers. These
programs include: Top Ten, internal work, reoccurring work, and customer feedback.
When asked what he was capable of doing but did not, one respondent suggested, “IWP.
Some bases I’ve seen do it, some don’t, and some do it halfway. It’s a good tool if used
to its full potential.” As is the case with most of these problems, the cure is a strong
presence by a senior controller. A MSgt recalled his method of refocusing a new shop:
“You get good data if you have a customer service department that makes
it a priority. When I get to a base, I immediately go into IWIMS and look
at a few obscure places to see if they were keeping stuff updated. If I went
to those places and they didn’t have data, I knew that we were going to
have a problem. I’d sit them down and say, ‘I don’t know what you did
beforehand, but this is how we’re going to do it now.’”
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Errant Data Entry
Each respondent was asked specifically whether or not the data entered by
controllers could be confidently used to make good asset management decisions. The
majority of answers were negative. The data was generally viewed to be wrong,
incomplete, or out of context. Said one respondent when asked about data quality: “I’d
say not very good—garbage in, garbage out.”
A caveat was added for the few neutral responses received in that it was all
dependent on the location and personnel responsible. One controller replied:
“IWIMS alone? It could be OK. I guess it would matter what base I’m at,
how much training the airman has had…Is my airman trained enough to
know what to put into the system? Am I getting the whole picture?
There’s a lot of places in the process that can get fouled up.”
Another asserted: “[The system] is only as good as the people who are using it.”
From these responses, it appears that there were legitimate doubts in the accuracy
of the data stored in the CE systems. One of the largest challenges to proper asset
management is the lack of useful data or data in a useful form. This weakness is due to
information systems that lack flexibility and the low rate of data gathering and entering.
When a system is implemented, it is important that it not create more work and drive the
process, but instead become a tool to help the process (Jones, 1994). Most information
systems fail due to lack of training, insufficient commitment, and lack of a demonstrable
use of the system output (Jones, 1994). Another problem is duplication of data rather
than sharing.
Currently, the Air Force uses two primary systems for civil engineering tracking:
the Automated Civil Engineer System (ACES) and the Interim Work Information
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Management System (IWIMS). ACES contains information on real property, readiness,
construction processes, and project management. IWIMS is a smaller system that
communicates with ACES and focuses on work order, materials, and job management.
Reviews of these two systems have been mixed. Most problems mentioned concerning
ACES centered on its tendency to get overloaded. One controller stated, “I don’t like
ACES. It decides when it wants to work and when it doesn’t. If you go too quickly, it just
locks up.” Problems with IWIMS were due to its outdated interface and the fact that it
sometimes “dumps” information. Many controllers preferred a web-based system to
allow ease of access and use.
The proposed solution to these complaints lies in a CE initiative called NexGen
IT. The purpose of this transformation is to use commercial off-the-shelf software to
provide engineers with an updated information management system (Thomas, 2009).
The system will replace and consolidate multiple CE systems (including ACES and
IWIMS) into one web-based interface. However, this idea has been discussed for many
years. Although CE leaders have aggressively pushed this initiative recently, the timeline
remains uncertain.
The absence of a simple user interface has caused two main problems. The first is
the quality of data entered by the other shops. Controllers understand IWIMS and have
little trouble entering data because it is a fundamental lesson taught in tech school. On
the other hand, the other shops do not have the training. Without training, IWIMS is
extremely difficult to navigate. This problem stems from issues with manning and
experience previously discussed. A respondent noted:
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“It should be a good tool to use. Because of the shortage of manning and
the loss of knowledge, we kind of lean on the shops to input labor and
sometimes work order stuff. We’ve turned it into a junk in, junk out
problem. It’s not the most reliable stuff out there.”
Another added, “The labor reporting has been farmed out to the shops, so I know there
are gigantic holes in that.” One controller thought that having the shop foreman enter
the data may be beneficial since they were closest to the job. Still, he admitted that he
would rather be responsible for making sure the data was entered correctly. The problem
was summed up by an interviewee: “The craftsmen don’t use [IWIMS] because they
don’t like it. Therefore, the data is not being input correctly.”
The quality of the data is also compromised when it is incomplete. The dislike of
the system leads many to simply ignore it. One subject explained, “IWIMS isn’t a
horrible system…Unfortunately, 90% of civil engineers don’t understand it, therefore
they don’t use it. There’s not a lot of data input.” A few others offered that the quality
of the data was dependent on the integrity of the individual entering it and the local
emphasis placed on it. Lastly, it was suggested that it is a classic case of blue versus
white collar workers. Blue collar workers simply do not feel comfortable in an
administrative role nor do they understand the importance of it. This was noticed in
deployment settings as well. The tendency was use spreadsheets and other systems since
IWIMS usage was not mandated.

Questionable Results
Another problem with data in CE systems is the manner in which it is retrieved.
IWIMS data entry, as challenging as it may be, was not seen half as difficult as data
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retrieval. Once controller saw it like this: “IWIMS is a good system because it will give
you what you need…If you know how to run those reports, you can just about do
miracles. Unfortunately, it’s an archaic system from the 80s that doesn’t allow us to do
the things we could.” Another suggested, “If we had the familiarity with it, we could pull
those reports out easy, just breeze through it.”
When reports are generated, controllers still displayed distrust in what was
produced. Sometimes it was a case of knowing the intricacies of the system. An
interviewee suggested, “Sometimes the data can be wrong if it’s pulling the rejects or it’s
not talking to the history. There are parts that you have to know to check.” Other times,
there were problems with the interpretation of the data. One controller remembered,
“I’ve seen other people try to produce products out of IWIMS in order to
develop asset management plans. They’ll do some analysis and the stuff
they’ve been getting is suspect…Being able to pull out info and change the
context for what you’re trying to present, that’s really our role.”
The final quote includes similar thoughts along with previous concerns about supervisors
understanding the role of a controller and the ability that they bring to the table.
“At my last base I was fortunate to work with a commander and ops chief
that were willing to listen. They understood when it came to getting info
out of the computer, putting it into a format that meant something to them,
they’d let me do that. They weren’t just telling me what slides they wanted
to see. They left it up to me to gather info that meant something. I was
allowed to make decisions that would help them make good decisions. At
some bases, I’ve seen ops chiefs that tell them what they want to see
without really understanding what they’re looking at. It’s useless
information. I’ve also seen where there’s the tendency to misinterpret the
data. Luckily, the ops chiefs that I’ve worked for have been very willing to
listen to the information and allow us to explain what it means rather than
them drawing conclusions.”
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Poor Understanding of Asset Management
As the Air Force moves towards a culture of asset management, it may be wise to
ensure that controllers are educated on the principles of the philosophy and how they fit
into it. At this point, a majority of controllers are unaware of what asset management
entails. They also appear to be unsure of the role they play in it. A few respondents
humbly admitted that they did not know what asset management was. Some of those
who had a rough understanding of the concept did not believe that controllers were a part
of it. A common theme shared was that asset management is just another name for the
environmental flight. One controller thought, “Its money and materials. I don’t see how
we fit into it. Maybe we do because we put work orders into IWIMS.”
A handful of interviewees understood parts of the idea. One controller stated, “I
see myself as the person that collects all the data that would go into the process.”
Another shared opinion was that controllers are only responsible for RWP. One
controller hypothesized, “One way we might fit in is with a firm oversight of
RWP…That’s a piece of it. To go in and manage that program: how it should be and
identify all the pieces that play into it, making sure the data is accurate so that life cycles
can be analyzed.” The best definition received was from the youngest interviewee. He
was not taught his definition. Instead, he developed it on his own from the changes he
observed around him. He defined asset management as:
“Managing all property on base whether a facility or real property
installed equipment; making sure you have the correct date of installation;
making sure you have the appropriate preventative maintenance program
to keep the RPIE [real property installed equipment] meeting or exceeding
the life expectancy; being able to capture and show all of that to higher
headquarters.”
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With the lack of guidance provided to controllers, it is hard to assume that many accurate
asset management decisions can be made. The instructions do not exist to explain to
controllers how to perform their job. Standards do not exist to regulate what information
is required. Finally, controllers are not educated on the concepts of asset management
and how their job contributes to its success. The following section looks at the training
that controllers receive to address the shortages in guidance.

Model Comparison
This section compares the results associated with this theme to the Liu et al.
(2007) models provided in Chapter II. The major processes and the individual HPWPs
that were discussed in the results are emphasized by bold lettering and a dotted oval in
Figure 15. The factor of vertical alignment which contributes to the effectiveness of
HPWP implementation in emphasized in Figure 16.
This theme touches on all of the processes. First, it pertains to the process of
enhancing KSAs. The needed guidance to make sure that every controller is learning the
same skills and performing to the same standards was discarded. It also touches on
training. Rather than having controllers trained to the same level, local policies and
emphases have become the only standard for training. It points to the need for other shops
to be trained if they are expected to help maintain data.
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Figure 15: HPWPs and Processes Discussed in Theme #5

Figure 16: Factors that Impacts HPWP Effectiveness Discussed in Theme #5
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If controllers are empowered to do their jobs, they can focus on maintaining the
quality and completeness of the data. When it comes time to use the data, controllers can
be trusted to analyze it and provide supervisors with the desired information. In addition,
the quality of the data comes down to the individual motivation of the controller inputting
it. At that critical point, all the HPWPs employed must work together to ensure that the
data is entered correctly and completely.
Lastly, this theme once again highlights a lack of vertical integration. Asset
management was proposed as an idea that would help the CE community cut costs and
increase efficiencies. Though it appears to be an important topic, controllers are not
educated on how they fit into the process. They are not aligned with the overall CE asset
management agenda.

Further Model Discussion
The HPWPs and their relationships shown in the Liu et al. (2007) models were
gathered from studies of numerous organizational types. Although each organization was
unique, the same common truths emerged when observed together. The military also
presents a highly unique set of circumstances that makes the implementation of some
HPWPs difficult and, at times, impossible. In an effort to keep things standardized and
consistent, many decisions regarding HPWPs are made at the highest levels and apply to
everyone. This discussion addresses the limitations of the military in implementation of
HPWPs.
The three HPWPs prescribed to enhance KSAs are training, selection, and
compensation. As discussed previously, each career field receives training specific to
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their career field supplemented by experienced workers at the lowest levels. In this
regard, training can be tailored by each level of leadership in order to meet the mission
intent. On the other hand, selection and compensation cannot be varied as easily.
Selection of airmen into the career field is done at the Air Force level based on needs,
aptitude tests, and historical indicators. Although this is more advanced than random
assignment, local controllers are not allowed to conduct interviews to choose the best fit
candidates for their organization. The military actually operates from the perspective that
if one airman is removed a second should be easily inserted in their place. Compensation
for performance is possible through creative channels such as day passes or preferred
parking spots. Other than that, few avenues for compensation are available. Military pay
is not decided by the Air Force and cannot be altered at the local level. Retention
bonuses are used, but again, they are offered at the service level.
Internal promotion and incentive compensation are the two HPWPs listed as
motivation enhancers. These two areas are probably the most well known and well
implemented by the military. The promotion system is the backbone of many different
human resource management (HRM) practices. Often times, opportunities are framed as
“promotion helpers” while punishments result in loss of rank and described as “career
enders.” These common views help motivate airmen to perform assuming that promotion
is a goal of most members. More famously, the military is known for its benefits such as
healthcare and retirement. These benefits are often regarded as good reasons to join and
good reasons to stay. Through these two HPWPs, the military is better able to retain
members and increase performance.
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The four HPWPs included in enhancing empowerment are grievance procedures,
flex-time, participation programs, and employment security. Two of these HPWPs were
not discussed in the results of this research. Flex-time refers to flexible schedules and
work environments. Employees can be allowed to work hours when they choose and/or
work from home. These practices are used by some military offices, although certain
demands unique to the military lessen the effectiveness of such variable schedules.
Employment security was also not presented, although it is significant. For the military,
job security is often wrapped up in the benefits previously mentioned.
Grievance procedures are present in the military, although they may not be
available at all levels. For actions such as crimes or discriminations, grievance
procedures are readily available for all members. In less severe cases such as work ideas
or displeasures, the means to make claims are dependent on the personality of the leader.
Leaders may be highly receptive of the opinions of subordinates or they may not.
Similarly, the participation that leaders allow subordinates to have in decisions is highly
dependent on their personalities. The rigid rank hierarchy of the military allows leaders
to make decisions without the permission of the subordinates. Most would argue that
effective leaders listen to their people, yet this is not a requirement. Therefore, the
implementation of these two HPWPs is determined by the perceptions of the leader.
The final HPWP mentioned is HRM planning. This touches on each of the three
processes and is further discussed in the second Liu et al. (2007) model. The second
model includes vertical and horizontal alignment as well as work context. A large
number of the problems described in the interviews resulted from poor vertical alignment
between HRM practices and the Air Force mission. At times, it seemed that controllers
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were being managed one way while the mission required a different approach. Some of
these problems are a result of the fact that many HRM practices in the military are
standardized. While HRM planning may be more effective if implemented at a lower
level, many decisions for controllers are made at the Air Force level and sometimes the
Department of Defense level. Rather than creating a unique management solution for
controllers that places them perfectly in line with the strategic plan, controllers, like most
others, are forced to work within a one-size-fits-all system.
Horizontal alignment is also hindered by standardized procedures. Proper
alignment requires each HPWP to be fitted with complementary practices. Instead, some
practices are simply immovable and are not negotiable at lower levels. By not allowing
some practices to shift, it may be difficult to effectively integrate the HPWPs that are
negotiable. Lastly, the context of the work environment must be considered to properly
implement a successful HPWP system. This requires the HRM planner to create a unique
system that will appeal to the needs of controllers specifically. Unfortunately, this level
of tailoring is not possible within the overall HRM structure of the military.

Summary
This chapter presented the top five themes of HRM problems as perceived by
controllers. Each theme was supplemented with direct quotes from interview subjects as
well as secondary sources. Each theme was related to the models proposed by Liu et al.
(2007). The chapter was concluded with a discussion of the limitations that the military
places on HPWP implementation. The final chapter contains the conclusions reached by
this research.
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V. Conclusions

The purpose of this study was to see if current human resource practices are
contributing to controllers’ perceptions. A phenomenological approach was used to
collect data from controllers throughout the Air Force about their experiences and
perceptions. The results were analyzed by coding them into overall themes. These
results were compared to models of high-performance work practices (HPWPs) to see
what practices could be altered to possibly increase performance. This chapter includes a
further discussion of the results in relation to the investigative questions posed in the first
chapter. The discussion is followed by implications of the results and limitations of the
research; it concludes with a discussion regarding future research topics.

Discussion
The key findings that emerged during this research were presented and discussed
as five themes:
•

#1: Few senior leaders in the career field

•

#2: Unawareness of role

•

#3: Inconsistent employment and recognition

•

#4: No advanced training and

•

#5: Lack of guidance

These broad themes included many resultant problems used to answer the investigative
questions. The first question was if controllers felt they possessed the knowledge, skills,
and abilities (KSAs) needed to perform their jobs well. Based mostly on the problems
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addressed in the fourth theme, controllers perceived that they did not have the needed
KSAs to perform their jobs well. This problem was shown through shortcomings that
occurred in initial tech school training and continued throughout their careers by the
absence of advance training courses offered by the Air Force. In response to that, the
career field placed a heavy emphasis on on-the-job training (OJT). Some controllers
sought out contracted civilian courses while others developed in-house workarounds.
While these fixes helped, the career field as a whole remained without a standard
advanced course. With such an emphasis on OJT, the lack of experience of some of the
senior career field leaders discussed in the first theme also must be considered.
The second investigative question asked if controllers were motivated to perform.
This question was indirectly addressed in the second and third themes. First, controllers
felt that they were not part of the team due to the fact that other members of the squadron
did not understand the role they played in accomplishing the mission. Along with not
feeling like part of the team, controllers felt they were poorly managed based on the jobs
they were given. By employing them to do jobs they felt were meaningless or unrelated
to their career field, controllers felt that leaders did not understand what they did. They
often felt underutilized both at home and while deployed. Lastly, controllers perceived
that the misuse and misunderstanding of what they did sometimes negatively affected
their chances to win awards and get promoted. Despite these issues though, the
controllers still demonstrated pride in their jobs and a motivation to overcome whatever
obstacles they met. Considering these facts, the second investigative question was not
definitively answered.
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The third question looked at how interpersonal relationships between controllers
and other engineers affected job performance. This question was addressed by the
second theme. The unawareness that other members of the squadron had of the
controllers’ role left some controllers feeling that they were not part of the team. This
unawareness further manifested itself in an increased workload for controllers. In some
instances, there was also inter-shop friction. The blame was not always placed on the
other squadron members; some interviewees noted that they and fellow controllers had
mishandled situations. Moments of ignorance from other engineers could be used as
teaching and teamwork building opportunities. Additionally, changes in squadron
practices may have made the circumstances worse. While the interviews did not
explicitly measure performance, it can be reasonably assumed that performance may be
sub-optimal while conflict exists.
The fourth investigative question asked if controllers believed they had the
necessary representation among decision-makers. The answer was “no” based on
problems described in the first theme. Due to changes over 15 years ago, imbalances in
manpower and experience developed in the career field. The result is multiple
undermanned ranks within operation management. Since the higher ranks are not at full
capacity, members of other career fields have been placed in controller supervisor
positions. Along with the manpower problems that continue to propagate, controllers feel
that it is hard for them to get promoted for reasons described in the third theme. Overall,
controllers felt that they were not properly represented.
The final question was whether or not controllers perceived that the product they
produced was reliable. This question was addressed in the fifth theme. Because of a lack
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of guidance, controllers believed that there were issues with the quality of the data being
entered into databases. When regulations were replaced by instructions, specific
guidance on what programs were required and how data had to be entered all but
disappeared. This led to incomplete data files. To compound the issue, data entry was
farmed out to other shops, further increasing the chances of incorrect or incomplete data
entry. Assuming that the data were correct, some controllers identified issues with data
retrieval. There were perceptions that some data were errantly compiled or simply
misinterpreted by decision-makers. Lastly, no guidance on asset management strategies
was provided to controllers despite the fact that they play a significant role in capturing
the data necessary to implement asset management principles. In general, controllers
were not confident in the final product they created.

Implications
At the end of each theme discussion in Chapter IV, the human resource
management practices identified were compared to a model of HPWPs to see which
practices were used and which were absent. At the end of Chapter IV, a further
discussion showed the limitations the military faces in implementing all of the HPWPs
described in the models. It is implied in this research that if a HPWP can be used to
manage controllers, it should not only be used, but also maximized to make up for the
practices that are less negotiable.
Enhancing KSAs is accomplished by training, selecting, and compensating.
While selection into the career field is limited and compensation is decided by the
Department of Defense, the training for controllers is the area that leaders should focus
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on. Throughout the results, controllers voiced a desire to have an advanced course.
Though there are some contracted civilian courses available, the Air Force should be able
to provide a standardized advanced course to the operations management career field.
While controllers desperately need an advanced course, other members of the squadron
also need more training. Other members should be trained on how work flows through
the squadron and what role controllers play in the process. This training would not only
shed light on the importance of controllers but could possibly help them complete their
own jobs more efficiently. Operations Flight chiefs could also benefit from a greater
understanding of what controllers are trained to do and what skills they bring to the table.
Lastly, if the civil engineer community is committed to implementing asset management
processes in hopes of increasing performance, it should consider training all squadron
members on the principles of asset management and how each shop plays a part in them.
Promotion and incentives are the HPWPs used to enhance motivation. While the
incentives of being in the military are impressive, they are the same for everyone. To
specifically increase the performance of controllers, the manner in which members are
promoted should be investigated. The reality may be that smaller career fields simply do
not get as many top ranked positions. If this is the case, efforts must be made to put the
few senior leaders in the best possible positions and enable the most senior controllers to
represent their career field at the same level as other career fields.
The third process of enhancing empowerment can be supported by grievance
procedures, participation programs, the availability of flextime, and employment security.
Grievance procedures are yet another way that controllers can represent the needs of their
career field. Regardless of rank, the most senior career leaders must be afforded the same
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level of consideration for issues that affect their field. This relates to participation
programs. Controllers must be given a chance to make decisions and be trusted to
perform the jobs they have been trained to do. If squadron leaders can make an effort to
embrace controllers, they may empower them to perform their duties at the highest levels
possible. Finally, employment security as far as actual employment is high for military
members. However, controllers may suffer from not knowing how securely they will be
accepted in a new job or while deployed. For this reason, much attention should be
placed on the fairness of the extra duties controllers are tasked with and the validity and
necessity of the jobs they are asked to perform.
Most of the problems reported show a lack of vertical alignment between the way
controllers are managed and the mission that must be completed. In order for HPWPs to
be effectively implemented, the practices used must increase the overall performance of
controllers and enable them to contribute to the mission. When making decisions on how
controllers will be managed, leaders must investigate how that decision will impact
performance. This could be accomplished by giving more authority to the senior
controllers. Increasing their abilities to lead the operations management career field may
also help with horizontal alignment. Career field leaders should be allowed to shape
HPWPs in a way such that the practices complement each other. This also allows them
to place the HPWPs in the proper work context that would most benefit controllers.

Limitations
There were some limitations to this research that may reduce its applicability
across other populations. The first limitation was that not all of the HPWPs mentioned
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are available to members of the military. Due to this fact, those HPWPs were not
discussed much. The impact they may have on other organizations was not necessarily
captured in this study. HPWPs such as selection and flextime may be significant topics
to investigate.
The second limitation was that all of the results were self-reported. This was
inherent to the method used and accepted by the researcher from the beginning. Still, no
data showing quantitative levels of performance were used. With the themes provided by
this research, further studies can be conducted to provide such data.
The third limitation was that not all external factors were presented or considered.
The interviewee’s rank and past experience were gathered to provide some background
while other factors were not investigated. If each subject’s performance reports or
conduct records had been examined, there may have been indicators of why they held
certain opinions.
The final limitation was that only controllers were interviewed. The problems for
other workers, either in the Air Force or the civilian sector, may not be the same. Even if
similarly small career fields or production control workers in civilian manufacturing are
compared, the results may not apply equally. The research would need to be expanded to
other career fields in order to determine the factors that influenced the perceptions
recorded.

Future Research
There are many areas that could be studied in the future to further examine the
areas discussed in this research. The first such topic would be the training available to
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the other members of the squadron who are deeply involved in data collection similar to
controllers. Such areas should include the real property managers, the energy monitors in
the Asset Management Flight, and the maintenance engineers. Each one of these areas
collects and enters equally important data as controllers that will then be the basis of asset
management decisions. Possible problems may be present in their jobs which could also
affect the quality of the decisions made.
A second possible study could analyze the cost differences between developing an
internal advanced course versus sending every controller to a contracted civilian course.
If it is agreed that an advanced course should be required, the price of simply sending
everyone to existing courses should be compared to the cost of developing an Air Force
course which would require a location, curriculum development, and instructors from an
already stressed pool of qualified controllers.
A third future study could look at a single theme identified and use quantitative
methods to measure performance. While leaders may not be able to address every issue
reported in this research, they may decide to focus on fixing at least one area. In such a
case, a method that would produce hard data may be used to quantity the actual impact of
a certain HPWP on controllers.
The final idea for a future study would be to interview groups that are similar to
controllers. This could provide insight into which problems are unique and which are
symptoms of certain circumstances. Possible populations could include other small
career fields in the Air Force, production control clerks in civilian industries, or career
fields with a large number of cross-trained members.

106

Conclusion
In a time when the Air Force is looking to increase performance and reduce costs,
it is necessary to look at different areas that may produce the desired results. One such
area is the use of HPWPs to increase performance. In this study, civil engineer
controllers were interviewed to identify problems they perceived were keeping them from
performing. The identified issues were grouped into themes and compared against
models provided by past studies in human resource management. The results provided
five areas that leaders may investigate in order to make changes. By addressing these
issues, the Air Force may gain the increased performance it requires.
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Appendix A

Question and Response

Open Codes

Subject A
What is your current job and what is the scope
of your responsibilities?
My current job is [omitted]
And what is the STS?
The STS is the …I’ll have to get back to you on
that acronym.
What are your day to day tasks?
Day to day is mainly, is really additional duties on
my end, not really production. Just dealing
with…I’ve integrated myself into [omitted] talking
with AFCESA [omitted] their supervisor is a tech
sergeant and a lot of times they need a master to
help
Ok cool. What...how long have you been a 3e6?
I’ve been a 3e6 for the last 12.5 years.
Ok, is that the only job you’ve done?
No, I was a firefighter for 7.5 years.
Alright cool. What were your previous duty
stations?
Previous stations as an operations manager I was at
the [omitted]. I was a unit deployment manager
and a readiness person looking over the personnel,
their folders, deployments coming in and out. We
overlooked the RWP for all the contingency assets.
Sounds good.
From there I went to the [omitted]. While I there,
my job title was CE NCOIC. What we did was
look over…we were quality assurance evaluators
looking over BOS contracts, facilitation repair on
houses and facilities in the area. We looked over
solid waste, custodial services. Let’s see...we did
pest management and we were the housing office
and also we were the office tending to any of the
projects. Some of what I did…I helped plan
program and implement some pavilions and then
other projects that were going on. I was more like
an EA than a triple nickel.
That’s what it sounds like.
Then from there I went to the [omitted]. And I was
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Mostly does
additional duties

Selective Codes

Not working in ops
management

Helps provide
higher rank

12.5 years
Previously fire
fighter
Served as UDM
and readiness
Looked at RWP of
contingency assets

QAE
BOS contracts
Housing flight
duties?
Built pavilions

Spent a lot of time
not working in
primary job

More like an EA
than a controller

With army, worked
as supply, facility

Not used as
controller during

just doing regular CE customer service. From there
I deployed to Iraq which was on an army base.
While there, I did BOS contracting again,
overseeing just so many different types of things
from supplies to food and water. Also looked over
facilities maintenance and also the CE exchange
between the facility maintenance turnaround from
when our basic trainees left, what needed cleaning
and fixed and then we gave it to the BOS contractor
to fix. I worked for MNSTCI. That was the group
I worked for. They were in charge. Then after
that, I went to the [omittied] and I was the NCOIC
of ops management. While there, I was the
emergency manager until our 3E9s rolled in. I
created a data base for project management. It’s
kinda like you guys’ blue book but in a different
form. I also helped the supply personnel track all
the equipment. And then I was CE CSA after they
pulled all the CSAs out. Then I worked liaisons
with the national guard and reserve folks that were
coming into help build the northwest field facility.
Then, while I was there I deployed out with the
[omitted] to Kandahar, Afghanistan. While I was
in Kandahar I was the superintendent of the tactical
ops center. We got the mail, we tracked convoys,
we did damage control. If there were any attacks,
we did accountability. We did what we could. The
biggest thing was we did a lot of computer support.
We made sure the SWA hut we were in, which was
the HQ, had all the comm in it and then tried to
extend it out. We worked with comm and army
and laid some fiber optics and set up comm and
repaired computers as well.
So it sounds like you’ve done comm, emergency
management and EA stuff.
Yep. And then they also looked at me as a radio
guy. I knew a lot of things. I made sure they knew
how to use them, programming comsec.
Ok.
And then I went back and ran the UCC and then
came here to be the [omitted].
Ok, we’ll keep moving. So this is a big question
for what I’m looking at. What is in your
definition, what do you know about asset
management?
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maintenance, QAE
Served as EM
Served as CSA for
unit
Deployed and
tracked convoys,
got mail, and a lot
of computer
support, laid fiber
optics

Radio guy

An ok idea of asset
management
Focused on

deployments

Umm…my thought process of asset management is
whatever, whether is a piece of equipment or a
facility, you’re following it, making sure it’s
working correctly, it’s repaired correctly, if you
have an RWP set up on it, you forecast when you
need the parts for it. That’s what is consider asset
management.
How do you see that you fit in as an ops
manager?
I fit in the process…I see myself as the person that
collects all the data that would go into the process
of managing the asset. When a customer says it’s
broken, I’ll gather data and submit it to the
craftsmen to get it fixed. They’ll send it back to me
if there’s any parts material or labor. Then I would
track that where it needs to go, put the project on
hold if need be, and then again do what’s needed to
manage the asset.
Ok, so you said it was 12.5 years ago that you
went to tech school, correct?
Yeah. Now a lot has changed.
What your educational background? What
other training or academic degrees have you
done?
I’ve done an AFS from CCAF in fire fighting tech,
an AFS in CCAF in maintenance production
management. I’m in the process of finishing my
bachelors in science and computer technology. I’ve
got background in building databases. With fire,
good grief, the whole list of fire fighting stuff.
Ok.
I have some medical background training as well.
I hadn’t heard of the maintenance management
degree.
Yeah it’s the CCAF for ops management.
Right.
It’s with three other career fields.
So that’s the advanced training you’ve got?
Have you got anything that’s specifically ops
management advanced training?
No. We had a 7-level school and it pretty much
gave us the same info we’d get at basic operations
school.
So where was that school at?
It was at Sheppard. It was the 7-level course they
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equipment

Good understanding
of asset
management

CCAF maintenance
production
management, fire
fighting

Plenty secondary
education

Bachelor’s science
and computer tech

Did medical work
as well

Used to have 7
level school,
though it wasn’t
much good

7-level course
stopped

used to have up until about 5 years ago.
So it doesn’t exist anymore?
Correct.
Cool, so do you feel like you’re being used in a
capacity in which you were trained?
Not really and I guess looking at my career, it’s a
very small amount that’s been utilized like that.
Ok, so maybe you weren’t trained in it, but do
you feel like you have clear guidance for the job
that you’re currently in?
Not really. There’s some days that I really
understand, being the [omitted], I understand where
I’m going. But it seems like the next day I get new
information. I guess it changes day by day. The
interpretation of what a person expects changes.
So what percentage do you think of your current
job tasks are something that you learned in tech
school?
25%
OK, so even if you weren’t trained…wait, that’s
a repeat question. What training do you want,
do you think you need?
Ok, all ops mangers should go to the Alice
Anderson course because…there’s a lot of people
that get the basic information [at tech school] and
go out. They know how to do the basic data input
but beyond that, they don’t know how to get deep
into IWIMS and feel comfortable in running it.
Also IWIMS administration has gone by the way
side where it’s just civilians either doing it or
masters or older folks that have gotten that training
are retiring. I know where trying to go the next gen
but it’s not here yet, so I feel like everybody needs
to go into that process to get a full good grasp of
what a data base is, the IWIMS database. They can
go into it, they can feel really comfortable using it.
What is the Alice Anderson course?
She was an ops manager back in the day and she
was really good at the program. She’s since got out
and has become a multi-millionaire on training
people how to use IWIMS.
Ok I think I took a course with her. I went to a
finance management course here at Wright-Patt
and we brought in a lady that was apparently
the last living person that knew what IWIMS
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Not used how they
were trained
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they were trained to
do
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Likes Alice
No advanced
Anderson course on training offered by
IWIMS
Air Force
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Expertise is retiring

Alice Anderson is
an outside
consultant for
IWIMS

Relies on civilian
training

did. That was probably her. And she’s out of Las
Vegas usually and she’s gone around the world
training people but lately she’s been kind of
holding things off.
In your career field, do you feel that there is a
normal path that traditionally ops managers
follow?
There’s a normal path of just staying in CE and just
working in customer service like regular. They can
just stay there their whole time.
Do you feel that there are enough senior leaders
in your career field? If you have a question for
someone that is an ops manager, do you feel like
you have mentors to turn to?
No. If I could say it bluntly, hellllll no.
Ok, do you think that members of your career
field have an equal or fair chance of promotion?
I think we have a fair chance among ourselves, but
once we get into senior or chief level, I don’t think
we’re fair.
So you mean among CE career fields or Air
Force wide?
I mean among CE. I think in the Air Force it’s fair.
Having the smaller number of people, it’s kind of
difficult. The percentages for career field are
decent at lower levels but we get stuck at senior.
Have you had opportunities to work other areas
within the ops flight or even other areas within
the squadron outside of customer service?
I have not . Everything I’ve done as CE was in
customer service accept my extra duties.
Moving towards just your day to day
performance, what do you think are the top
issues that hinder your daily job?
I think people not having enough people and time
crunches and all the stuff they throw at us. The
biggest thing I look at is people because over the
last ten years or 12, there’s the ebb and flow of
folks and if it had been left the way it was there
wouldn’t be the wrong number of folks we have.
Personnel, time and looking at money is one thing.
Because all people want these jobs done and they
get the top 10 projects and they’re on the lists,
there’s always a backlog of work to get done. The
pile gets higher and higher so you don’t have, you
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keep going back to the work orders to make sure
they’re valid and if we had enough money we
could just continue on and fix them. Things like
quality of life items or IWP items or saber projects,
larger projects below MILCON that needs to get
done.
So you’re saying that you’re managing the
backlog of work orders? That makes sense.
One of the things I feel hinders us day to day is the
fact that no one takes us seriously in a sense.
Where you can say to a shop, “hey this stuff needs
to get done. We’re going to be delinquent.” It just
gets pushed off. By them just pushing it off, it
gives us more work to do. I just feel like people
don’t take us seriously.
What part are you asking them to do? Are you
asking them to get you info or are you asking
them to do the actual work?
You say you have a work order that is urgent that is
becoming delinquent and you say “hey we need to
get some hours on this or we need to pause it for
labor or materials.” Just the whole aspect of “hey
do your part to make sure your part of the work
order is paused so then we don’t have to call you
out on the carpet in the ops flight meetings.” Just
calling folks out on the table because the work
orders are delinquent and then they say “well we
did this and that” and we say “well you didn’t tell
us, [expletive].” Sorry.
Well that makes sense. Alright, one thing I want
to touch on because I want to give you the
chance to comment, do you have any issues with
ACES or IWIMS?
I don’t have any issues with ACES or IWIMS.
Sometimes they are slow but I think that the
amount of training that people get on those for ops
managers isn’t as much as it should as we talked
about earlier.
That’s actually good to know because a lot of
times the systems are getting blamed.
Right I think that if people had more familiarity
with them, they could pull the reports out, they
could just breeze through it and run it really well.
Cool now well move to some stuff that you’ve
already kind of touched on, how you feel the
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People don’t know
what we do

Unawareness of role

other people in the squadron respect you or at
least interact with you. First, do you think that
the other element chiefs and the ops chief, do
you think that they fully understand what your
role is?
No.
And are they not interested in the things that
you’re willing to do? Are you able to do
everything that they want you to do?
They are and you got to the point correct. We’re
willing to do things that they’re not interested in.
We could bring so much more to the fight, if you
call it, and make sure that we’re doing things
proactively, but it just seem like their interest is
into either HVAC, structures, or dirt boys.
So then that leads into do you feel like you’re a
part of the ops flight team?
Not really. We’re there to run the programs and
we’re mostly just off to the side.
Ok, then expanding to the programs flight or
environmental or whatever, do you think other
people in the squadron understand your role?
On that side, no.
Bonus question—when you were in customer
service, how was your relationship with the
programs flight?
You mean more the asset management or the
engineer’s systems?
More the engineers. I came from being deputy
flight commander of the engineering flight and
was referring to whenever a job got created or
got kicked up to us, that kind of stuff. How is
that relationship?
It didn’t seem like it was that good of relationship.
A lot of time we get a 1391 back saying “hey we
need a job for this.” Kind of seemed like we were
working backwards. It just seemed a lot of times
like we were a second thought when we should be
the first thought to make sure everything was going
right.
Do you feel like you’re a part of the team as far
as the squadron is involved?
Not really.
So there’s feeling like a part of the team, but do
you feel like you are respected by the squadron?
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The people that are E5s and below, no, I don’t
think so. They think we’re just folks sitting in the
office doing nothing. There’s a little more respect
for those above but it always seems like they were
like “we really don’t know what you’re supposed to
be doing or we don’t know if you’re really doing
your job what you’re supposed to be
accomplishing.”
Have you ever worked for an ops manager,
where he was your element superintendent?
Like the ops support element super?
Well that has come up recently. The NCOIC of
ops…we used to be under...when I was in the
[omitted], our section was under the deputy ops
flight commander, so it was mainly a young captain
overseeing the flight that had material acquisition
and maintenance engineering.
Do you feel like ops managers are competitive
for quarterly and yearly awards?
No, no.
Why do you think that?
I don’t think we are that able to, our justifications
on things aren’t adequately captured or they’re not
big enough like, for instance, the dirt boys working
in REDHORSE or the fire department and EOD.
Sure, fire department and EOD are big things
among everyone else, but it seems like they look at
us like “you’re just paper pushers” unless you’re
saving somebody.
How often are you asked to do things that have
nothing to do with your job skills?
I’d say a lot. About 70% of our duties.
Do you feel like it’s the way the Air Force is
moving, like everyone’s doing additional duties
or do you think it’s a somewhat unique problem
for ops managers?
I think it’s a kind of a little of both, mainly an air
force problem but they look at us like “you’re in
the office, so you can just pick these things up.”
In your current unit, are all the 3e6s, are they
doing ops management related jobs?
Where I am now, they are.
You touched on this a little earlier but we’ll
touch on it a little more in detail. What are your
typical roles while deployed?
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Quality assurance evaluation. Looking at repair
maintenance and sustainability for facilities on a
base. Tactical ops support, communications,
setting up data links between one point wherever
we’re at such that we’re going forward operating.
Some of things we’ve also been tasked with have
been convoy duties and then damage control.
Do you receive any training on QAE?
A little bit. The basic stuff you get form
contracting.
So I mean during tech school, is that even
covered?
During tech school there’s no QA.
And obviously not comm.
It’s just how to push the button the radio. That’s
about it.
So how much of your time is doing things that
resemble home station duties?
I’d say it varies base to base but I’d say 55%.
And so at the bases you’ve been at where you’re
not doing that job, who to your knowledge is
doing that work?
As in like??
Like keeping up with facilities and the actual
work production, scheduling.
It’s usually us or a contractor. And if you’re
looking back home it’s whoever is left back.
Do you think that the deployments, either the
tempo or what you do while you’re there, do you
think that it’s had an impact on your career
field?
Yeah I think so, especially since were so small.
People heard that word on the street is that we’re
good at multitasking, we can do a lot so we’ve been
picked up for a lot of JET taskings. And because
we’re willing to do the job in those JET taskings,
we’ve been tasked quite a bit. For instance, having
a supply background, or a comm background or the
tracking background, the Army has asked us to do a
lot and asked us to go out on multiple things. It’s
good in the sense that we’re the ones who they
want to go out there and fulfill the military mission,
but there are those folks that continuously get
called up over and over and we don’t have a whole
lot of folks to send out.
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So what options do you think are available to
relieve some of that stress?
More personnel is one. Getting the correct training
to do what were asked to do. Starting at the basic
course, looking at what people ask us to do, that
would help some people to say “hey, I know what
I’m doing when I get there” rather than trying to
figure it out once they get there and kind of soft
shoe dance if you call it.
About retention, do you feel that you have
trouble retaining people?
I don’t know. It’s kind of mixed. I don’t know
why people don’t want to stay in the career field
since it’s relatively easy, but in a sense that people
look at us and don’t take us seriously; people don’t
want to stay in the career field. A lot of folks, they
come in and they don’t know what they’re getting
into. Some get into ops and their recruiters lied to
them, and then some are retrained into ops and they
don’t want to do it. I’ve seen so many
pararescuemen and gung ho young men come in
and they’re like “this is the last thing I wanted to
do. I wanted to do something else and here I am in
this ops career field.” They immediately find what
they can do to make it good or get out of it.
So not necessarily getting out of the AF but
trying to cross-train into something different?
Correct.
How long are you staying? I guess you’re sitting
at 20 years. So you’re getting out next week?
Yeah, yeah I am. I fully retire in February 2012.
So I guess you’re separating because its 20
years…
Well yeah but based on my last base, I wasn’t taken
seriously. I came with a lot of great ideas. I had a
great deployment background, knowledge. The EM
thing, so much background knowledge that could
help my unit out, but yet I was pushed to the side
and told “just sit behind the glass and whenever we
need you to set up the UCC, we’ll break it and let
you out.” So I felt led to change my DEROS and
allow me to come here. It was kinda frustrating
cuz I felt like I was getting squelched. I had all this
to provide yet you want me to do nothing until you
ask me to do it.
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And so do you think that’s the leading cause for
people wanting to get out?
I’ve talked to a lot of masters and techs in the
career field and they feel the same way.
So you’re seeing people are coming in like
“whoa this is not a job I want to do”?
Right.
That’s all the questions I had written but I’ll
give you the chance to clarify any points or
touch on any other areas. Feel free to open up.
One thing you didn’t ask was “do you feel like
you’re being used at capacity?” I say no, I don’t
think so. Like at tech school we get the tracking
stuff, the database stuff and then we go out and
sometimes the database were using is either
IWIMS or maximo like in Guam since we were
with the navy for joint basing. So instead of just
teaching IWIMS we should teach how to use
databases in general to understand the process of
how one works to feel comfortable using any
database you go to. A lot of times we have guard or
reserves that go to training and they use IMES or
BEAMS or something else on that side. I know the
NexGen program that comes out is supposed to
squelch all that, but if everyone understood how a
database works, it’d be a lot easier to come into and
say “it’s a database and I know how it works. I just
need to get used to it.” Whether it needs to be
access training or excel or whatever, visual basic.
Stuff like that would help out. I know it sounds
like it’s beyond what they want us to do, but if you
don’t understand how a database works you’re not
going to be able to adjust whatever database comes
at you, there’s no way to trouble shoot it.
Do you think there’s stuff that you did get
trained for that you’re not using at all?
No I think we utilize it in one sense or another. I’m
thinking of going to the tech school. I think there’s
a lack of training for the things that should go into
it. We get out there and we get trained on say 15%
of the things that we should be doing. Maybe it’s a
core thing from the folks that are training. We got
so many things going on we can’t get people proper
training to make them understand what’s going on.
Like database type things. We get a little bit of
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IWIMS here then they go to the CE squadron and
don’t get a whole lot. All we get is how to input
stuff into the database and we get good at that but if
you don’t go to an Alice Anderson class, you don’t
know how to set up an RWP cycle or adjust the
whole RWP to make sure the database is running
well. Or setting up the…there’s a way to get a
report. Most people just transfer the file to excel
and then play with it there rather than utilizing the
program itself.
I’m thinking about some points I’m trying to
answer with these interviews and so two areas I
guess that I need to go in a little harder. For
one, what do you think the quality of the data is
that is getting entered in? If you went into
IWIMS and you had to make a decision based
just on what you saw there, how confident
would you be that the info is good and up to date
and complete?
I’d say not very good; garbage in and garbage out.
It’d depend on the airman entering in there, what
the base emphasizes on how much info you put in
there. Then you have the integrity of the individual
putting it in. I don’t think…don’t know if it’s the
individual putting it in or what’s emphasized,
making sure you get all the info in there. Beyond
that, it goes to the shop, what info they should be
putting in there, why they can’t perform the job or
what material or if there’s an issue with the delay
of material. More info needs to be put into IWIMS
so people can get into that work order to find out
what’s going on.
When you said that part of it is what the base
emphasizes, do you only put info in based on the
reports that they’re going to want?
It’s mainly based on the info you’re given; either
the customer or the shop foremen or craftsmen
that’s working on the job. That’s where you get the
information. It’d be better if the foremen put the
info in themselves and that way they’d have
firsthand information instead of using us as a
funnel to get into it. A lot of times we’re used
which is a good thing, for us to be accountable for
the info, but if they’re not giving us the information
that something’s going on good, bad, or ugly, then
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the info doesn’t get into IWIMS.
So if you don’t get it from them initially, is there
any effort to try to go back and complete all the
files, like going back to the shop to get missing
info?
Yes, and depending on what kind of job it is and
what additional info needs to be put into it, but on
an everyday job, it just is minimal info put in.
Again, it really depends on the individual’s esprit
de corps on how much gets in there. You can have
a gung ho firewall 5 guy that puts in all kinds of
information, but then you have an airman that just
doesn’t care who’s doing it for some college money
or a get out of jail free card. They’re going to put
in the minimal info. If their supervisor doesn’t
emphasize it, the info won’t get in.
That leads into the other part I wanted to ask.
We’ve talked about you not feeling like you’re
part of the team, not taken seriously. Do you
think that then has an effect on job
performance?
Yes, especially when folks say “you’re just playing
video games during the day or just zooming
YouTube, or something.” A lot of times, people
are screwing around, but the supervisor needs to be
on them, again integrity. It’s great to have the
ability to be on the internet, but perhaps the Air
Force has let the door open a little too much,
allowed too much in that people may get distracted.
But in a whole, people look at us as just sitting in
front of a computer not doing anything, answering
phones. People think “if that’s all you think I’m
doing, then that’s all I’m going to do.”
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Appendix B

Question and Response

Open Codes

Subject B
Have you always been a 3E6?
Yes sir, I came in as a 555 back in 1991.
Ok cool and then if you could give an
explanation of your duty history. I know
it’s been a long career, so if you just wan to
highlight what positions you held and what
you did in those jobs.
I came in 1991 to [omitted] as an airman in
training and deployed to Operation Restore
Hope in 92-93 for 60 days. We built their
base in Egypt. I did some training in data then
moved on to [omitted] and did customer
service airman work. Moved from there to
[omitted]. Again just basic customer service,
calls, no deployments. From there went to
[omitted]. There I had several positions
starting in zoning work then going to the self
help store and from there to the facility
manager monitor in charge of the facility
management program for all of [omitted] for a
year and a half. From there I was NCOIC of
scheduling and programming. During those
six years, I had a deployment to Kuwait and
one TDY to an Alice Anderson course for
work control which was two weeks long.
Then I had a TDY to the 7-level course where
I was a DG. After that, I went to [omitted] as
a brand new tech sergeant. Had a lot of good
experience there, NCO of the quarter. I
learned many aspects of supervision before
going to the academy. I had two personnel
that had article 15s and had two that were
below the zone, one airman of the year. So I
had the full spectrum of subordinates from
some that were insubordinate to some super
stars. I learned the whole gamut of
supervision. I went to the academy after I
learned all that stuff. Also had a deployment
to Al Dahfra. After there, I moved to
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[omitted]. There I made master sergeant. I
was section chief for planning, the 3E6s ops
management, and a small material acquisition
section. Also deployed to Kosovo for four
months. After [omitted], I went to the job I’m
currently holding as [omitted] and from here I
had one deployment to Afghanistan. I was
awarded [omitted] this year for work with
[omitted]. That’s my career in a nutshell.
Sounds like you were doing customer
service most the time doing that job.
Well at [omitted], but from there I dispersed
out to facility management as a specialized
area. Scheduling and planning is specialized
area. At [omitted], I was NCOIC over all
operations as far as experience with
supervising civilians.
That’s stark contrast to a gentlemen I
talked with previously. He was hardly in
any typical 3E6 jobs. He was all over the
place. What is your academic background
as far as other degrees?
Of course I hold my CCAF in my current
career field and associates for University of
Maryland University Colleges in business
administration. I hold a business certificate
from University of Maryland.
Did you find that the maintenance
production course helped you with your
actual job?
It could be a little bit better and is something
they should probably look at because it’s
come up over the last year. A lot of others in
the career field have brought it up since then.
What other training have you received
specific to your career field? You said Alice
Anderson and 7-level?
Alice Anderson course kind of brought the
light bulb on because before that it was OJT
so you picked up whatever your supervisor
told you. The Alice Anderson course tied
everything, all those little tid bits you learn
over time together so you understand how
they go together. Its two weeks and definitely
an excellent course.
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How do you go to that course? Who offers
it and how many people get to go to it?
It’s a contracted course so it’s up to your
commander or organization if you have money
for it. There’s no set pot of money at HAF or
MAJCOM for it. ACC manages their money
better for offering courses. [Omitted] setup
some courses for his 3E6s, got all his people
in the command two positions and then got his
folks to those and funded them.
What about the 7-level course? I’ve heard
it’s gone away. How useful was that when
you took it?
I don’t think it was too useful for 3E6s
because the first week was an overview of
IWIMS. More beneficial to the craftsmen
because it dove into areas that they needed to
know how they use and go in and make
comments. Pretty much all 3E6s could take
the first week test and pass with flying colors.
So as far as the 7-level course going away, for
the most part, it hasn’t impacted the career
field. Saying that, I’ve been trying to work
and advanced course and [omitted] has kind of
been working that material. What we as 3E6s
want to see is an advanced course for the
career field. Hard because if it looks like a 7level they say “how does it contribute to the
war effort?” Money is a big thing. Over the
last few years it’s been even worse. We’ve
talked it up but I’ve been kept at bay on that as
far as getting anything solid. It kind of just
gets mentioned later down the road. We’ve
been kicking the can for a while.
Do you feel like you’ve been trained to do
what you’ve been asked to do?
I think as an airman coming up, whatever
tasks I was given I was provided guidance on
what I needed to do it, but once you get past
those initial things like scheduling and
programming you pretty much depend on
what I learned in the Alice Anderson course
and taught myself. There’s no real course to
teach that what you should look at when you
become a 7-level. There’s no specific
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guidance. That’s why when I was a tech
sergeant leaving [omitted], I said if I were in a
position to help change it I would, so I
[omitted] because we do need an advanced
course. What we should do, looking at 7level. At every base, everyone’s different,
different MAJCOMs, some are better than
others at providing guidance and mentorship.
So what other training do you think would
benefit?
We need to look. I’ve been working with
USAFE. Kind of took what Alice Anderson
was providing as a template and kind of built
more upon that as far as what we need to have
in a course. She provides fundamental work
control course but also has more advanced
courses in IWP, RWP and those type areas.
We need to have a two week course and kind
of hit all those areas.
As far as career goes, is there a normal
career progression or typical path for a
3E6?
Yeah, I mean if you look at the tree, pyramid,
airmen come in, then 3-level, 5-level upgrade
training. Then were trying to train the 5-level
in the advanced course. 7-levels need just a
few QTPs and core tasks, a few things. Other
than that, there’s no advanced course, just wait
your time. Pretty limited number of
superintendents of positions, usually saved for
infrastructure, horizontal, vertical, or your dirt
boys. They have a lot more numbers, so they
tend to hold those positions. So as a master
sergeant, you’ll be the section chief or
NCOIC, unless you make senior master
sergeant. But based on our numbers, most of
those 12 positions, they’re at AFISR, a couple
at Kadena and Ramstein, probably one at
Colorado. The rest are more special position
duties created for senior master sergeants.
So do you feel that there are ample senior
members in your career field for when all
levels of career field need guidance? Are
there ample levels of mentors at the senior
level?
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Right now tech to master is really hurting as
far as manning numbers, so within a squadron,
there’s not enough of that leadership. A lot
are being filled by cross-trained tech sergeants
like from AGE or other career fields. And
now we’re trying to recover since they cut too
much, trying to rebuild those positions and get
numbers up. We do have ACC and material
command and I’m sure places at other
MAJCOMS, that have FAMS for 3E6 that I
do provide info to or ask questions to if I get a
tasker down that I feel like I shouldn’t answer
for the whole career field. I ask them “what’s
your command’s feedback on this or what’s
your feel?” Young airmen get feedback, but
it’s feedback from the field where there NCO
is deployed and they’re by themselves, so they
go on about their business and when the NCO
comes home, they leave then. We have master
sergeants that are water/waste management or
from other shops because there’s no other tech
or master. They’re filling in where there’s a
void. We only have 52% masters on the
books. They’re not giving 3E6 mentorship. If
anything, they’re asking the senior airman for
a report they need for the boss. If they’ve had
the training or not, they can provide something
to that master. If the tech and masters aren’t
there, it’s really missing.
Do you feel members of your career field
have a fair chance at promotions?
At senior airman, staff, tech, percentage wise,
it’s as good as anyone else. Once you meet
master, if you’re a 2SOX1, you have better
numbers to get promoted. If you’re a really
super troop, we only get usually two slots for
senior master sergeant. Are the other
candidates better than the master sergeants in
other career fields? Perhaps maybe they are,
but you know based on the numbers that we
have we don’t have the numbers. That
happens in other career fields. There are more
seniors and chiefs in 2SOX1 career field than
in my total career field. There are only 431
authorized active duty.
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So I guess fair is a relative term because it
is fair based on percentage. It’s just
unfortunate that there’s not that much
room at the top.
Yeah, the smaller the career field is, the more
cut-throat it is to get promoted. It goes back
to master sergeants. If you want to make
senior—do I want to mentor my airmen or do
I look out for myself? You need to do top
three, you need to deploy, get recognized, to
get annual, quarterly awards. Do you spend
less time with your airmen mentoring them
because you’re doing those things to make
senior? Then yes.
What are your top issues that hinder your
day to day job performance?
Well here at [omitted], I have three big
projects, but people keep you from getting
them done. Seems like we daily get
redirected. Financial constraints lead to work
to prioritize TDYs which takes a lot of extra
stuff.
Well if you look back to the last time you
were at base level…
Well it’s been a while, four years. I think the
biggest thing I hear from airmen and I
remember myself. A lot of the folks want to
deploy because they do so many extraneous
tasks at home. Commander’s calls, extra
duties, guard the gate. So they tend to want to
deploy so they can concentrate on their duty,
do my mission and come back.
That’s interesting because I was under the
impression that people weren’t doing their
duties while deployed, that they were
getting deployed out of their normal tasks.
When I went as an airman to Egypt and then
Kuwait and Al Dahfra, I always did the core
prime beef duties, work control, command and
control, the stuff we train for ORIs and ORE.
Maybe not airfield recovery since we haven’t
worried about that kind of enemy, which is a
good thing. When I went to Kosovo I did
more facility management, was in charge of
quarters. So yeah, I was still doing my job.
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The last time with the Corps of Engineers, I
was supposed to be QAE of projects, but they
wanted us more to be NCOIC of operations.
Some did contract prep, but myself was
mostly first sergeant, facility management, did
movements, getting my folks from one place
to another which is kind of what 3E6s do, but
any 3EX could have done. A dirt boy could
do that job. I wrote 20 pages of continuity of
tasks that weren’t QAE type stuff. Just doing
odd jobs. My earlier deployments were in line
with training, but the latest, not so much.
How much of the time in the career field
have you used what you learned in tech
school? Are there things you learned that
you don’t use or stuff you do that you were
never trained for?
Well tech school was so long ago back in ‘91.
Some of the things that stick out in my mind,
there were a lot of dirt boys cross-training to
3E6. I don’t remember working in IWIMS.
We did a little in DSWs, but I just remember a
lot of organization—who is prime beef? What
are the different sections? The different shops
and more of those kinds of aspects. I think the
courses have gotten better, though they still
need improvement. The course now, we have
an actual UCC mock up that we didn’t have in
‘91. There wasn’t that kind of training. I
think I got most of my training at [omitted].
Most of UCC stuff was at home station.
Service call type stuff, computer, stuff like
that you hit a little at tech school. Most
training was OJT. But it’s definitely changed
since then.
Do you feel like there are things you were
trained in or things you are able to do that
you aren’t getting to do? Stuff that you
could offer that people don’t necessarily
want? You ever feel like that? Did you say
“hey I could do this” but no one really
listened to your offerings?
When I was in [omitted] which was my last
assignment as a traditional 3E6, to the captain,
I said “hey I can run reports for you guys, for
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EPRs or what you’ve done. We have stuff we
can do for your shop to show or prioritize your
requests.” We even gave classes, built our
own enhancement classes where part of the
3E6s showed the craftsmen that you can do
these yourselves or we could offer this. I
think more than anything they were positive to
what I knew or learned over the years between
OJT and teaching myself, Alice Anderson. I
don’t think they knew that. Maybe it’s
because the 7-level school went away and the
craftsmen weren’t learning that anymore. It
was up to us as NCOs to offer that course to
CE to other craftsmen since we knew they
were lacking it. We as senior NCOs realize
that it’s been dropped. Are other bases doing
that? Perhaps not. When I showed them what
I could do they were impressed.
That leads into the next question. Do you
feel the other members of the ops flight or
the ops chief himself fully understands your
role and abilities?
I think it depends on where you go. My ops
commander was a captain that came from the
support group, so she was pretty much new to
that role, so she asked questions. She was
smart, she asked the senior NCOs and I pretty
much mentored her on what we could do for
her, what are capabilities were, what we were
supposed to do. As far as other senior NCOs,
the chief, I guess maybe I’ve been lucky to
have the good ones where they knew what we
could do or they asked. I’m sure there’s
plenty people out there that are working with
folks that don’t know, especially with the 7level course gone. You have younger NCOs
becoming seniors and getting in charge and
don’t have that background and don’t know
what we can provide them. You might have
airmen that are NCO s now that don’t
understand what they can do because they
haven’t had the Alice Anderson course or that
tech or master there to mentor them.
Deployed and undermanned. When there’s no
one there, the airman doesn’t know what
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they’re supposed to tell the ops chief that they
can provide this to you. There’s no standard
to provide them.
Do you feel like a part of the team in the
ops flight?
When I was working it? With the captain or
with the other senior NCOs I’d say yes, but
with some senior NCOs and in the shop level,
you get that feeling that you’re not, more
looked at as CSS or administrative red tape
that they have to do. They don’t understand
what’s required or why it’s really necessary.
You’re more of a hindrance than helping, but
for me, I saw it more at the lower level.
What about throughout the rest of the
squadron in the other flights?
That’s a good question. I would say the
people we work directly with in programs or
asset management know what we’re doing
since we interact with them, dropping work
orders off or updates to real property. I’m
interacting and talking with them, we have
that relationship, but generally your 3E5s,
civilians, some officers don’t know. Maybe
the 3E5s know more if they’re working
deployments with you. There’s probably
some disconnect in the programs flight.
Do you feel that you’re respected by the
other members of the squadron?
Respected?….never really had any issues as
far as the squadron. More just craftsmen
always thinking that maybe we’re more of a
hindrance than a help, but that goes to the
3E6s needing to explain themselves to the
shop leads to educate them. It’s all about
networking and communicating. If you
actually bring something to the fight and show
what you can do for them or how it impacts
them, you get that respect. It goes that way
with any job.
Do you feel like retention is an issue for ops
managers?
For sure because I see the numbers the last
three years. Retention is a huge thing. I see
the surveys. Maybe it’s AFPC cutting so
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much. We had an airman at Ramstein that got
cross-trained out of 3E6 into 3E6. It made no
sense at all because they cut too much.
Wow!
It just seems like AFPC is riding the wave or
the wrong part of the wave. By the time
they’re into their cuts, we’re in the down slope
and they’re cutting too much. I saw that back
in 2000 in [omitted]. We had 20 brand new
airmen but only had slots for a quarter of them
but the Air Force was plus-ing up. Of course
then we start cutting again in 2005-6. Right
before I left [omitted], they were trying to fix
the deep cuts. Now we’re kind of hurting.
That’s led to one to one, especially in 7-levels
at 52% master sergeants, 70% techs. But the
one to one deployments they get tasked and
we still have special duty assignments that
staff, techs, and masters get pulled out to be
facility managers at intel squadrons and other
areas. We addressed this several years ago but
maybe to the wrong people. We said we’d
keep them filled even though they’re outside
the prime beef mission. I heard a story of an
airman that was a single mom, went to Korea,
came back and did a year deployment, and in
six months deployed. They told her, “by the
way, when you get back, you’re going back to
Korea.” She got out at 15 years because over
five, years she’d see her kid for only one year.
Do you think that’s the main reason for
retention issues? You talk about manning
getting cut, but the people you do have, can
you keep them?
I’d have to look at my numbers and get that
answer to you later. We have so many people
cross-training in and still have problems.
We’ve got a bunch of new airmen getting
filled in. In our year groups from 13-17,
there’s only two or three people when there’s
supposed to be 10. When the older ones
retire, there won’t be much left at the top.
You’ll have less and less seasoned guys. They
will be more robots than actual people that
know their jobs.
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That makes sense that just because people
have been around for a long time doesn’t
mean they’ve matured at that same rate.
You’re correct. When I came in, it took
forever to make staff and tech. Nowadays, it’s
like boom, boom. You can be a staff or tech
in a leadership position, but how much
experience did you really get because you got
there so quick? As far as that stick time or
time with airmen. You could be a master with
only a few years actually in charge of people.
What kind of leader are you going to be?
So another area of my research, what is
your definition of asset management?
You want the book answer?
Well how do you see yourself fitting into it?
I think 3E6s are important because we’re
working a lot of those metrics as far as
capturing or managing those between RWP,
work orders and requests. Me being here and
not in a squadron, I’ve found it hard to know
or learn from anyone the answer I’m really
looking for. What are we doing at the
squadron level to provide that info? The
feedback I’m getting is that mainly them
looking at RWP as far as asset management.
Do you need to replace stuff or does it need to
be in the program? Is asset management a
program? I’ve heard it’s a tool.
I think it’s more of a mindset that can be
applied to everything from people to
facilities. Would you be confident making a
decision based on IWIMS data alone?
Alone? I guess it would matter what base I’m
at, how much training the airman has had
because…let’s break it down. With work
requests—I take a request and of course some
come in that have RAC codes. Now is my
airman trained enough to know to put those
into the system? When it goes to planning and
goes to the board, I’m the ops chief looking at
requirements. Am I getting the whole picture?
But there are a lot of places in the process that
can get fouled out.
What problems have we discussed today
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that affect data entry? It sounds like
you’ve said mostly that the lack of
mentorship and training is suspect. What
the airman knows determines what they put
in. Am I saying that right?
Well I went to the school house last year. I
said “you’re showing them how to enter data
but you’re not giving them the fine intricacies
of why you’re entering some things or what
the correct data is.” If you have the trainer
explain that, they’ll know why they’re doing
stuff. But if they came out of tech school a
year ago and their supervisor didn’t teach
them, then maybe it gets overlooked and the
problem perpetuates. Really it’s left to
whoever is left to do the teaching. Once we
hit that 18-19 year mark, we have a big gap in
experience.
Do you see any kind of critical failure
points in the future? Anything completely
broken?
Well the young techs and masters getting
promoted now that haven’t had the mentorship
and training. It’s hard to quantify without
surveying or talking to each one of them. But
that little bubble I mentioned, the young techs
and masters that got promoted quick because
there’s less in front of them. Do they have the
knowledge and leadership experience to fill
those positions? We complain we’re always
stuck as a section chief, but if the people were
promoting don’t know that much, they won’t
be able to advance themselves. It’s a good
question—how do we quantify what’s going
to happen? Have we trained them enough
thorough OJT?
You’ve mentioned the advanced course a
lot. What is the timeline? Is there support?
Any roadblocks?
The biggest roadblock is funding. Now with
TDYs getting cut and money being tighter for
courses, everyone is fighting to justify a
course. It’s hard to tie back to wartime
mission. My boss has been in communication
with [o] about a course. I’m still hopeful
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based on what the chief said, but it’s kind of
been put off until FY12 to look at again. Still,
I don’t feel any ownership. We have to be
able to let them know the costs and
consequences. I have some work to do. This
will be the third year in a row that’s just talk,
talk, talk.
Do you feel like IWIMS or ACES are
getting in the way?
Well it’s nice to have a system to help
organize what you’re doing. It goes back to
asset management about figuring out what we
should do. IWP is in the system but only a
few MAJCOMs use it. It goes back to the AFI
in dictating what you have to do. When regs
changed to pamphlets, 85-2 went from 200
pages to 10 pages in 32-1001. It lets you do
whatever you want if you’re not getting
measured. There’s no AFI.
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Appendix C

Question and Response
Subject C
Have you always been a 3E6?
I have, I came in 1989 as a 555, so I’m
probably one of the only originals left in the
Air Force. Not many of us that came in as a
production control specialist.
If you just want to give me a rundown of
your duty history including deployments
and what you did at each one of those jobs.
My first base was [omitted]. Total of 10
PCSs and six deployments. First 10 bases:
[omitted] here where I’ll finish up.
Everywhere but here, I worked in the
customer service, production control office
pretty much doing 3E6 stuff. [omitted] I was
the operations support flight superintendent,
which customer service and all the functions
of production control fell under me. Pretty
much every base but here at [omitted] I’ve
done actually traditional 3E6 work to include
a lot of those deployments except the last two,
Iraq and Afghanistan.
What did you doing during those two?
During the Iraq deployment, I was
superintendent of ops support section at Ali
air base in Iraq. I had vehicle maintenance
under me, I had the computer support folks,
the engineering assistants, material control,
PERSCO, had all the nontraditional functions
under me and then the craftsmen were on the
other side of the building. Then in
Afghanistan, I was the liaison between the
[omitted]. I let them know what we could do,
what we couldn’t, get projects for our guys to
work on, looked at projects across the AOR.
In your current job, what makes it
different?
We don’t do any traditional 3E6 stuff. We do
a little bit of tracking projects, but not much.
We don’t have access to IWIMS. I do a lot of
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ACES work with our UTCs, trying to manage
those and make sure we’re good to go for
deployments and stuff like that. We do a little
facility management stuff, not me so much. I
monitor it all but we all manage [omitted].
Other than that, everything else we do is not
traditionally what 3E6s do. We have huge
radio accounts that we manage, CRO
accounts, personal wireless communication
accounts that we manage even though we
have comm folks, we serve as backups to
those accounts. Other than that, not a whole
lot not a real need for 3E6s [here] in my mind.
How many are there right now?
Just me. We have four authorizations and
I’ve lost everybody but me.
So you attended tech school back when you
came in…
No, I never went to tech school.
Never went to tech school? How’d that
happen?
I joined in ‘89 back when they had what they
called direct duty airmen, so I graduated from
basic training, went on leave and then they
assigned me right out to my unit in [omitted].
So I went straight from basic up there as a 1level and they stuck me in my CDC 3-level
upgrade. I had to kind of learn it from my
supervisors.
So what other academic background do
you have?
High school, CCAF and a little bit of other
college.
OK, your CCAF, was that in maintenance
production management?
Yeah.
Did it actually help in your 3E6 duties?
No not really. Most of it you get from your
military training, basic and your tech schools.
Then you just take your core classes like
speech, English, math, history. Maybe speech
and English might have helped a little bit.
But the other ones really didn’t.
Have you had any other training since
then? Any advanced course or outside
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classes?
Yeah I’ve had some advanced courses—work
order, cost management with Alice Anderson.
She was one of the original people that
developed IWIMS. She consults now and
goes around to different bases and instructs in
IWIMS and I’ve taken her RWP class, her
funds class, her work control class, her
advanced work order cost management class.
I’ve gone down to the [omitted] and did a
pretty in depth project management course
down there and then we have some upcoming
ACES training I’ll be involved in.
Who’s offering that?
Were actually bringing a guy up from Gunter,
Alabama so he can train a bunch of us, you
know, since budgets are so tight right now.
It’s more cost effective to bring him here than
sending 25 of us down there.
When you say a bunch of us you mean 3E6
and other shops?
No I’m talking me and some other folks in the
unit.
I’m amazed by the whole Alice Anderson
thing. You’re not the first to mention it.
The fact that she is our main source of
training…
She definitely has a monopoly that’s for sure.
She’s been doing it for, the first class of hers I
went to was back in the ‘90s. Then I went to
classes of hers from everywhere I’ve been.
She came to [omitted] as well as gave a bunch
of classes. We paid for her to come and travel
and put her up and then we paid additional for
each student in the class. She’s done fairly
well off the Air Force for sure.
When you’re working in traditional 3E6
roles, did you feel that you were trained to
do all the stuff you were asked to do?
Yeah if felt like I was trained to do what I was
asked to do. Of course we do a lot of things
that are outside of our career field since a lot
of folks don’t know exactly what we’re
supposed to do I guess. And that’s been a
sore spot for a lot of 3E6s over the years.
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“Why do we have to do that, it’s not our job?”
So you kind of gotta nip it in the bud and you
know, suck it up and do it, I guess.
Do you think there’s any training that
would benefit you all that you’re not
getting? Something that would help?
Yes, as a matter of fact, with the new material
control portion that was added to our CEFTP
for the career field. It would have been nice if
some sort of training would have been
established before they dropped that bomb on
us. What happened is that they updated the
CFETP but didn’t offer any type of training to
say “ok were going to put these 15 new tasks
in your rating plan but here’s a class you can
send your folks to in order to get them signed
off.” For instance, here at [omitted], if I have
a person that comes in that doesn’t have all
those tasks sign off, I have to find some place
to send that person because one, we don’t
have access to IWMS, and two, I could send
her to the base, but the base material control
section is contracted out and it’s not in their
contract to train a military person on material
control. The 3E6s at main base that I often
deal with a lot and sometimes I help them out
with their training, they’re still not trained on
all that stuff. It’s been close to a year since
that stuff has come out and they still have to
get their folks to a training course to get them
signed off. The last girl [omitted] I had
working here, she actually PCS’ed without
having any of it signed off, had to get a
special letter that the commander signed
saying we didn’t have the capability to do it to
get trained in those items. That would have
been good if they had said, “Here are 15 new
items for your plan. Here’s a course where
you can send your folks and it’ll be funded by
your command or Air Force, not your unit.
It’s not their fault that new tasks got added.”
But they didn’t, so that was kind of
disappointing. A lot of times you don’t have
the time to do all that research and find out. I
called bases in Arizona and Georgia to see if
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they had some folks down there to help train
these guys on material control. They didn’t
have time to do it.
Do you see that there are enough senior
leaders in your career filed to account for
all the younger troops, to mentor them?
No, what I think is if you’re lucky, you might
come across a 3E6 that’s been a 555 for a
while and really, really knows the career field.
We’re critical on master sergeants and we
only have 12 or 13 seniors. We’re only about
400 strong anyway. The senior master
sergeants, half of those are working outside
the career field in different odd jobs. I just
think that with master sergeants at 52%, not
every base has a senior NCO that their airmen
can look up to or ask for help. There’s just
not enough of us to go around. Nothing
against the officers, but they’re not trained in
the production control side of things. They’ve
probably been taught a little about it but
nothing that will help as we go about in our
training.
I know, I was the ops support chief back at
Barksdale and yeah, I was learning from
them. I didn’t know much. There was so
much in it that I learned something new
every day. What do you think about the
expertise and experience base that exists in
the techs and masters?
I think it’s a little on the, it could be better.
There’re a lot of techs and masters that
haven’t spent a lot of time in the career field.
You can make rank if you study the books.
You don’t necessarily have to work in the job,
all though it does help. Me, I’ve always
worked in this career filed since the day I
came in. I was the heavy repair controller.
I’ve known that since day one. A lot of guys
are corsstrainees or brand new 3E6s. They
don’t really know the career field. They know
IWIMS but the deep down bones, I don’t
think they know. That’s kind of bothersome.
For instance, there’s a tech sergeant select
coming here from [omitted]. I asked what her

143

No senior leaders
Most bases don’t
have a senior NCO
in their sections

The expertise and
experience not
necessarily
congruent with the
rank
Many crosstrainees
Some stay in jobs
outside of primary
role for a long
time

No senior leaders
available at base
level

Experience gaps at
top
Assignments
outside of primary
role prevalent

experience was. She said, “From 2002 to
2008 I was in a medical logistics office at
[omitted] med center. I didn’t have IWMMS
access, never fired an M16, never had radio
training, never went to Silver Flag.” Now
she’s at [omitted] doing a facility
management job from 2008 to now. Still
hasn’t, she wears civilian clothes, hasn’t fired
a weapon, no 3E6 training. Now they want to
send her here without any training, when she
really needs to go to a main base so she can
get all that training. Never been deployed
never had contingency training whatsoever.
Folks like that know the books but don’t
know the job.
She was a 3E6 the whole time or crosstrained?
Yep, 3E6 the whole time. Went to tech
school, got sent to [omitted] and then facility
management. There’s another question you’ll
ask later, but my answer is that there are a lot
of 3E6s that work outside of the career filed
on special duty. I had a girl that worked for
me at [omitted] that’s now at Fort Meade,
Maryland that works as a facility manager.
Not in a CE unit, but working for the army.
Really anyone can do a facility management
job, doesn’t have to be a 3E6. We have one in
Belgium, a couple others spread out, one in
Maui. All these folks could be brought in to
units that are really stressed right now. That’s
been a major concern of the career field. It’s
been brought up a few times, reeling these
guys back into the career field. Got to beef up
the units that have two or three with six or
seven authorizations.
Do you feel people in your career field have
a fair chance at promotions?
I do. As long as they study. Of course our
career field is the smallest in CE, so
historically the career field is the toughest to
get promoted in with EOD, fire, readiness.
Still over the years, if you look at promotion
rates, we get what we deserve. At one point
we had the highest cutoff in the Air Force
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from senior airman to staff sergeant. Since
2003, I’d say, the cutoffs have dropped below
300 which was never the case when I was
coming up in the ranks. It’s getting better I
think. Cutoffs are dropping. If they know the
job or not, who knows yet. They know the
books, but don’t know the job.
What do you think are the biggest
hindrances for doing your job?
[omitted] I guess in the squadron, I’d say all
the non related 3E6 stuff that we do since
we’re up in the head shed. We get tasked
with the odds and ends. It can be anything to
cleaning the building to getting put on base
cleanup teams, all the additional duty stuff
usually comes down to the ops center because
we’re right there. The commander, first
sergeant can point at us and say “the 3E6s can
do it.” I think that’s the biggest thing over the
years. We’re just so close that we get stuck
with the extra duties. Base details, urinalysis,
that kind of stuff.
Any other big issues?
I don’t think I’ve had a challenge big enough
that we couldn’t perform our duties. I could
say prime beef, but that’s the main reason
why we’re here. So it’s not really a
hindrance. Maybe training would be an issue.
Tech school to me, our tech school should be
completely rebuilt from the ground up. It’s
not doing anything for the airmen going to
base.
You want to expand on that?
When I was at [omitted], I had 21 3E6s
working for me. We were the largest 3E6 unit
in the AF, maybe [omitted] rivaled us some.
Whenever I get new airmen in, you get a
report card from their tech school that follows
them. “He was great, here are his scores.”
You then go online to fill out a critique and
what you think about the airman. How
they’re doing in your unit after graduating
tech school. So I’d sit them down one on one
and ask “how’s tech school? Looks like you
did pretty well in all your areas.” They’d say
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“the teachers would fall asleep, people texted
in class, we didn’t learn a whole lot. I’ve
learned more here being in your section for
the last month than I did in all of tech school.”
I don’t think they really teach the bones in
tech school. They teach them how to put in a
job order and that’s it. They teach maybe
how to do a minor report in IWIMS. Teach
them some radio discipline and DCC/UCC
stuff but there is so much more that they need
to know and learn. To make them mission
ready when they come in, to be able to go
down range, I don’t think it’s happening. At
least not back a few years ago when I left
[omitted].
Do you have any issues with ACES or
IWIMS themselves?
IWIMS is an old system. It’s tough to
navigate around sometimes. For me I haven’t
used it in two years. I have it loaded to look
at things but don’t have rights to actually go
in and train anyone. ACES I use quite a bit. I
think it’s a pretty good system. It’s web
based so it kind of kicks you out a lot when
you’re working if a lot of people are working
at that time of day. As long as they keep
ACES updated with the info it needs to have,
it’s a super system. I think the upgrades that
are coming to replace IWIMS sounds like it’s
going to be a good system. Then again we
tried that with ACES-OPS and it kind of
floundered, so hopefully they get it right this
time. But yeah I’ve worked with both
systems, WIMS then IWIMS, for 22 years.
So I guess it works a little bit.
Yeah, well it’s grown and developed over the
years. Now it’s come time to do a windows
based program where it’ll drop down the
different stuff you load into IWIMS. It would
have been nice to have that. Would have been
quicker to help customers. But nowadays
these techie guys can throw in a job order in
30 seconds and move on to the next one.
Do you feel like you’ve been used in your
max capacity? If you had something to
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offer, they’d listen and take you up on it?
Yeah I guess when I was in main base my
first 20 years, I think I was used to the
capacity I was trained. I offered stuff up and
people seemed to be receptive to whatever I
was saying or giving them. I think I was used
based on the training and knowledge I had.
Fortunately, I had bosses that took me in and
trained me, took care of me. That doesn’t
happen a lot anymore. The past four years I
haven’t been used at my capacity because we
don’t do the traditional stuff. We don’t have
the need.
If you could put a number to it, back at
base level, what percentage were you doing
duties you were trained to do as opposed to
extra duties?
When I was younger, probably 90% of the
time. Tech and master, maybe 75%. In
[omitted], I was the real property liaison job,
so I traveled a lot around [omitted].
This is an extra question—whenever you’re
at a location like that and you’re not doing
a typical 3E6 job, do you see that someone
else is though? Contracted, host nation,
anyone keeping up with job order data,
facility maintenance and condition? Is the
job being done? Another group doing your
normal job?
When I was at [omitted], I was part of the
transition team and had to train the civilian
contractors to do our job. In 45 days of
transition, we just monitored the last 15 to see
them do our jobs. It was odd to watch how
they did things differently. When I was in
[omitted], I was a liaison between [omitted].
When there was any construction on the
collocated base, I would go down and
capitalize those in order to get them put on the
real property records. On those little bases,
they didn’t have 3E6s, the Air Force guys just
worked as QAs watching the [omitted],
managing facilities. They did a great job
monitoring those things, but there was nobody
assigned to the bases that really owned the
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process. There weren’t many 3E6s out there
other than on bases.
Ok, so in an ops flight do you think other
members and to go as far as the actual ops
chief, do they understand your roles and
abilities?
I think yes if you have a seasoned ops chief.
A lot of times you get a guy that come from
either readiness or engineering flight. They
don’t really get 3E6s.
What about the other guys in ops flight?
Well the other guys, yeah I think they have a
pretty good knowledge of what we do and
what were there for because a lot of the older
guys have seen us when we used to work in
the shops themselves. We were part of the
shops instead of being in the ops flight office.
We were part of a zone or the HVAC shop.
We weren’t set apart as a group of 3E6s.
I didn’t even realize that is how it was.
Yeah when I came in I was in heavy repair. I
worked with heavy repair chief and the
captain in charge. Sometimes I’d work in
snow removal in the missile field with those
guys, putting their labor in. Then I moved to
zones and maintenance engineering. Since
some of the guys at a base like that, who
started the zone concept back in ‘89, they
stayed in the zone the whole time. They were
a part of the group. All crafts and 3E6s
managing one sector. You also knew your
customers and the buildings.
I’d heard of zones before but didn’t realize
that’s how they worked. So you felt like
part of the team in the ops flight?
Yeah I felt like we were. More so at some
bases than others, just the mentality they had
there before I got there. When I was
managing customer service, I tried to get us
engaged in the unit. I moved guys around to
the shops so they got HVAC calls, plumbing
calls. Then when they came back to customer
service, they asked better questions. They
knew a little more. I moved them around. I
had the ability to do that at [omitted] because
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I had so many 3E6s. They were crowded in
customer service, so I stuck them in shops. I
tell you what, job orders got put in a lot more
clear with concise descriptions. Their
questions to the customer were better. “What
kind of door closure? What type of lock?
How many urinals and which one is running?”
They were asking extra questions and it really
helped the craftsmen. They could look at the
order and be able to understand right where
the problem was, especially if it was an
emergency.
How was your relationship with other
flights in the squadron?
I think we had a pretty good relationship. We
had an asset management flight which was
new to us in [omitted]. I stuck a few 3E6s in
there a while so they could learn it and bring
it back to us. Were they needed? No. Could
they benefit there? Maybe. We’re a pretty
diverse group of individuals.
Overall, your take on this is more
optimistic than I’ve heard previously. It’s
good to see that there are places where
things are working more like they’re
designed.
I know a lot of 3E6s. I get a lot of emails
from those that used to work for me. Some
Silver Flag guys, Ellsworth, Alaska, Hickam,
Fort Meade. They’re all over and they
constantly email me with questions and issues
with customer service. I try to help them as
much as I can based on past experiences.
What I do now in my position, it’s nice that
they keep me updated on what’s going on. At
times there are bases that had four
authorizations that didn’t have any 3E6s. If
you look at the number of people we have in
the career field, we have more authorizations
than airmen to fill them. Something should
change.
Do you feel like your career field is
respected then in the squadron?
When I was in the squadron, yeah, but I think
it was because we earned it. I would put in
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my guys for awards. There were section that
when it came for awards or BTZs, they were
really hesitant to putting anybody in if they
knew my section was in it. For the most part
of my career, the 3E6 section was respected.
As much as you’re painting a better picture
than I’ve seen, you’re making a point that
they’ve made. It seems that a lot of the
success you’ve witnessed is because you’re
a good master sergeant. In a lot of shops
you just don’t have a strong master
sergeant to lead them.
Yeah there’s not. I’m not saying the ones out
there aren’t any good. I’ve had guys that
doubt themselves for making rank and I just
encourage them and put them on the right
path to get rank on their first tries. I just try to
teach them how I was taught so that
ultimately it will make the career field better.
So your happiness in your career field, did
that make an impact on you staying for as
long as you did?
I like interaction with people and all the
airmen and training. Deploying with these
guys, you really get to know them. You meet
a lot of great people. I’ve been fortunate
enough to have great supervisors and leaders
working above me. It just kept pushing me
on. When I’m done, I’ll have 24 years. That
was always my goal.
Do you feel that retention is a problem
though?
Obviously, the Air Force does since they’re
giving the 6% bonus for zone A. I don’t think
there’s a huge retention problem. Not as long
as there’s a bonus. If there wasn’t a bonus,
there may be a lot that cross-train or get out.
The trouble makers that everyone has.
Do deployments have anything to do with
it? What impact has that had?
At one point, well we still get hammered
pretty hard for deployments. I think it’s
because we go so much. As example, I had a
buddy master sergeant. We came in at the
same time. He did 11 years out of the career
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field and came back, was at [omitted] and just
went on terminal leave. He deployed to
Afghanistan at the same time I did. I just got
back in April. He got back and in august they
tried to tag him to go to Afghanistan again.
Really? We have 60 other master sergeants in
the career field and you’re going to tag
someone that got back six months ago? He
was gone for seven, home for six and you’re
going to send him for seven? He dropped his
paperwork. He’s one of the guys that know
the career field, a 555 like me. The Air Force
lost a good one there. Don’t know if they
don’t know how to spread the wealth or just
too lazy to look. It doesn’t make any since to
me. When I retire, they’re going to have to
fill this slot. It was advertised online. It
retired three master sergeants before it got to
me. Three master sergeants were non-voled
here and dropped paperwork. I was looking
to get back to [omitted] since my wife was
here and they couldn’t believe I wanted the
job. I think it goes back to the girl coming
here with no experience. They don’t
scrutinize at all. That’s what I think bothers
people and is the ultimate reason to get out.
I have a few questions about asset
management. In your opinion what do you
know of asset management and how do
3E6s play a role in it?
In [omitted], they just stood up that flight. Is
that what you’re talking about?
Well if that’s what it means to you. From
the officer academic side, it’s huge, so I
want to know what you think or have
heard about it.
When they started that flight, I was getting
ready to PCS. We sent some guys there to
work with them since I didn’t know what it
was. I haven’t had a whole lot of interaction
with asset management. Is housing under
them? Real property?
Yeah both, and environmental.
I worked a little with real property. Making a
flight maybe was good. Is it the best thing, I
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don’t know.
Do you feel that you fit in with it?
Well no, we never really did stuff with
environmental. 3E6s didn’t do stuff with
housing. I guess we coordinated 332s with
environmental.
If you had to make a decision based totally
on the data in IWIMS, how confident
would you be?
I’d probably be 85% confident based on my
experience. It was one of my pet peeves was
that we didn’t procrastinate on updating
IWIMS. We didn’t go half way when we put
a DSW in the system. On 332s, we filled out
every field in IWIMS and ultimately it helps
everybody. We kept it as updated as possible.
If you asked the status and they said it was
awaiting material, and then the shop said they
had already done it, sometimes you see the lag
with shops entering data after the fact. All
around its good data if you have a customer
service department that makes it a priority and
shops too. It’s only as good at the people
using it.
I’ll say it again. You seem more optimistic
outlook but that seems its coming from the
effort you put in it.
Yeah when I’d get to a base, I’d immediately
go into IWIMS and look at a few obscure
places to see if they were keeping stuff
updated. If I went to those places and they
didn’t have data, I knew that we were going to
have a problem. I’d sit them down and say “I
don’t know what you did before hand, but this
is how we’re going to do it now.” They let a
bunch of guys go at 15 years when they
almost did away with the career field. Root
cause of problem is the expertise that left the
Air Force. Second problem is the tech school
and third is people that don’t care enough to
put data in right.
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Appendix D

Question and Response
Subject D
Have you always been a 3E6 and if not, what
were you prior?
Before I was a 3E6 I was a 3D, information
management.
What exactly is that?
I worked for generals and commanders in the
command section, orderly duties. That was my
whole career for 13 years.
How long ago was it that you cross-trained?
I put my package in two years ago and then went to
cross-training school back in June/ July. Graduated
July 20th of last year.
Ok, cross-training school, that’s at Sheppard?
Yes sir.
Is it a different school than the tech school that
people straight from basic go to?
Yes sir.
So it’s an abridged version since they assume
you already know about the military?
Actually we did have, we were mixed in with the
basic trainees. We had priors and non-priors.
As far as your duty history, where else have you
been based and what did you do?
I was stationed at [omitted] up to ‘98. Then I
moved to [omitted]. I worked as an info manager
for the wing commander. Then I moved in ‘06 to
[omitted] and then moved with the wing
commander at the time. Usually when you work
for a commander, if they prefer, they take their
admin troop with them. So they pulled me with
them. I worked as [omitted] A3O and then A3/5
after he retired.
What drove that change to cross-train?
I was on the forced cross-training list.
Hmm it’s funny because when I was at
Barksdale, we pushed a girl out of 3E6. In just a
few years, it swung the other way. So then tech
school was a year ago?
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Yes sir, last July.
What other academic background do you have?
Any other training or degrees?
I graduated with an associate’s in legal assistance, a
bachelor’s degree in organizational management
with a minor in legal and I’m working on my
master’s degree in public health.
Have you done your CCAF?
I have two, one in information management which
is computer background and I’m also about to
graduate with the CCAF for ops management.
Have you gotten any specific 3E6 training since
tech school? Maybe not because it’s only been a
year.
I’m already a 5-level and already finished all tests
for my 7-level, so I’ve completed all my hard core
tasks. I’ve been trained a little more than the other
7-levels here because I had the chance when we
merged into material control, I actually was one of
the first to go over there. For six months I was
trained up on contracting duties and how to do QAE
duties.
You’re talking OJT stuff?
Yes sir.
So far, do you feel that you’ve been adequately
trained for the duties you’re being asked to do?
Yes sir.
Is there anything you wish you had more
training in? Any gaps?
The one I’m kind of missing is because I don’t
understand it, the IWP and also the WRRB and then
also what the planners do. We were pulling guys
from the shop to be planners and that’s one area of
training that I’d like to have since you’re putting
money and costs to the 5 digits. I’d like to touch on
that.
What are your biggest problems day to day?
Your biggest hindrances?
I’m a new supervisor, I’ve never supervised. So
that’s my biggest hurdle right now. I’m supervising
four guys and then there are seven of us and I’m the
NCOIC of the shop. So on top of supervision I’m
also the office manager. That’s the biggest hurdle.
Are you NCOIC of just customer service or
whole ops support element?
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Just ops management career field, a total of seven
of us.
So yall have seven 3E6s there?
Yeah.
Wow that must be nice.
Yeah were all sitting on top of each other, though.
Do you ever send anybody out into the shops?
Not yet. When the new tech sergeant comes in later
this month, once she gets here, once everyone gets
settled in, we’re going to start sending people out to
the shops. We do work hand in hand with the
shops.
Cool I spoke with someone that used his extra
troops in the shops. It really helped them with
better work orders. Anything else?
No sir.
Everything else is fine?? So, does the job you’re
in now, is it what you were told you would do in
tech school?
We do a little but more because of where our office
is. We get tagged for a lot of the stuff that’s our
higher ups kind of need. We end up doing
SharePoint and other fun stuff. They can’t really
get the guys in the shop to do it so they come to us.
We have most of the additional duties.
Would you like to expand? What other duties?
Well one of my troops owns the SharePoint
website. He has to update it when the shops won’t.
We in process all the guys into ACES and out
process them. We’ve taken over some of the labor
and some of the weekly schedule because some of
the guys don’t know how to input in correctly.
So it’s not extra from squadron but guys in
shops not knowing stuff that you now pick up?
Yes sir.
Do you have any specific issues with ACES or
IWIMS?
I don’t like ACES. It decides when it wants to
work and when it doesn’t. It locks up. If you go
into it too quickly and click on something, it just
locks up.
Do you feel there anything you know how do
that you’re not being asked to? Anything your
shop could offer the squadron that you’re not?
One thing when I went to Silver Flag and talked
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with other 3E6s, one thing we’re missing is going
out into the shops and learning. Especially us
females when we come into this career field. Like
who does hot water? I didn’t realize HVAC did
that until I talked to them. Things like that, getting
hands on experience with what they really do.
People at Silver Flag said they had the
opportunity to do that?
Yeah, a lot have.
What’s driving that missed opportunity?
I think it’ll take a little bit before we get the airmen
up to 5-level. Once we get them trained, we’ll
move in that direction.
What percentage do you think you spend doing
your core job as opposed to extra duties?
About 95%.
Is that case with your airmen as well?
No probably more like 75%.
So you have a full shop them. What about
deployments? Have you been deployed as a
3E6?
No sir and that’s one of the drawbacks here. As
soon as I got here, one staff sergeant was deployed
and another about to. When my bucket came
around again, we didn’t get taskings. They went to
the utility shop. He ended up taking a 3E6 job. I’m
just, that’s frustrating because I came in to this
career field and one of the biggest draws was to
deploy and now I’m not getting the opportunity.
Wow this is why I need a wide range of people
because that’s opposite of what I’ve heard.
Yeah I’ve been here a year and three months and no
taskings.
Do you have any senior leaders or guidance in
your career field that you can turn to?
Not really, since I’ve been here, we’ve had three
master sergeants in the ops support superintendent
position so far and they keep changing out. We’ll
see what happens, when the new tech sergeant gets
here, maybe I’ll move into that position.
What AFSCs were they?
A plumber, utilities and electric
Do you feel that the other people in the shops
understand what you do?
They do, they come and ask us and were more than
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willing to help them. Since I’ve been here, all the
shop leads have come over. I think I’ve had a
personal touch with them. They pulled me for
orderly room duties as well. I’m filling that
position as well as supervisor. I think that has
opened the door for the shops. When I first got
here, I don’t think they had that work environment
where they worked with the shops that close. Now
they have that.
Do you think the ops chief knows what you do?
Yes, I think he does.
Does he ask interesting 3E6 questions or do you
just feed him stuff he’s already asking for? If
that makes sense…
I know what you’re asking. Yeah he does. He
comes in here, he’s already asked to change
scheduler meeting slides to get changed. We’re
revamping the facility manager program since our
commander and other squadrons have been asking
about it.
Do you feel like you’re part of the team?
Yes sir.
Between yall and the shops, any “us versus
them” in meetings?
No, like I said, when I first got here and they found
I did orderly room duties, they pulled me for that
job. Ever since then, I think the guys have started
to meet all the guys here and we know all the shops
now since they all come in if not for 3E6 duties,
they come in for orderly room stuff. So we’ve built
a pretty good relationship with them.
What about with the rest of the squadron? Do
the other flights understand what you do?
I don’t think so, not the fire department or EOD.
What about programs?
Yes, we work closely with programs.
And that relationship is good?
Yes sir.
So overall, you feel respected by the rest of the
squadron?
Yes sir.
What about quarterly awards and yearly
awards? Do you have a fair shot?
Yeah we do. One of our staff sergeants actually
made it to the group for quarterly awards. We had
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an airman with a BTZ and were putting in another.
We’ve had an opportunity to compete.
What about promotions being fair?
Not sure yet, I haven’t tested in our career field.
I’m still exempt. I only test PEG this coming year.
Do you feel that there are any retention issues in
your career field now?
Talking to new airmen and even me as a crosstrainee, when the job is advertised as a critical
career field and then we come here and there’s no
deployments, and it’s not how it’s written in the
AFSC guide, it kind of blows you away. My
airmen are already thinking about cross-training.
One’s thinking of OTS. It’s obviously too late for
me to cross-train since I only have a couple more
years before retirement.
When you say they’re not written correctly in
the guide, what do you mean?
The job sounds more like you’re not just sitting
behind a desk. It sounds like you’re a part of the
shops or outside working and really getting
involved. As opposed to sitting behind a computer,
which this job should be listed as an administrative
job. I understand that we hold the shops together
and make sure work gets done. But at the same
time they should probably advertise it a little
different.
So you’re planning on staying in for your full
20?
Yeah hoping to retire as a senior or chief.
And how many years is that?
About five.
Does your current career field have any bearing
on that decision?
No not really. I think this career field might be
good for me as soon as I make master. What might
hurt me is the whole person concept since I don’t
have a deployment. I hope deployments start
picking up for us. I’ve actually put in for a 365.
Have you had anyone in the shop deploy over the
last year?
Just one staff sergeant but he was our last one.
So wrapping up with asset management
questions, what does asset management mean to
you when you hear that term?
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Everything on the base money wise that we might
work on. I also think that goes into resources.
Right now is a bad time for it. To me its money
and materials.
So how do you see 3E6s fitting into that?
I’d say on this base right now, I don’t see it. The
only thing that we may do is how we get into
IWIMS to put in work orders, maybe the Top 20. I
really don’t see us touching more than that.
If you were a decision maker and were looking
at IWIMS data alone, how confident would you
be using that data alone?
I wouldn’t. IWIMS is great on some terms but not
always. Sometimes the data can be wrong if it’s
pulling the rejects or it’s not talking to the history,
just the active and it doesn’t compare. When
you’re pulling data, you have to actually pull the
history.
So it can be done, so the issue is how it’s being
used or the data itself?
If someone else were to walk in and want it all in
one, I’d rather pull it all at once than doing it two
different times. As far as how they use it, they get
numbers and see how the shops are doing.
Lastly, do you see any big problems on the
horizon? Anything for your career field that
might be a problem?
Nope.
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Appendix E

Question and Response

Open Codes

Subject E
Have you always been a 3E6?
Yes sir, since 1991.
Please go through your duty history—
where you’ve been and what jobs you did
while there.
I started off at [omitted] working the service
call desk as an airman basic. While I was
there, we went from doing it in paper and
BEAMS to implementation of the WIMS
system and also the zonal concept initiative.
So I went from service call desk to a zonal
customer service section. Stayed there for
two years, then went to [omitted], where I was
also assigned to a zone for the first year and a
half. After that was moved over to the self
help store. I processed all the work orders
and did some planning and also took care of
replenishing the store shelves while I was
there. Then in 1996, I went to [omitted]. I
was in customer service doing scheduling as
well as answering phones and processing
work orders. Then in 1999, I was picked up
as [omitted]. From there, I went back to
[omitted] on a special duty assignment as the
facility manger for [omitted] and I spent a
year and half doing that job. When I made
master, I was taken above the line and put in
[omitted] on the A7 staff. I did that for five
years and then during my last year, I went
down to [omitted] to help them transition
[omitted]. After that last year, I’m now at
[omitted] working in ops support.
Did you go to tech school?
Yes I did. When I was there, they taught us
how to do everything three ways—on paper,
in BEAMS, and then WIMS.
What other academic background do you
have?
My concentration on my bachelor’s is in
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information systems.
What about your CCAF?
I have three. I have one in military instruction
and also production management.
That production management course, was
it any help?
It’s more just a qualification based on your
training experience.
What other training either inside the Air
Force or not have you got?
I’ve gone through PMP courses, the PMI
course offered, the prep courses for
certification. I’ve also done quite a lot of IT
type classes. I’m also pretty skilled with the
office suite, especially Excel and Access.
I’ve taken a lot of courses on those.
Cool, a lot of people don’t know Access.
They just use Excel.
Yeah you don’t have to tell me that. Yeah it’s
always misused.
Did you feel you were adequately trained in
the jobs you had?
Yeah absolutely. I think growing up coming
in when I did and going to tech school.
Having the chance to work with NCOs of the
‘90s era brought me a long way. They shared
a lot of knowledge with me that you don’t
find published anywhere today.
If you could get any other training, is there
anything you wish you would get trained
in?
At this point in my career I think I’m fully
qualified in my career field. Don’t think
there’s anything else out there for me.
What do you think are the top roadblocks
for 3E6s in general? What hinders day to
day performance?
I think it goes back to ‘93 when they did away
with Air Force regulations and went to AFIs.
A lot of the processes that apply to doing
work in IWIMS, they were outlined in those
publications. Then in the AFIS, they were
just so thin. For reference for future
generations to develop training using AFIs or
if they were trying to pick up extra skills with
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no one to help them it was impossible. Plain
and simple, good old fashion guidance—
standardized guidance.
It’s funny to hear this. The master
sergeants I interview say there’s a
knowledge gap but the younger troops say
they know everything.
Well they do for the generation because there
aren’t really a lot of things they can go out
there and read and know. The master
sergeants are right when they say there’s a
void of knowledge. When they had the early
out, they drew down the career field and a lot
of smart 3E6s got out and the knowledge went
with them. You went through a phase where
you had to cross-train into the 3E6 career field
again. It was ‘95 or ‘96 when they basically
turned off the pipeline for the career field. So
you had to be a prior CE staff sergeant to get
cross-trained into it. So they were bringing in
craftsmen in the lower management levels
with no experience and all the people that
would have been around to teach them were
gone because they had dumped a bunch of the
3E6s back in the civilian world. So you had
this void of knowledge. There are very few
3E6s that came in at the tail end, the early
‘90s and were the people to get exposed to the
people that knew their job really well and had
rock solid guidance.
Anything else? Other challenges?
Yeah, career progression for 3E6s right now.
The way that we have to compete with the
blue collar work force for chief slots. What
you wind up having is very few 3E6 chiefs
who are able to affect the future of career
field and have enough clout to make sure that
things are progressing in the career field,
guidance being published, CFETPs, training
in place. You just don’t have it anymore.
Ever since they moved the promotions to
chief together, you don’t have a lot of 3E6
chiefs out there.
What about deployments? Is that a
problem or not?
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When I went on plenty of JET taskings with
the Army, I didn’t work as a 3E6 downrange.
From what I’ve seen, a lot of tech sergeants
and staff sergeants were deployed to jobs that
anybody could have done. As a result we
were losing a lot of tech sergeants that then
lead to the shortage of master sergeants. You
get used and abused and you end up getting
out. And there’s not a chance in the
promotion pool. That’s why we’re at 60%
right now.
As far as the job you’re in, or last base
level job, do you feel like you were used in
the capacity that you could be used?
Yes, at my last base I was fortunate to work
with a commander and ops chief that were
willing to listen. They understood when it
came to getting info out of the computer,
putting it into a format that meant something
to them, they’d let me do that. They weren’t
just telling me what slides they wanted to see.
They left it up to me to gather info that meant
something. I was allowed to make the
decision to help them make good decision. At
some bases, I’ve seen ops chiefs that tell them
what they want to see without really
understanding what they’re looking at. Like
“let me see the 10 oldest work orders.” It’s
useless information. You need to break it
down by shops, take a look at the entire
backlog, how long it’s been there, how long to
get materials, how long it takes the shops to
get materials on order—you know,
meaningful information, not just scratching
the surface. I’ve also seen bases where
there’s the tendency to misinterpret the data.
For example, I’ve seen bases where they try
to hold the shop accountable for availability
rates—how productive versus not productive.
The problem is it’s a direct measured time—
just time cost accounting. If the availability
time is low, it’s not the shops fault but maybe
leadership’s for not streamlining ancillary
duties and training along with the jobs.
That’s done on a daily basis. In my
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experience, the majority of ops chiefs that
I’ve worked for have been very willing to
listen to the information and willing to allow
us to explain what it means rather than them
drawing conclusions.
As far as extra duties, what percentage of
your time is spent on core duties?
At base level, my last experience I would say
90% of my time. I was in the ops support
super position. With all that was going on
they turned me loose and let me focus on the
ops support side to keep things going through
the transition.
Were other ops managers that were around
you doing ops management jobs?
Yep they were gainfully employed.
As far as deployments…
We were always at 50% manned—three here,
three downrange.
And they weren’t necessarily doing 3E6
jobs?
The ones from my office were, but I meant
mostly the senior NCOs were filling JET
taskings.
Whenever you’re at a place not doing ops
management, did you see that other people
were doing it? Facility maintenance being
tracked and work going into different
facilities being tracked?
Not particularly, when we’re stifled or there’s
no one there, it’s pretty much by the seat of
your pants. It’s really kind of ad hoc and not
done very well. I’ve never seen it run
smoothly at all. Like any business, you have
blue collar employees and white collar.
White collars have done administrative for
years and blue fixing equipment and
managing their schedules. But when they’re
forced into the situations, they don’t like it
and they don’t or understand everything that
needs to be done.
Do you feel like there are ample senior
leaders in your career field to mentor?
No, there’s only 11 seniors.
But even at base levels, are there masters in
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the shops?
Well only 60% will have a master sergeant in
the shop. It’s just going to take a lot of time
to grown master sergeants. You can’t just
cross-train them in. You can’t cross-train
experience. You got to let it grow up.
Do you feel like the other people in the
shops, flight know what you do?
No they don’t. Most of the people you talk to
think all you do is answer the telephone.
That’s your whole job.
What about ops chiefs?
Ops chiefs? I don’t think they get taught
much of anything at the ops chief course. I
saw the curriculum once and it was basically
just talking about base appearance and ride
arounds. Didn’t really talk about day to day
operation, maintenance functions. It’s like the
industrial engineers do a little input.
Yeah, I’m actually going to talk to a few
ops chiefs. Did you feel like you a part of
the team?
Yeah I’ve been lucky every place where I’ve
been I’ve been with good people. And a good
team of people. I was an appreciated part of
the squadron. You’ll see some of the 3E6s
have the wrong approach. Instead of trying to
help the shops, they get focused on pointing
out the problems, finger pointing all the
shops. You just can’t do that. When you
show a problem or issue, you got to present it
not as a shop supervisor issue but as a
problem for the ops flight that needs to be
resolved. You got to say, “Here’s the issue.
You got a backlog. But why do you have a
backlog? Is it because of the time they’re
spending doing honey-do’s this quarter? Is
that why there a backlog?” That’s what you
got to do. You can’t point out that there are
500 job backlogs. You’ve got to find out why
so you can help.
What about the other flights in the
squadron?
No, nope, not even the EAs. I don’t know
what they do every day and I doubt they know
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what I do.
What about programs?
Naa we don’t really work with them.

Doesn’t consider
that they work with
programs

Really? I think that they should be linked
a little more. Are yall competitive for
quarterly awards?
I’d have to say no.
Is it the blue collar/white collar thing
again?
Yep that’s exactly what it is. All the glory is
in the shops. Typically, the 3E6s are hard to
write a package on administrative
accomplishments that can be comparable to
the shops “responded to in flight
emergencies” or “mission critical facility.”
It’s like apples and oranges. There shouldn’t
be, how do you compare those two totally
different functions?
You kind of touched on promotions
earlier…
In a small career field like this, it’s very
difficult to get promoted. It took me seven
years to make staff sergeant. I had a 324. I
got that the last year I didn’t get selected. My
friend in the other shop only had to get a 200
something to get staff. That’s the disparity
we have between small and large career fields
because they work off of percentages. So that
year—this is not a lie—I was the highest
scoring non-selectee in the United States Air
Force that year.
So do you feel that retention is an issue for
you?
I think it is. I think that at the 7-level, techs
and masters it is a problem.
So what do you think is driving that
problem?
Ops tempo, lack of manning. You have a lot
of tech sergeants put in a position where they
know their job, they want to do the right
thing, but because we’re so light in master
sergeants, they want a master sergeant in the
shop. They put an outside craftsman in as
NCOIC. While there may some that can do it,
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a majority of them don’t know what they’re
doing and they butt heads with that tech
sergeant who knows what needs to be done
but can’t do it.
Obviously you’re at 20 or over. Did your
happiness in the career field have anything
to do with that?
With me? I’m a type A sir. I like frustration.
I like a challenge, so that’s not an issue for
me. I don’t want to be bored.
Are there any ideas you could suggest to
relieve some of the tempo problems?
We had some guys that got deployed and did
nothing. Just across the board they need to
get a grasp on what they actually need down
range. The problem is that most positions,
once they’re on the books, they never come
off. Even if the function goes away, the slot
doesn’t get turned off. Well there has been
some progress because a lot of Iraq stuff has
gone and the Air Force has put the brakes on
the stuff going on in Afghanistan. They’re
getting a little more critical with what they
need.
What is asset management to you?
The way I understand it is identifying your
assets, assigning mission critical, then
managing risk. It’s tied into programming,
what level are you going to maintain this?
How long do you want it to last? How much
risk do you accept? Being more effective
with managing your resources.
So how do you feel that 3E6s fit in with
that?
That’s a good question. I was trying to think
what really do we do. I guess for us, I right
now primarily support A4/7A with
information. I’ve seen other people try to
produce products out of IWIMS in order to
develop asset management plans. They’ll do
some analysis and the stuff they’ve been
getting is suspect. So I’m pulling info out and
sharing it. Doing what we do, being data
managers and analysts, being able to pull info
and change the context for what you’re
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presenting to asset management is what our
role is really.
Well that’s a good answer. I think yall are
a critical piece of that that’s getting lost in
that.
Well that’s what I’ve been doing for the two
months here is getting asset management
information.
If you had to make a decision based on
IWIMS data alone, how confident would
you be?
Well if you know what you’re doing and you
know the base. Well first you have to know
the base and how well they’re managing their
info. Then how much do you understand
about IWIMS and how it’s stored and
processed. If you know both of those, then
nine times out of 10, you’ll get good stuff.
Maybe one of the bases not doing it well
could drop to 60%. The base quality goes
back to the lack of standardized guidance on
the procedures on how to directly input the
data. Like how do you account for people
while they’re deployed? It took AFCESA
nearly two years to figure that out. That
answer used to be out there. The thing is you
won’t find the answers written down
anywhere—you just have to know it. I’m not
talking about playbook. I’m talking good old
fashioned instruction manuals.
So last question, do you see any critical
problems coming down the pipeline?
Well with the money the way it is, you’ll have
to look at how to be more efficient. One of
things that I think needs to happen is more
centralization and standardization. For ops
managers, we work in ops support. Well what
is that? Its planning, materials, service
contracts, data analysis. The 3E6s aren’t
being used in all those sections. What makes
sense to me is to take the experience and
knowledge of these functions and centralize
them into one office. If you don’t do that,
move them to one spot, you’ll never build up
an experienced work force than understands
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all these things. All the functions. Not only
that, I always equate it to the merging of the
multi-skilled craftsmen—fuels and utilities or
exterior and interior electrics—you merged
the shops to share knowledge and experience
to do better at both. Right now where at the
same situation where were being asked to do
the material control job as well. A lot of
places they’re just sticking a 3E6 over there in
the material control office for 3-6 months and
then bringing them back. Then you still have
“them versus us” when it’s really just “us.”
You need to merge the administrative pieces
into one office that’s the ops support office
God forbid. If you have one office, it just
makes sense. Good for the career field and
good for the squadron because they’ll realize
more efficiency.
I guess service contracts as well.
Well if you have COCESS, then the 3E6s
would have experience as QAEs of that
contract. You wouldn’t have to take it out of
hide. You could do more than one job.
That’s how the whole Air Force is. We all
wear more than one hat. I see the same need
for the 3E6 career field and material control.
There’s no reason someone can’t answer the
phone and then go back to ordering materials.

169

Appendix F

Question and Response

Open Codes
Traditional roles

Subject F
If you could give a brief duty history as far
as when you came in, started tech school,
bases you’ve been at, deployments, what
you did at each.
Sure. I came in in September of ‘90 and basic
training until November. It was about six
weeks, longer for holidays. My first base was
[omitted] in the service call section. I stayed
there for about three years. Then I went to
[omitted] where I did more customer service
for about two years. While I was there at
[omitted], went to [omitted] for four months.
Then at [omitted], I went to [omitted] for my
second deployment for four months. [omitted]
was going through a closure, so I left early
and went to [omitted], where I worked outside
of career field as a facility manager for
[MAJCOM]. I stayed there for two years then
was assigned to [omitted]. It was a two year
assignment and was mostly customer service
aspect, not getting too much into work orders
or the different aspects of the job. From there,
I went to [omitted] for about four years. After
that, I went back to [omitted] where I worked
in housing as a dorm manager for officers.
After [omitted], I went to [omitted] for two
years. After that, I went back to [omitted] for
almost five years. Now I’m here at [omitted].
So tech school in ‘90? What other
academic education have you had since
then?
Got my CCAF back in 2000-2001. I just
recently finished my bachelor’s in education
and development.
Did you feet the CCAF helped you with 3E6 CCAF helped with
leadership
work?
A little bit in the manner that I had more of a
background and expanse of knowledge to pull
on dealing with other aspects, communicating
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Selective Codes

CCAF useful

requirements, dealing with leadership. As for
dealing with building and production
management, no.
What other training job specific have you
received?
There’s not that many classes out there for the
career field specifically. There are some
popular ones through a consultant Alice
Anderson. She offers classes specific to us.
She does RWP, IWP, report writing and some
others. I attended one or two of those.
In the jobs you’ve been in, did you feel you
were adequately trained?
I do for a majority of the aspects of the job.
The hands on training when I first got there
was very good, a lot of depth back then. As
folks started thinning out thru VSI of the ‘90s,
the people weren’t available and the pool of
knowledge started to shrink in the career field.
As the most part, I’d say yes due to hands on
training. There are still holes out there in my
knowledge.
What other training do you think would be
beneficial? If someone would train you, it
would be a big help?
I think I’ve actually been out of the career
field since I’ve been a master for five years. I
think the younger guys would definitely
benefit from more project management side,
IWP is kind of a lost art, not many people
know how to do it. A piece I seldom do is life
cycle cost analysis piece, kind of a lost art as
well.
Well we’ll get to that later. Back at base
level, what do you think were the top issues
for the career field? What keeps you from
doing your day to day job?
Not for me, but for others in the career field it
is definitely the manning. It seems to be
excruciatingly low here. Leadership still asks
the same things from us in the career field, but
they just don’t have the manning to
accomplish it all. Work orders, area
programs, doing in depth analysis of RWP,
guys are not there to do it. Simple things,
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customer feedback and survey programs, no
time for that either.
What other problems other than manning?
Other big problems?
IWIMS is extremely antiquated. It did what it
was designed to but that’s changed. It’s not
very user friendly.
Any specific problems with ACES or
IWIMS?
If folks knew how to manipulate the data, it
would be a very good tool to use. But because
of the shortage of manning and the loss of
knowledge, we kind of lean on the shops to
input labor and sometimes work order stuff.
We’ve turned it into a junk in junk out
problem. It’s not the most reliable stuff out
there. From a connectivity issue, it’s a pain to
use. From what I saw, it wasn’t user friendly
either. Seemed like there was a steep learning
curve for it.
As far as what you’ve been trained to do,
did you feel like you were being used at
your full capacity, that you were doing
what you had been taught?
Oh, very limited.
How so? What else could you offer?
A lot of times back then it was just customer
service when there was so much about IWP,
Top 10 programs, actually programming a
project. We were looking at data, that life
cycle analysis, trend analysis, looking at data
out there to develop management tools.
As far as extra duties, how much are you
doing core duties?
Now or back in the squadron? Because today
it’s never.
No, I guess back in the squadron.
I guess about 75% of the time with 25% in
additional duties.
Are there other 3E6s in your job right
now?
Well I’m the ops flight super, so we have four
military and two civilian.
All in traditional roles?
Yes they are.
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You touched on deployments earlier. Were
you doing typical 3E6 jobs while deployed?
Yes.
Do you see that your career field has ample
leadership at the top to fight for you and to
mentor you?
Well I guess I am the guy they go to now. As
far as people above me, I don’t even know
who’s left out there.
Well looking the other way where you are
that guy, are there enough of “you” out
there?
Nope , I don’t think they’re distributed around
out there where the young guys can pick those
minds. There’s not actually a master sergeant
slot here. I got here on my wife’s orders.
There was only a tech sergeant slot here.
There weren’t any 3E6s above staff sergeant
here when I came, so there was quite a bit of
knowledge gap to be made up.
Are people coming to you to get that
mentorship? Are previous workers coming
to you with questions?
Definitely. We have two tech sergeants that
are leaving us with just a senior airman and a
one striper, so yeah, they do come up
frequently.
What about other guys in the ops flight?
Do these shops know what you do?
Absolutely not. They think they do. They
know about the piece they see every day,
customer service, taking calls, putting in labor.
Outside of that, their view is pretty limited.
What about the Ops chief?
Yeah I believe so.
Do you feel then that you’re a part of the
team in the ops flight?
Yes, but I don’t know if that applies to the
guys down in the ops section.
Do you notice any problems between
customer service section and the other
shops? Any disagreeing in meetings where
there’s animosity?
Continually yes.
What do you think is driving that? Not
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knowing what they do?
It’s a combination of things. Personality
differences of course. Then the piece of not
being knowledgeable of what we do. There’s
distrust at the perceived lack of training.
Certain sections will question data no matter
what.
What about the other flights in the
squadron? Asset management and
programs? Do they know what you do?
In a limited fashion. A lot of the retired guys
grew up in CE and know what’s going on.
Are those relationships good?
In some case I guess so. There’s still some
juggling between real property and us and
asset management folks.
So then overall, do you feel that you’re
respected in the squadron?
Yeah, I think so.
Do you feel like you’re competitive for
quarterly awards and yearly awards?
The folks in the career field have a hard time
with it because they don’t have the hands on
impact other guys do. They’re the funnel. It’s
harder for them to build up the duty bullets.
They aren’t always as strong like fire or EOD.
Other bullets are on them.
What about promotions? Does your career
field have a fair shot at those?
Yeah, how the system is set up, I don’t think
that’s a problem.
So you’re obviously in over 20 years. Do
you think retention is an issue for you?
I do. In recent years I’ve seen a lot of young
folks that want to get out the door. They’ve
articulated that the skills they’ve learn aren’t
going to be that beneficial in the future and
they’re overall not that interested in the job.
In a lot of cases, these guys came in and didn’t
really get to choose what they wanted. The
Air Force threw them into a slot. The
deployment rate is pretty high for the younger
guys. Yeah, it’s an issue.
Well you’re staying in for 20. How much
did your happiness with the career field
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have to do with that?
It was a portion but it was more establishing a
family and providing for them. I knew I’d
eventually promote out of day to day stuff.
You mentioned deployments having an
impact with younger guys.
Yeah we had one airman here that before she
even went into her duty section, she was
immediately assigned to honor guard. She
stayed there for four months. Immediately
upon return to the squadron, she was tasked to
deploy. That was a huge factor for her
decision to separate. She’s on her way out.
Any of those deployment related issues you
have an answer for?
Not really at my level. Maybe if we did a
better job of managing our people so that we
didn’t throw people into awful situations.
How do you see asset management and how
do 3E6s play into it?
When I think of the term, I think of the new
concept that we’re moving towards. It’s
having a better grasp of knowing what the
infrastructure systems are on base. One way
we fit in is a firm oversight of the RWP
program would be one. A few years ago there
was a call where they asked bases to beef up
their RWP program to what it was back in the
mid ‘90s when we had the huge strength.
That’s a piece of it, to go in and manage that
program, how it should be and identify all the
pieces that play in it. Making sure the data is
accurate so that life cycles could be analyzed.
At one point, they wanted programs to load
everything in ACES that was identified out
there. They wanted that from ops as well. So
getting that in there, identifying options,
providing a picture for them to look at.
So my biggest question is if you had to
make a decision based on IWIMS data
alone, how confident would you be?
No very. Not very. There would be certain
pieces I’d be confident in and others not.
Explain a little about which parts are good
and not.
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I’m relatively confident in the status of the
current RWP program. The labor reporting
has been farmed out to the shops, so I know
there are gigantic holes in that. The manner
we go about doing that isn’t good. There’s
probably better ways to do that.
Manning limits
As kind of an overall opportunity, do you
what shop can
see anything critical on the horizon? Big
offer leadership
issues?
I think it’s the huge knowledge gap where
folks don’t know all the aspects of the job.
Due to all the things we’ve mentioned,
manning is bad. We can’t provide the services
to leadership that I think we should—IWP,
Top 10 programs—so we don’t have knee jerk
reactions to work orders.
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Question and Response
Subject G
Please give me a background on your
career, where you’ve been based, deployed
and what you did at those jobs.
I was stationed at [omitted] at the beginning. I
was a supply troop that eventually crosstrained into 3E6. Then I moved to [omitted]
where I was stationed for four years and
deployed to Afghanistan for six months out of
there. Then I was at [omitted] and deployed
to Kosovo from there. Now I’m here at
[omitted] and deployed to Oman and getting
ready to deploy again to Kuwait. During my
time at [omitted], I did labor, RWP, work
orders. At [omitted], I did the same things. In
Afghanistan, I actually was not able to do ops
management. I just ran the CQ there. In
[omitted], I was able to do resources. I did
everything for the ops flight. It was a small
GSU with only nine military, so I was highly
involved in everything for the entire ops
flight. I even stood in as ops flight chief for a
period of time. I was deployed to Kosovo
where I was a facility manager for all the
dorms, so I didn’t do a lot of the ops
management stuff, just managed all the
maintenance work orders for the dorms. At
[omitted], I’ve been the NCOIC for customer
service doing report analysis, running all the
programs for ops management. I deployed to
Oman where I was able to do the full ops
management job, resource advisor, admin,
UDM, every aspect of our career field. I was
able to do that while deployed to Oman
because of the commander I was with.
Returning from Oman, I’ve been down at the
UDM position for the past year.
How long ago did you go to texh school?
I went in 2002 when I was a senior airman as
a cross-trainee.
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What academic background do you have?
I finished both of my CCAFs, but prior to that,
I graduated high school and joined the
military.
The CCAF in maintenance production?
Yes.
How helpful was that as far as helping with
ops management?
I don’t believe it was helpful at all. We have
to have it but all the stuff I’ve learned about
ops management has been from being thrown
in the fire, figuring it out and asking
questions.
Did you have someone in your shop that
was responsible for that or did you learn it
on your own?
There was a lot of learning on my own at
[omitted]. When I went to [omitted] there was
a few NCOs there. Master sergeant [omitted]
who is now [omitted], he helped a lot. I was
moved to UDM in [omitted]. This is my third
base doing UDM rather than ops management.
Have you had any training since tech
school?
I went three different Alice Anderson classes.
I did report writing, an RWP class and also a
work control class.
And those were good?
They gave you a basis but not an in depth
look. Just “here this is what’s possible and
here’s how you figure the rest out.”
You already spoke to this, but do you feel
you were adequately trained to do the jobs
you were asked to do?
No.
The stuff you’re doing now, how does it
compare to what you thought the career
field would be when you came out of tech
school?
I don’t think tech school prepares people for
what you will be doing. Tech school teaches
you a lot of labor and gives you a background.
Doesn’t give you any IWIMS experience
because it is usually down. Everything you’re
going to learn is going to be on the job. They
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say, “this is stuff you could be doing. Go to
your base and figure it out.” That’s how I felt
when I graduated.
What other areas do you wish you had
more training in?
Most of the items that we deal with are in
IWIMS and work orders. They don’t touch on
work orders because most won’t deal with
them until the NCO level. But since we don’t
have that many NCOs, many airmen are
dealing with them as soon as they get to a
base. There was no training whatsoever on
work orders.
Anything else?
Well the career field as a whole. When I went
to tech school, I didn’t learn anything actually.
There was a lot of background but since I had
already been a part of CE, I knew how they
ran already. I didn’t learn anything. So I
know what I should have learned since I’d
been in a squadron for three years.
So you were an LRS troop assigned to CE?
Correct.
What do you think are the top issues that
hinder your day to day performance?
I think it’s a lot of the mind frame of civil
engineers. I don’t think that most understand
what we have the capability to do and what
we could do for them. That and the training
aspect of it. A lot of things are being thrown
our way with no training. Supply came into
the career field recently. I’m lucky because I
was a former supply troop, so I had the back
ground. Unfortunately, most of the troops
will just learn on their own by sending them
down there to figure it out on their own. I
think the leadership of the whole engineering
world in the Air Force doesn’t really utilize us
the way they could. When I was in [omitted],
they utilized me because I was the only one
there. We had a craftsman master sergeant
that had never dealt with the management
portion of it. He had just run heavy
equipment his whole career. He was like, “I
don’t know what to do. Tell me what needs to
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be done.” I was able to do a lot of stuff, but
that’s not because he knew what I could do for
him but because we were both helping each
other out, if that makes sense.
Do you want to expand on any of the stuff
you think you could do that you’re not
being used to do at full capacity?
I think we could do more management portion
of it. Right now, they just come to us and ask
for a report and we give them a report. They
ask us for information and we give it to them.
There’s no decision making process on our
end even though we have the ability,
especially at the NCO level. We have the
ability to give them the information, give them
the best guess based on what we see. We’re
never asked those questions. We’re never
given the opportunity to give our input.
We’re just data entry and data collection for
the civil engineers.
Yep, that’s the overwhelming response I’m
getting. As far as extra duties, how much
time do you spend that is not ops
management?
Throughout my career, most of the time. Like
I said, it’s my third out of fourth assignment
that I’ve been the UDM. I’ve been on three
deployments and only one of them I have
actually been able to do my job. Therefore,
it’s usually a lot of extra stuff. I know my ops
managers here do the commander’s calls.
They set up all the multimedia for the
commander’s calls. We do a lot of slides
shows for the ops chiefs for their meetings and
stuff like that. You have safety. Right now
we have three ops managers at this base not
doing ops management. Myself as UDM,
another NCO down here in the Prime BEEF
section doing logistics, and we have a senior
airman over in EOD doing their logistics.
That’s what’s happening. When I was in
[omitted], I was the UCI monitor, safety NCO,
vehicle NCO, I was everything. When I was
at [omitted], we had three to four of the 23
triple nickels farmed out to extra duties.
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Do you have any issues with ACES or
IWIMS?
Both actually. IWIMS, if you know how to
use it, you have the experience in it, it’s a
good system because it will give you the data
that you need. Running those reports—if you
know how to run those reports you can do
miracles just about. Unfortunately, it’s an
archaic system form the ‘80s. It doesn’t allow
us a lot of things we could do. It doesn’t
allow us to put in more information so that we
can pull the data better. Does that make
sense?
Yeah.
The only time I’ve dealt with ACES is down
here in Prime BEEF with personnel and
readiness. It’s great if it works.
Yeah that’s been my experience with it as
well.
IWIMS isn’t a horrible system. You could
still do your stuff. Unfortunately 90% of civil
engineers don’t understand IWIMS therefore
they don’t use it. The data being input, there’s
not a lot being input because they don’t like
using it. They want to use emails and Excel.
Word documents instead of using the system
for what it’s for.
That’s a good point. I haven’t quite
thought of it that way.
Yeah down range we use Excel sheets and I
love it. I have everything on one document
that I know I can always pull it up on my
desktop or a disc and can filter it. I love
Excel. When I go down range, I look forward
to using the Excel spreadsheet so I can get my
info right then and there.
You said you weren’t necessarily doing ops
management stuff at deployments. The
times you weren’t, did you see another
group doing that work? Was anyone doing
it?
Well I’ve never actually tracked labor while
deployed. Never seen that myself. They
don’t see how many hours are spent on a
building. They pretty much just track whether
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work orders are open or closed. When I was
in Afghanistan, the senior NCOs took control
of all that and I spent six months watching
Oprah. In Kosovo, we didn’t do any of that
because a contractor kept track of the work
orders. When the contractors called us, we
did our part but that was the only time. In
Oman, I was able to track work orders but not
labor. They don’t track labor in the AOR from
what I’ve seen.
Do you feel like you’ve had senior mentors
in your career field to mentor you?
One in the past 15 years. When I was at
[omitted], I had a supervisor retired on active
duty. He was a good guy but he was on his
way out. I had a two in [omitted]. In
[omitted], I was the only one and here I’m the
senior 3E6, so I too reach out and get answers
on the COP. It’s mostly just sink or swim.
Do you feel like other people in ops flight
know what you do?
No, not at all.
What about the ops chief?
It depends on which one you get. That sounds
bad but some of them use us fully. Before I
deployed, I was only here four months. Ours
was fully engaged in the ops management, she
used us fully, asked us for information,
allowed us to give our input on how to build
the work order priority program. That was
great. Other bases, they didn’t deal with us at
all. Other than telling us, “run this report, run
that report.” That’s all we were utilized for.
Do you feel like you’re a part of the team in
the ops flight?
Not so much. Like I said, people look at us
like we’re their admin troops. I had a master
sergeant say, “here’s a deployment for admin.
Would you like to go?” I said, “I’m not
admin.” He said, “then what are you?” I said,
“I’m a 3E6 in the CE career field.” That
pretty much spoke to my whole career. We’re
more or less treated as admin troops than
actual civil engineers like structures, utilities,
those guys.
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Do you feel that there’s any friction
between your shop and the other shops?
I don’t believe its animosity because most of
them just do what they have to do. They give
us their labor and such. I don’t think its
animosity. I know the 3E6s hate that other
guys are getting the glory while we do all the
paperwork for them to let them do their jobs,
but I don’t think its animosity.
What about other flights in the squadron
like asset management or programs?
Mostly what they feel is that we’re just
keeping track of work orders. That’s the
extent of what they believe that we do.
Do you feel that you’re respected in the
squadron?
I don’t feel the career field is respected in the
squadron. I don’t think that it is respected Air
Force wide.
What about awards? Do you feel that
you’re competitive?
I believe we are. Unfortunately, when you’re
building a million dollar building rather than
doing the parts that go into it, you don’t get as
much credit as the craftsmen with the action.
Therefore, when they sit on the boards, it
looks like the guys are doing more of the
work. That’s why I try to sit on boards so I
can make them understand. So I don’t feel
that we are competitive. We have to fight a
lot harder than the craftsmen do.
What about promotions? Are they fair?
I feel like there are more opportunity for
promotions in other CE career fields than us
because they are larger. They have more
positions. We don’t have many leadership
positions to go in to. The only way to go
further in your career is to do a headquarters
job, go be an instructor. But sitting at base
level doing customer service, you’re not going
to go that far.
What about retention? Is that an issue?
Absolutely. I even thought of changing
myself. I love my career field, but as I said
earlier, there’s no room from growth. I know
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a lot of things I can’t do, I’m not being
utilized and I wanted to get out. But I can’t do
anything. I can’t even apply for a special
duty. But I’m not even doing my job.
How long do you have until 20?
I have five years and three months left.
How much is your satisfaction with your
career field play into that decision?
It didn’t play into it at all. I’m finishing my
five years because I love wearing my uniform.
But if it was based totally on my career field, I
wouldn’t have stayed in.
Do you think deployments have a direct on
retention?
The deployments are extremely aggravating.
It’s a tossup of whether you’re going to do
your job or be bored for six months. That and
a lot of the deployments are looking for E6
minimums. I’m the only one here, so I know
I’m going to go every single time. I’m not
sure about other bases, but I see a lot of under
utilization in the AOR for the 3E6s. They ask,
“why I am here?” We’re sitting over in the
AOR being looked at like “why are you even
here? Someone else is doing your job.” But I
still have to be away from my family. So I
feel like they’re deploying a lot of us. They
have two or three of us at one location when
there’s only enough work for one.
What do you think could help some of that
stress?
They need to really pay attention to the
manning over there, what’s actually needed
versus what they’d like to have to do all their
admin and extra duties.
So what’s your definition of asset
management?
I don’t have a lot of understanding of asset
management. It’s more managing all the
assets on the base. Whether it is the buildings,
the roads, the grounds, those types of things.
Taking care of making sure that the base is
managed properly and the utilization of the
buildings and stuff.
How do you see that 3E6s fit into that?
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I think that because we deal with the roads,
grounds, buildings, pretty much everything. I
think that we would fit very well into asset
management portion of CE. We could do so
much more than just cutting work orders and
taking service calls.
So if you had to make a decision based
solely on IWIMS data, how confident
would you be?
Not at all because unless you’re a 3E6, you’re
not using IWIMS. The craftsmen don’t use it
because they don’t like it. Therefore the data
is not being input correctly. Sometimes it just
dumps stuff as well. Things I know I put in
that I go and look for later and it’s not there.
Well for the data that does go in, does
anything we’ve talked about affect the
quality of it?
Yeah, like I said, the craftsmen want to do
their job and get on with it. They don’t want
to deal with this archaic system, so they don’t.
Remarks aren’t being put in so there’s a lot of
research. If someone calls me about a work
order, I should be able to look into IWIMS
and find everything I need to know about that
work order but I can’t. I have to research, find
out who was on the job, all the craftsmen, talk
to other people. It takes me what should have
taken five minutes takes me a few hours in a
day to get the proper data for that work order.
Do you see that you’re career field is in
trouble? Anything critical coming over the
horizon?
The new airmen aren’t going to stay in this
career field. They’re going to see it as the
guys in CE that are pretty much the stepchild
of CE. That’s what they’re going to feel like
and they won’t stay in. I’ve had conversations
with a lot of the young airmen. I had a staff
sergeant tell me that one of his airmen said
that a monkey could do our job and that he’s
not staying in. He’s still here. We had a lot of
conversations while deployed to help him see
the bigger picture. But we don’t have
leadership telling us the capabilities that we
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have are important to the squadron therefore
you have this sense of not belonging, not
being understood. What’s the point of staying
if I could make more of a difference
somewhere else? The airmen don’t see the
difference we make in CE.
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Appendix H

Question and Response
Subject H
Could you please give me an idea of your
background? Where were you based and
what did you do in those jobs?
First base was [omitted]. I was there from
2002 to 2006. From there, I PCS’ed to
[omitted] and did the standard one year
remote tour there. I had my follow on to
[omitted]. I was there for the past four years
and I was transferred over here to [omitted]
where I’m currently stationed.
What kind of jobs did you do at those other
places?
I’ve always done 3E6s duties. The only
exception was at [omitted]. I was actually
assigned to [omitted]. I was the UDM there.
I did that for the whole year I was there.
Basically that was my only time out of the
3E6 realm. Just did mobility training and
equipment and then also preparing logistics.
That was the last year [omitted].
What about deployments?
So far I have two deployments. One to
Kuwait back in 2005 to Ali Al Salem air base.
I did 3E6 duties there. My second
deployment was to Kyrgyzstan or the transit
city of Manas. On my second deployment, I
was still in customer service, but I was only
doing QA duties versus actually traditional
duties. Now currently, I’m tasked to deploy
again in March and this time headed to Africa.
I hear it’s up heating up there.
The place I’m going has been there since
2001, so it’s pretty established.
So what year was tech school?
In 2002.
What other academic background do you
have?
Some college, basically three credits shy of
the CCAF for my AFSC.
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How useful have you found that to be for
3E6 duties?
Leadership and management, I thought it was
pretty useful. Without taking those classes,
I’m not sure how effective a leader or mentor
I’d be without those skills.
Have you received any other career specific
training since tech school?
The only training I’ve received was the QA
training I had to knock out before I deployed
to Kyrgyzstan.
Yeah I thought it was odd that QA was in
the job description thought no one knows
much about it.
Well yeah they changed the CFETP but it’s
not actually a core task.
Well that’s tough if they update one
document but not the other. Have you
heard of the Alice Anderson courses?
Looking to go to one of them?
Yeah for sure. I’ve seen some she has
available. We’ve sent a few individuals from
this base to go get whatever she’s offered.
Do you feel that you’ve been adequately
trained for the stuff you’ve been asked to
do?
When I first came in, tech school was
supposed to provide a foundation for our
training. I feel they could have hit on a couple
things a little more effectively.
Like what?
Like how to run certain programs. How RWP
and IWP play into things, how to manage
labor, how to basically command and control
a customer service shop basically.
That leads into my next question. Are
there any areas you wish you had another
course for?
I’d probably say IWP. Some bases I’ve seen
don’t do it, some do it halfway. It’s a good
tool if used to its full potential. Obviously if
people aren’t trained adequately, they’ll cut
corners and just tailor it to accommodate
whatever location they’re working out of.
What would you say are your top problems
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with day to day performance?
I’d probably say being taken away to do
upgrade training. I understand we have to
provide some more training at home station
than what they learn at tech school. Granted, I
realize that every situation is unique. When I
came into here, they didn’t have a trainer slash
certifier. Everyone they had here was a crosstrainee that needed to get upgraded to become
a trainer or certifier. Without a trainer slash
certifier, they’re basically just at a stand still
waiting for someone to come here and sign off
on a task. Once we catch up to that, I don’t
think it’ll be a factor anymore, but that’s what
I’m dealing with now.
Cool, I haven’t quite heard that aspect
before.
Yeah they’re given the military rank, put in
key positions but they’re still learning the job
and what not. It’s hard to learn to train and
understand what to do in that position if you
don’t know what to do in the first place.
Anything else? Big problems?
I’d probably say our training could be better.
I understand that LRS pulled the 2Ss out of
the 3E6 realm, so naturally we had to
incorporate that workload. Our CDCs were
redone, but our TTPs were released
immediately but some were delayed. Without
having those TTPs, that may hinder people
getting upgraded and trained on time
successfully.
Do you have any big issues with ACES or
IWIMS?
ACES intermittingly works when it wants to.
It does what it’s supposed to do.
Do you feel there are things you can
provide that you’re not being used for?
Are you working at full capacity of your
abilities?
No.
What is it that you think you could offer?
Coming from [omitted], I was fairly busy.
There was a joint mission. Being in the
positions I was in, I was the section chief
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more or less. Back here, I’m just a trainer.
My main goal is just to train. I know that’s
where we’re lacking, but still I feel I could be
utilized in other programs our section is
responsible for.
How much time to do spend doing
additional duties?
Probably maybe 2-4 hours.
Cool, so mostly 3E6 duties. Are all the
3E6s there actually in 3E6 jobs?
Yes, the only exception is one position we’re
doing. We call it a floater. They go to the
individual shops and do the controller duties
for that respective shop.
How many do yall have there?
Currently we have 10 with one in bound from
tech school. I guess when I first came in there
were too many so they started kicking people
out. A few years went by and then they said,
“wait, there’s not enough.” I think we’re
starting to get fat again.
Do you feel like you have senior leaders to
lean on and mentor you in your career
field?
It’s been hit or miss. I’ve had leadership that
hides behind a computer and don’t do face to
face.
Do you feel like other guys in the ops flight
know what you do?
Yes, yes. And if they don’t I like to make it
known that without ops support you pretty
much won’t have ops.
What about the ops chief?
The ops chief is behind us 100%. If we need
something he’ll give an extra 50%. He’ll give
us what we need because we all play our role
and if we don’t get the proper support we
need, he’s there to back us up. Everywhere
I’ve been has had good ops chiefs.
Is there ever any friction between you and
the other shops?
The only friction we get is in the update
meetings. We run our reports and show the
trend analysis, Top 10. Naturally, whenever a
shop gets called out, they’ll respond, “oh we
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had an issue trying to close it.” No one
identified it to us, so how could we help? We
can’t know what’s wrong if you don’t tell us.
What about the other flights? Programs?
Asset management?
Is hit or miss. There’s a disconnect here.
From what I see, they program something into
ACES. Then when it comes to funding, they
ask for a 322. If they followed the process,
they wouldn’t have to backtrack or jump
through hoops at the end. At other bases, I’ve
seen a fairly good relationship. I’ve tried to
work with asset management so that we can
get good data in. If we don’t, then we can’t
accurately account for the true maintenance
costs for a facility.
Do you feel like you’re competitive for
awards?
Oh yeah. We had a guy get the group. Not
the wing yet, but we keep trying.
What about promotions? Do you have a
fair chance at those?
Yeah definitely. I haven’t had any issues with
that.
So what are your intentions as far as
staying in until 20?
You know, I’m continuing to make a
difference. I’ve been training everyone
beneath me to replace me for whenever I
leave and someday retire. I think I’ll stay in
as long as I can. I don’t have a problem with
taskings or deployments. I think it’s
something we have to do just part of the job.
So your satisfaction with the career field
plays into that?
Yeah I’m happy with what I do. I feel I have
a pretty specific role in the work of the Air
Force. As far as how things get done and
making sure the mission stays good to go.
Being able to keep the planes in the air and
the infrastructure running.
So what’s your definition of asset
management?
Managing all your assets on base whether is
facility or RPIE, making sure you have the
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correct date installed, making sure you have
the appropriate preventative maintenance
program to keep the RPIE meeting or
exceeding the life expectancy, being able to
capture and show all of that to higher
headquarters. That’s my definition of asset
management.
Where’d you learn that?
Just working in IWIMS, different bases, just
seeing the whole big picture.
Well that’s the best answer I’ve got so far.
Yeah if we don’t have the correct customer
account codes or the wrong user for the
facility, it’s a waste of time. If we don’t have
the right data in, then we won’t get the right
data out.
So if you had to decide something based
solely on IWIMS, how confident would you
be?
ID probably be 80% for the fact that there’s a
chance that a lot could be wrong.
Do you think there are any problems
coming?
I’d say the training. With budget cuts coming,
we need to be able to filter some of the
requests.
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